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As modern men, we proudly proclaim that we have been freed from 
the bonds of superstition that have plagued man since antiquity. This 
is a fallacy, however, due to the aesthetic refinement of our worship. 
For just as the ancient Jews, Egyptians, and Romans worshiped idols made 
with human hands, so we worship idols made with human minds. Truly our 
culture prizes above all others before it the freedom from metaphysical 
tutelage; but, sadly, we have not freed ourselves from any forms of 
superstition, but merely have become partakers in them all. We no 
longer have a basis to believe anything, so instead we believe nothing, 
which is simply a backwards way of believing anything, only we don't 
know it. And when a man does not know that he believes something, this 
does not prevent him from doing so, nor allow him to stop doing so. He 
becomes a slave to his nothingness. He becomes a slave to himself. 
Ross Channing Reed 
12 July 1982 
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CHAPTER 1 
ADDICTION: DEFINITIONS AND ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS 
Introduction 
A wise man once told me that I should write about only 
that which has got me by the throat. Without a doubt, the 
phenomenon of addiction and Sartre's notion of love are just 
such topics. So I am writing, so to speak, my way out of a 
stranglehold. Writing under such conditions, you may be sure, 
involves both pain and a sense of exigency, with a searing 
telos of truth. What I write about has been and is a matter 
of existence for me, and it is for this pressing and weighty 
reason that I could do none other than employ phenomenologi-
cal/existential methodology. 
Before giving a general overview of my methodological 
commitments operative within this dissertation, I feel it 
necessary to give a broad overview of what I seek to accom-
plish during the course of this work. In the present chapter, 
my aim is twofold: (1) To introduce the reader to the subject 
matter of the dissertation, and (2) To introduce the reader to 
the methodological underpinnings employed throughout the 
course of the dissertation. In chapter two, I explicate and 
analyze Sartre's philosophy of love. Drawing from the vast 
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gamut of his works, I show that he develops two distinct 
theories of love, and I raise the question concerning the 
compatibility of these two theories. I conclude that, given 
Sartre's ontology, no synthesis of the two is possible. 
Furthermore, I conclude that one of Sartre's theories of love 
is, within his own ontological framework, an unrealizable 
ideal. 
In chapter three, I wish to lay out a comprehensive 
theory of addiction. I shall draw upon numerous phenomenolog-
ical/existential texts to accomplish this aim. Primarily, I 
will utilize the writings of Soren Kierkegaard and Jean-Paul 
Sartre, but I will also employ in a tangential role the 
thoughts of Simone de Beauvoir, Albert Camus, the Marquis de 
Sade, Ortega y Gasset, and Friedrich Nietzsche. None of the 
latter five thinkers are necessary for the coherence and 
legitimation of my theory of addiction, but serve as addition-
al voices of wisdom, hopefully serving to further illuminate 
the recesses of the hidden caverns of a dark problem. The 
voices of de Beauvoir, Camus, Sade, Ortega, and Nietzsche 
shall be contained in the footnotes of the theory of addic-
tion. These voices embody various intra and inter-paradigma-
tical perspectives on the text, and proffer a meta-level of 
discourse. Since none of the seven thinkers represented 
focused on the phenomenon of addiction or offered an analysis 
of the issue, I must develop my own theory, utilizing the 
ontological tools they have provided. I have as of yet not 
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seen any thinker off er a philosophical theory of addiction, 
and it is for this reason as well as those stated in the 
opening paragraph that I have set before myself this task. 
Or, possibly better said, I have attended to the task that has 
been set before me. 
In chapter four, I show that Sartre's remaining 
theory of love, given the phenomenological/existential theory 
of addiction developed in chapter three, is in fact a theory 
of addiction. I wish to do this by way of addressing and 
critiquing Sartre's notions of "conversion," "authenticity," 
and the "phenomenological reduction." In the Sartrean world, 
I demonstrate, all love is but a species of covert addiction. 
The Sartrean cosmos, peopled with naught but bad dreams, is 
found to be a loveless one indeed. 
Part One 
Section A 
A "Subjective" "Definition" of Addiction1 
1The following "subjective" "definition" of addiction is 
written in the first person and therefore may require patience 
and vigilance on the part of the reader. This "definition" is 
necessary to balance the subsequently appearing "objective" 
"definition" of addiction, which may appear as a wholly 
different phenomenon. Nevertheless, so as not to minimize the 
terrible suffering of the addict, the "subjective" "defini-
tion" of addiction must of necessity be contained herein. 
Therefore, I ask of the reader a magnanimous spirit in the 
reading of the text. A "subjective" "definition" of addiction 
is necessary to describe the addict's phenomenological field, 
therefore the essential appearance of this section in the 
text. 
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This slimy feeling is always with me, I can't shake it. 
Like sweating to the bone on a hot day, feeling the salt dry 
on your pasty body, and being unable to take a shower. And 
the feeling never goes away. Except maybe a little, when I'm 
drowned in a sea of unremitting unreality, choking on the 
venom of my own imagination. Oh, believe me, it's lonely in 
here. 
I don't look like a sick man. But that's part of the 
sickness. Tan, toned flesh can disguise countless lethal 
diseases, and one can die from a coronary on the day that he 
feels the best. I'm choking alright, and my spirit is bent. 
I'd cry forever if I ever really felt anything real. So 
falsehood is the order of the day. I even seek to discharge 
my trumped up emotions into obviously false scenarios. So I 
frequent the movies and imbibe almost any form of art whenever 
I can. Sure I'm screwed, but what can you do? Who to blame? 
A cosmic rape scene? Twentieth century Promethianism? 
I shake a lot. But it's mostly inside. Actually, almost 
always, and always inside. But I do make a lot of stupid 
mistakes - you know, where I almost hit pedestrians when I'm 
driving and crap like that. It's the anxiety that does it. 
I just can't lay it down. I hurt people all the time, but I 
never think I really want to. 
Sometimes I like to be really tired, to the bone, because 
then, sometimes, I don't feel the pain. I reflect on the pain 
during these times, so it never really leaves me. It just 
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stands back enough so that I can see it. 
I get this rage inside. Like, when am I going to stop 
getting screwed? It's metaphysical, this rage. I scream at 
the cosmos. I can't really look anybody in the eye. It's· 
just not right to be seen this way. 
I eat standing up a lot. The food kind of sticks in my 
throat. It never tastes good. I tend towards lighter foods. 
Heavier foods make me feel like I'm simply sinking further 
into the abyss. I'm sure that life means something because I 
couldn't feel this bad if it didn't. But the only real belief 
I have is in the pain. The rest is just fancy metaphor, 
skillfully constructed poison. Oh, I know there's a hell. 
I've been living there for years. 
How can one escape from a metaphysical prison? What 
would even constitute escape? Maybe if I went deeper into it 
I wouldn't care enough to feel the pain anymore. But the pain 
doesn't lead to answers, only questions. More and more 
questions. 
the pain. 
And I have no more time for questions. Because of 
It's a son of a bitch dog's world. 
I don't get no kick from anything no more, unless you 
mean kick in the ass. Pleasure for me now is not an illusion; 
it simply is not. Through the valley of the shadow of death 
I walk, but, unfortunately, I do not die. I do not know what 
death is, and I fear that suicide would be insufficient to 
bring it about. I eat cereal with milk, but only a little 
cereal, and only a little milk. Too much existence, too much 
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existence. I long to take up less space. Space itself haunts 
me as the distance between what I am and what I am. But I 
don't feel like anything. I really used to have hopes and 
dreams. Stuff that sounded nice, that had body. Now I 
exemplify the very negation of that disgusting positivity. 
I concoct my own universe, a playground of dissimilitude. 
The bitter draught of reality has already been swallowed; now 
is but the time to minimize its effects. Me and my illusions 
have become inseparable. I can no longer tell them apart, 
thank God! But I know too much to give them up and so be 
tossed upon the rocks of real reflectivity. I hate existence. 
But I am beyond cynicism, so I hate that too. The pain has 
systematically stripped me of my humanity, as a fisherman 
flays a walleyed, cold fish. Reality must be accepted - even 
if it involves for its acceptance a necessary injection of 
illusion. Confusion is my friend, for in it I wallow in the 
slimy pool of inactivity. I feel a kinship with all humankind 
because I know and understand the lowest of their wretched 
deeds. The pain has made brothers of us all. 
Don't question my motives, for motives are a thing that 
only make sense to you. Or, alas, perhaps they no longer make 
sense to you either. 
understanding here. 
motel. 
Fine. Don't expect consistency or 
You' re lucky if you can get a cheap 
Believe me, these addictions no longer make me feel 
guilty. I felt guilty before any of this. It's more like the 
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guilt drives me to it. The crevice in my being - the fault, 
if you will - I didn't bring about. I just noticed it at some 
point and that was it. I don't fault myself - my self faulted 
me. I sleep on a bed of knotty pine. But I haven't got a 
mattress. 
All buildings are too enclosed for me. I just can't seem 
to breathe in them. I never can breathe right. It's this 
tightness in my chest. It never leaves me. I know I'll have 
to crack soon. But I don't see how it can be any worse than 
this. 
I tried counseling. Quite a lot of it. But it all 
skirts the issue. When you' re drowning you don't want to know 
the composition of water. You don't really want to know 
anything. Knowledge itself has become a matter of suspicion 
for me. Knowledge is but a kind of power, and I have no more 
power, so I have ceased to know anything. But I have seen it 
all slip away, so I am privileged to know that I am deprived. 
Counselors all work from a cognitive or affective base 
anyhow, and since I have nothing more to know and nothing more 
to feel, it all passes me by. Besides, how does one accept 
the unacceptable? Believe the unbelievable? Desire what one 
does not desire? 
Love is foreign to me, lost in a Portuguese nun of futile 
passion. One should not call me hopeless. It is descriptive 
enough to say that I have ceased to hope. All my strength 
bleeds from me in a vain attempt to expel existence from me, 
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and love is simply an immersion therein. Besides, why bury 
two heads in a pillow of blood, when you can sweat and stifle 
more silently on your own? Real communication seems to imply 
truth and a modicum of self, and since I am in possession of 
neither I have nothing to say. 
Drugs don't cover the sickness up, be they legal or no. 
Just one more thing to pay for, and one more thing to choke 
on. And believe me, I've paid in more ways than I care to 
remember. Drugs don't cause the problem, and they sure as 
hell don't cure it. At best, they're a grimy mirage in a sea 
of blackness. But who would turn away from a light of 
falsehood, if all around there appeared qnly the dark? Men 
have been known to drink urine from time to time. 
Nothing feels right anymore. There are only degrees of 
less-wrongness. And since nothing feels right, I don't know 
what I want. Or is it that I don't want anything? Or if I 
knew what I wanted, something would feel right? Ambi-valence 
is the pathos-de-jour, the insufferable suffering. I don't 
know what I want. I don't know who I am. All that I know is 
that this isn't me. I'm in the grip of an alien power, the 
life force, if you will, dashing itself upon the rocks of 
Gehenna. 
If I really faced my own pain, I think it would kill me. 
So my life is a carefully constructed series of ruses designed 
to deflect away from myself the pain that I know I have. To 
dam the river of tears . I never cry for anything except 
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myself. Or, better put, the loss of myself. Don't mess with 
me, because I truly have nothing to lose. Even I don't know 
what I might do. Generally, all I ever manage to do is to 
attempt to resist the irresistible - a dismal failure. I end 
up trying to anchor myself in something I can get a hold on -
a little firewater, a dame, speed on the highway. It doesn't 
really matter what it is - it's what it does. Or what I 
pretend it's going to do. But it never does any of this and 
ends up pounding like a flashing neon on the underbelly of a 
wrecked Edsel. I don't have time for your questions; I'm 
bored enough already. Don't get me wrong. I'd love to love 
you. But it's all a joke to me, I can't get into it. 
Detachment is the order of the day, and I observe even the 
spectators. I doubt that it would be beyond me to witness my 
own funeral. Actually, it wasn't. 
If I could actually make a choice, I'd be free. But this 
piss ant twilight dragged down crapper of a life feels no such 
freedom. Choice appears vacuous if there ain't a damn thing 
that looks good. It ain't nothin' free, but a smorgasbord of 
inedible vermin. The griffon vulture or the rock badger? 
I'll have two of each! There's no choice when the voluminous 
spread sports only fare that sickens the palate. Don't talk 
to me about a change of taste. I'd probably have to move to 
a different table. And I'm frail from all these years of 
struggle, and my eyesight is poor. Besides, even the Eskimos 
shiver in winter. 
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I don't feel any gray area here. Either you're screwed 
or you're not. I mean, do you have to wait till it's over to 
know what happened? Amidst the sweat and the stench, do you 
really question if it's a rape? I didn't consent to this, and 
it's nailed me to the tree. Can't you take one look at me and 
know I'm just a pawn? Don't babble to me about love for my 
attacker, acceptance, and the meaningless like. I'm still 
trying to get this bastard off me. Can I help it if I 
bludgeon myself in the process? 
I don't see what I see anymore. That's the point. I 
don't know what I know anymore. That's the point. I don't 
feel what I feel anymore. That's the point. I don't live 
what I live anymore. That's the point. I don't do what I do 
anymore. That's the point. I don't say what I say anymore. 
There is no point. 
I see the clock but I don't feel the time. It's a never 
ending nursery rhyme. Clickety- clack, up and back, there 
ain't no way to get off the track. Though dreams are gone and 
night has come, the train will take another run. Up yours. 
When I get scared I go back to the stake. It rescues me 
from the toss of the flow, and I have nowhere else to go. 
Twixt anxious thought and deep depression, through the stake 
my tensions lessen. Never fear if light is dark, back again 
I know I'll hark. 
The hell with emotions. Lies, damn lies. Positivity? 
Yeah, right. Yank my heart out and eat it for dinner. Throw 
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it up and make stew. Feed me the leftovers. And don't forget 
the croissants. Blow me with a lead pipe. I'd definitely 
rather never feel again than feel this bad. No contest. 
I'm a trinitarian. I believe in pain, death, and the 
stake. You couldn't fit a pipe cleaner through my window of 
opportunity, unless you consider the chance for self-dismem-
berment a gift. My calling is to curdle blood. I do it with 
a pitchfork and a touch of lime. They say the stake's 
delusional, but that's only when it works. The rest of the 
time it's bloodletting as usual. Peace be unto you. And 
also to you. Bastards. How can you have peace if you don't 
even believe in peace? As for me, I believe in the stake. 
Sometimes. When I'm at my best. Or my worst. You tell me. 
Okay, if you swallow paint 
Induce vomiting? Right. Well, 
thinner, what do you do? 
it's the same damn nasty 
business if you've swallowed too much unpalatable reality. 
You need to vomit it up. You need the stake. After expul-
sion, you feel lighter, freer. You think different thoughts, 
feel different feelings. Know the truth. Sing songs. You no 
longer feel like yourself. And it's a good thing too. 
Why do I believe these lies I tell myself? Why, I ask 
you? Because I like them. I like them better than what I 
avoid knowing when I employ them. Not to say they' re 
pleasant. I like them in the same way I like going to the 
dentist. The moron. My teeth'll be fine when the mercury 
finally seeps into my brain and kills me. And to think I paid 
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for this. Yes, I paid for this. 
How the hell can I come to believe the feces I feed 
myself as truth? Well, I had reasons for doing so. How do 
these reasons override what I heretofore believed to be true? 
Simple, really. Before, I believed what seemed to me to be 
true. Now, I've got reasons to believe otherwise, and these 
reasons be they bogus or no always seem somehow to 
override the previous beliefs, you know, the ones that were 
believable simply because they seemed to be true. But now I 
am the king of seeming, and in particular, seeming to be true. 
I mean, who can fight with reasons? I have no problem 
gathering them by the score! How can one's experience hold up 
in the face of reasons perpetuated expressly for its denial? 
Cognition jettisons experience once again. Or should I say, 
the experience of cognition I find more serviceable than flat 
experience itself, that naive stuff predicated on who knows 
what. With the mind I can definitely step back from life. 
Now everything revolves around the metaphysics of the stake. 
Luckily. 
Am I afraid of existence? Damn right, insofar as I ever 
actually experience it. You would be too if your ass got 
roasted on the coals of life day after day after day. The 
hell with it. Give me liberty or give me death? Right. 
Liberty's blown a gasket somewhere along the Jersey turnpike, 
got ramrodded by a couple of semis. Make no mistake, death 
scares the crap out of me too. But it's got that strange 
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allure. I've seen the sun rise and fall on this side, and the 
stars vanish with the moon in the blackness of the night. I 
await another sphere, where, just maybe (who the hell knows?), 
crying would be no more. But don't ask me questions. I don't 
know anything. Here in my world I'm God and the Devil in my 
own heaven and hell (for I have left the earth!) - and only 
the stake exists. And I (blessed be he!) am the author of the 
stake. 
Section B 
An "Objective" "Definition" of Addiction 
Addiction is a pathological (suffering) condition of the 
human being which transpires when the project of the human 
being is nonsynchronous/incompatible with the being of that 
human being. Addiction can be characterized as a form of as 
well as a result of self-betrayal. The addicted self's 
attempt to "fuse" with being is the result of its inability to 
fuse with itself, that is, become itself, process itself, live 
itself. Addiction involves the experience of alienation from 
oneself and the seeming inability to in any way rectify this 
situation. Addiction, then, develops and is anchored in the 
dolorous experience of missing oneself. 
Addiction involves a sacrifice of the real in that the 
addicted "self" seeks to construct for itself an imaginary 
self so as to disguise from itself the ongoing loss of itself. 
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The imaginary self (universal) is chosen in lieu of the real 
self (particular) . Since the self can only become a particu-
lar self - its self - the self is lost in the project to 
become its imaginary self. In this way, the addict achieves 
a respite from self-knowledge. 
Addiction involves freedom's self-entanglement. This 
occurs as a result of the attempt to avoid one's own anxiety, 
a feat accomplished only at the cost of self-avoidance. 
Anxiety is the thread by which, if followed, the self could 
come to constitute itself. Thus the refusal to face one's own 
anxiety casts one in the morass of the addictive process. 
Addiction involves not only the loss of self, but the 
experience of guilt, both of which are experienced as a loss 
of freedom. Freedom negation is the origin of ontological 
guilt. The addict experiences both bondage and culpability, 
the feeling of being shackled to and by oneself. Or, better 
said, by the self that is not. Addiction is a nonreflective 
project in opposition to the "weaker" reflective will, the 
latter being merely a tributary of the former. 
The addicted self seeks to constitute itself through the 
"object" of addiction. Since the self is infinite in nature 
(since freedom is infinite and the self is freedom) , it cannot 
be constituted through that which is finite (the object of 
addiction) . Therefore, addiction is expressed in the 
contradictory effort of a self seeking self- constitution 
through the not-self (object of addiction). The Creator-
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Ground of the self is the only legitimate object of the self's 
infinitude (freedom), because only the Creator-Ground itself 
exhibits the essential infinitude necessary to function as an 
object of the self's infinitude. Even though I am freedom, it 
is possible for me to be less than myself - if I chose to 
attempt to constitute myself through that which is inconunensu-
rate with my being (the finite) . Addiction involves a 
disrelationship in one's inmost being, and this disrelation-
ship expresses a self-relation of despair. A self despairs 
because it lacks necessary, free being as a constitutive 
ground for selfhood. Addiction is expunged from that self 
that dispenses with its own despair as a result of developing 
a relation with its own ground. 
The addict's lebenswelt becomes magical as a result of 
impure reflectivity, 2 which seeks for the self an essence or 
substantial being. Since the self has no essence or substan-
tial being, the deceptive gaze of impure reflection sets the 
self (addict) up for a pathological relation to its environ-
ment. In this warped condition, addiction is seen as a 
function of the essence of the self, rather than a project of 
2
" Pure reflection" , for Sartre, is the result of a 
katharsis consciousness effects on itself, which allows for 
the presence of the reflective consciousness to the conscious-
ness reflected on. "Impure" or "accessory" reflection occurs 
whenever consciousness focuses itself on its own "psychic 
states". Since consciousness is never comprised of a state or 
states, impure reflection always involves some measure of 
self-deception. See Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 
trans. Hazel Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, n.d.), 
633. 
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the self. Addiction is an impotent attempt to circumvent the 
essential nonessence of the self. 
Addiction is an habitual way of being emotional. It is 
the process of "objectifying" one's own affectivity in the 
object of addiction. Consciousness itself is symbolized in 
the object of addiction and its relation to the addict. The 
object of addiction is thus imbued with certain magical powers 
(as a function of impure reflectivity) that are in fact 
nothing other than rejected and split off facets of the 
addict's self. These facets of the self gain a degree of 
mastery and power over the addict they could in no way possess 
if they were acknowledged and psychically reintegrated via 
purifying reflectivity. This the addict seeks to prevent, for 
the self would then be faced with the very absence of itself. 
Addiction is a phenomenon of belief in that the addict 
believes (through the emotional consciousness of impure 
reflectivity) that his or her freedom has in fact been 
circumscribed through its relation to the object of addiction. 
Being-addicted is a species of impure reflection taking itself 
as pure reflection, an error possible only subsequent to the 
addict' s project to-be-addicted, a self-evasive maneuver. The 
addict, then, believes that he or she is engaging in pure 
reflection when in fact he or she is engaging in impure 
reflection. The self becomes handmaiden to its own project 
and, swept up in the current, is finally drowned. The omega 
of consciousness is the project to-be-addicted. 
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Addiction is a function of the imagination through the 
utilization of self-induced hypnagogic imagery. It is an 
intentional (nonthetic, at one with consciousness) project 
contrary to the (thetic, conscious) will. Hynagogic images 
are a way of being conscious, and they involve all the 
modifications of attention heretofore detailed - · impure 
reflectivity, emotional consciousness, and belief. The dream 
of hypnagogic consciousness is created by consciousness 
itself. Consciousness can no longer take a point of view on 
itself - it believes its own dream - and the representation of 
the (addictive) object is conflated with the object itself. 
The addict relates to himself or herself in an imaginary way, 
by way of imaginary constructions. 
Addiction is the attempted suppression of the nausea of 
being through self-derealization, focusing on the imaginary 
(hypnagogic) object which is transcendent but not external to 
consciousness. Why nausea? Because being "appears" meaning-
less, superfluous. Addiction, then, is an attempt to avoid 
the ex;perience of the meaninglessness of existence, or an 
attempt to surmount it by becoming essential being, being with 
an essence, necessary being. 
Addiction is a sedimented and successful pattern of 
flight from freedom. To flee freedom is to flee the self, 
thus addiction involves one in self-derealization, but this 
derealization is a project of the real self (freedom). Thus, 
in the addictive process the self is bent on its own self-
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effacement. 
Addiction, furthermore, is a phenomenon of bad faith 
(mauvaise foi, self-deception). It is an attempt to evade 
one's own being and substitute for that being another being. 
But one can either be addicted or be oneself, since both 
involve the other's negation. Addiction is the project of the 
(self-) extinguishment of one's own freedom (self), and so is 
not compatible with a lucid attempt at self-constitution. 
Since the will (reflectivity) is an epiphenomenon of the 
project (nonreflectivity, that which is at one with conscious-
ness), the addict remains as such unless a reflective 
katharsis reveals to the addict his or her project. But the 
self in bad faith evades such a reflective revelation, since 
untruth about the self (through imaginary consciousness, 
emotional consciousness, and the subsequent faulty belief) is 
a necessary prerequisite for the project to-be-addicted. 
The flight from oneself operative in the addictive 
phenomenon exhibits a basic fear of the human condition. 
Since human life is grounded in freedom (is being-free), the 
freedom negation of addiction is a denial of life and a 
project towards one's own death (global freedom negation). 
Angst (ontological anxiety, dis-ease) propels the addict away 
from him or herself into the addictive object that helps the 
addict prepare for his or her own death (negate his/her self). 
Freedom is the source of value for human being and thus 
must be preserved. In the project of addiction, freedom is 
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engulfed in the goal of self-extinguishment. Therefore, the 
project of addiction is not a valid, free project, since all 
projects are valid only insofar as they are a movement toward 
freedom. Freedom-denying projects must be denied, therefore, 
addiction is seen as an illegitimate and self-destructive 
project of the human being. This is revealed through a 
deconstruction of the epistemology of self-consciousness. 
Section C 
Addiction and Love 
This dissertation seeks to illuminate Sartre's theory of 
love and show that it is actually a theory of addiction, given 
the phenomenological theory of addiction found herein. Since 
this is the case, the dissertation in no way seeks to or 
claims to deal with a theory of love proper, but instead 
restricts itself to the topic of addiction. After delineating 
a theory of addiction, I seek to show that Sartre's theory of 
love is actually a theory of addiction. Therefore, either (A) 
All love is addictive, or (B) Sartre's use of the term "love" 
is unwarranted. 
What I would like to suggest is that there are two 
fundamental approaches or projects to being human: ( 1) A 
movement toward freedom, toward more fully appropriating one's 
freedom, and (2) A movement away from freedom, toward being, 
in which one's freedom is squandered, evaded, and discharged 
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fruitlessly in endeavors that trap one and make one less 
human. Furthermore, I would like to suggest that (1) is being 
in love, for one must be free to love and one must love to be 
free - the relation is reflexive, and mastery of one's being 
and its relation to the world can only come through love and 
in love. Contrariwise, situation (2) is a situation of 
addiction, a living process in which human being seeks to grip 
its own freedom in a self-mutilating attempt to divest itself 
of its own transcendence. 
My final claim is simply that loving and addiction as 
modes of being are mutually exclusive. One cannot be in love 
with oneself, with another, with anything, and at the same 
time seek to sever one's own freedom, for love involves, 
indeed is a projection into freedom. The continuum of love 
and addiction is wholly straight: as one move towards one, one 
moves away from the other. For both are possessions in which 
one's being reaches out to embrace the object of its encapsu-
lation, with either a wave of joy or derision, as the case may 
be. 
It could be that Sartre never meant to confuse love and 
addiction. It could be that he knew that his theory of "love" 
was just another trick of the light, another coy subterfuge, 
another hopeless hoping, another birthday party of one. It is 
my contention that Sartre knew full well the loveless world he 
painted, the dimly lit cavern of existence that he so 
painstakingly and starkly portrayed. What this all amounts to 
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saying is that Sartre knew his use of the term "love" was 
unwarranted, and that, finally, his world was a world without 
love. Who would want to be "in love" in Sartre's world? One 
more searing pain to the psyche, one more potent blow to the 
frame. 
The larger question that yet remains, one that is well 
beyond the scope of this work, is that concerning whether or 
not love exists in any world, or is all "love, " finally, 
nothing more than a covert form of addiction? The answer, it 
seems to me, hinges in the main on the ontological question 
concerning whether we ever really can move toward freedom, 
whether we ever really can dance freely among the beings of 
life. This question, I believe, is not beyond the scope of 
any adequate theory of addiction, but in fact lies within its 
very core. For if we cannot dance, then we cannot love. We 
are the addict, for the addict is the danceless soul. Many 
questions we could raise, but these would serve only to raise 
still more. The question is coming to know oneself. And this 
task cannot be surmounted through the reading or writing of 
any philosophical work. This task, on the contrary, involves 
flight from philosophical obstruction to the close self that 
is often so far, far away. It is here alone that we will find 
the secret key. 
Part Two 
Ontological Underpinnings Operative in the Theory of 
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Addiction 
At the outset, I shall lay bare the major ontological 
underpinnings operative in the theory of addiction. I feel 
somewhat uneasy, I must admit, utilizing the term "assump-
tions, " since all that follows is thought by Sartre or 
Kierkegaard (or both) to be philosophically grounded through 
the employment of existential/phenomenological methodology. 
Certainly, one could debate what constitutes "legitimate" 
philosophical grounding. I am only pointing out the fact that 
these men have in fact done copious amounts of philosophical 
footwork with a view to grounding the following ontological 
claims, footwork far beyond the scope of this present work. 
The reader is encouraged to consult any number of the 
voluminous primary sources which follow in both the footnotes 
and bibliography for an extensive defense of these claims. 
These claims, certainly, can in no way be grounded in "reason" 
alone, for existential/phenomenological methodology employs a 
far wider scope of possible ways of knowing than does 
traditional Cartesian and Post-Cartesian rationalism. With 
these considerations in mind, I proceed to utilize the terms 
"assumption" or "presupposition" with quotation marks. 
The first ontological "presupposition" operative within 
the phenomenological theory of addiction is the notion of a 
"self" - in particular, the notion of a "real self." This 
self is "comprised" of freedom and is infinite in nature, 
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since freedom is infinite (another ontological "presupposi-
tion" to which we shall attend shortly). We see the notion of 
"self" operative throughout the theory because one can choose 
not to be a self, and we see the notion of a "real self" 
operative in the phenomenon of one choosing to be other than 
himself or herself. 
The second ontological "presupposition," one already 
referred to in our mention of the first, is the notion of 
"freedom." The self is said to be free, in fact, the self is 
said to be comprised solely of freedom, as previously 
mentioned. The nature of freedom is such that it can become 
tangled in itself, and, so to speak, abort itself. The nature 
of freedom is such that it can do no other than project itself 
toward some transcendent goal. In fact it is nothing other 
than this projection, even if this project entails the 
attempted suppression of freedom itself. Freedom cannot be 
anything, because it has no essence. This is the same thing 
as saying that it is in constant flux, or that it is always a 
pro-ject. 
The third ontological "presupposition" at work in the 
theory of addiction is the notion of anxiety, coupled with its 
closely related concept, guilt. Anxiety is a function of the 
apprehension or experience of one's own freedom and so can in 
no way be expunged from the self. It is an aspect of the 
"essential nature" of the self. Anxiety speaks to the self 
about its self and so is a meaningful ontological event. 
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The sixth and closely related ontological "presupposi-
tion" is the notion of self-deception (mauvaise foi or bad 
faith in Sartre) . The nature of consciousness is such that it 
can deceive itself about itself and its own relation to what 
it believes to be true. This being the case, consciousness 
has the capacity to partition itself, so to speak, and 
simultaneously believe in two contradictory states of affairs. 
The possibility of self-deception is essential for the 
construction of my theory of addiction. 
The seventh and final ontological "presupposition" 
operative in the theory of addiction is one which piggybacks 
upon many of the preceding presuppositions, and this is the 
dyadic notion of the "will" and the "project." The "will" is 
the reflective discharge of one's freedom, that at which 
consciousness ostensibly aims. The "project," in contradis-
tinction, is "at one" with consciousness and so involves a 
nonreflective discharge of freedom. It is the vector or 
direction in which the self thrusts its being in the world. 
The will is no more than a tributary of the project, since the 
former must always negotiate within the originary thrust of 
the latter. This dyadic scheme, balanced within the notions 
of the nature of freedom, the self, and consciousness, is yet 
another necessary component in the construction of a viable 
existential theory of addiction. 
Concerning questions surrounding the metaphysics of the 
existence and role of a "God" in the theory of addiction, I 
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would like to point out that: (A) A "God-concept" is not 
necessary for the theory of addiction, and (B) A "God- concept" 
is necessary for the theory about the nonaddicted self. Otto 
Rank has stated that "For only by living in close union with 
a god-ideal that has been erected outside of one's own ego is 
3 
one able to live at all." If we define living as a movement 
toward freedom, and the ego as the existential self, then 
Rank's view encapsulates quite well the ontological position 
of a "God-concept" within the present work. 
30tto Rank, Modern Education: A Critique of Its Fundamen-
tal Ideas, trans. Mabel E. Maxon (New York: Agathon Press, 
1968), 142. 
CHAPTER 2 
SARTREAN THEORIES OF LOVE 
Introduction 
In Sartre's autobiography, The Words, (written in 1963), 
he states that "for the last ten years or so I've been a man 
who's been waking up. 111 What can Sartre mean by this? Is it 
to be taken seriously? I think Sartre invests it with very 
specific meaning, and that he was quite serious when he made 
the claim. The whole tenor of the work is quite serious, and 
seems to ref le ct a certain sense of loss and deep sadness 
associated with his pre-waking state. 
1 . Jean-Paul Sartre, The Words, trans. Bernard Frechtman 
(Greenwich, CT: Fawcett, 1964), 158. R. D. Laing picked up on 
this in his 1969 work entitled The Politics of the Family (New 
York: Vintage, 1972) . Laing' s notion of a "transpersonal 
system of collusion" is very certainly influenced by Sartre, 
and exhibits an elucidation of the social dimensions of bad 
faith (mauvaise foi). That is, Laing's transpersonal system 
of collusion is operative in a case where persons in bad faith 
agree in bad faith to a certain interpretation of "reality" 
which is based on self-deception "forgotten" as such. This 
conceptual nomenclature is of import when elucidating both the 
psychological and sociological dimensions of addiction as well 
as love in Sartre. 
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In Sartre's work on ethics, 
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2 Cahiers pour une morale , 
published only after his death in 1983, he made a number of 
comments which bear directly on the question of concrete 
relations with others. Early in that work, he stated that 
Being and Nothingness was an "ontology before conversion. "3 
The vast majority of commentators on Sartre view Being and 
Nothingness as the text in which Sartre treats concrete 
relations with others, including that of love. Does Sartre 
hold a consistent position throughout his works on the 
question of love? Or does he alter his position irremediably 
such that his ontology as presented in Being and Nothingness 
is no longer viable and must somehow be reconstructed? 
Should we accept the ontology posed in Being and Nothingness 
as necessary or as contingent? What is the nature of this so-
called "conversion" that Sartre did no more than hint at in 
his works published during his lifetime? 
In stating that Being and Nothingness is "ontology before 
conversion," is Sartre indicating to us some other, superior 
ontology, or really, is he indicating any alternative ontology 
whatsoever? Certainly to speak about an alternative ontology 
is not necessarily to develop one. Saying that you wish you 
could work out another ontology is just that - a wish, rather 
than a worked out philosophical position. Sartre also tells 
2Jean-Paul Sartre, Cahiers pour une morale (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1983). Hereafter referred to as Cahiers. 
3Cahiers, 13. 
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us in Cahiers that the "pursuit of Being is hell." 4 If this 
pursuit is necessarily connected with the ontology of Being 
and Nothingness, the question then becomes "Can one get out of 
hell?" Put differently: Within a Sartrean perspective, can we 
come up with a different ontology such that persons could 
dispense with the pursuit of Being, or is this pursuit forever 
indelibly impressed upon the being of Sartrean man? 
In a late interview, Sartre states that " .... beginning 
with Saint Genet I changed my position a bit, and now see more 
5 positivity in love." Does this "shift in position" necessi-
tate a change in ontology? If Sartre has merely changed his 
position "a bit," is the "conversion" nevertheless somehow 
necessary? Or is there simply one coherent Sartrean theory of 
love that cuts across ontological distinctions? These 
questions - as well as many others - crowded my mind as I 
sought to carefully distill and delineate a "Sartrean" theory 
of love. I have concluded that there is not one, but two 
distinct Sartrean theories of love. I have also concluded 
that these two theories are mutually exclusive. In chapter 
four the reader will be presented with an exhaustive analysis 
and critique of Sartrean texts in support of this claim. The 
theories in no way intersect, but are necessarily antithetical 
4Cahiers, 42. 
5
"An Interview with Jean-Paul Sartre," found in Jean-Paul 
Sartre : Contemporary Approaches to His Philosophy·, ed. by 
Hugh J. Silverman and Frederick A. Elliston (Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press, 1980), 13. 
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to one another. The pivot between the two is the "radical 
conversion" (or simply "conversion") that Sartre refers to 
sporadically in his works. 
In Being and Nothingness (1943), Sartre writes a haunting 
footnote after detailing the necessary failure of all human 
relationships: "These considerations do not exclude the 
possibility of an ethics of deliverance and salvation. But 
this can be achieved only after a radical conversion which we 
cannot discuss 6 here." Why couldn' t Sartre discuss the 
"radical conversion" here? How have we any way of knowing? 7 
Am I making an illicit linkage between ontology, ethics, and 
concrete human relations - in particular, love? Only if 
Sartre himself makes the connection as illicit. For this 
footnote clearly indicates their necessary interconnection in 
S I • d 8 artre s min . 
Some commentators, for example Thomas Busch, hold that 
Being and Nothingness is a partial ontology, and that Sartre 
6Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans Hazel E. 
Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), 412. 
7The discussion, possibly, would have been out of place 
if Being and Nothingness was deliberately relegated to the 
discussion of accessory rather than pure reflection, the 
former being the level at which, for Sartre, "psychic objects" 
are constituted. See Sartre's The Transcendence of the Ego, 
trans. Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick (New York: 
Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, n.d.), in particular, 64ff. 
8Sartre never supplied the ontological groundwork 
necessary for the possibility of other modes of human self-
consciousness. Therefore, for Sartre, all existing modes 
entail the same aforementioned result: the "failure" of all 
human relationships. 
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"reserves his treatment of authentic human relations for 
9 
separate study." If this is in fact the case, to relegate 
Sartre's theory of love to Being and Nothingness would be -
even in Sartre's mind - to deal with love relations between 
inauthentic human beings. Of course, one possibility is that, 
for Sartre, this is all there are, or can be. But this is 
only one possibility, and I intend to treat it as such. 
Therefore, because of the aforementioned difficulties in 
culling a single theory of love from Sartre's multifarious 
writings, I have decided to break this chapter into three 
separate parts, as follows: (1) The view of love found in 
Being and Nothingness and supporting writings: the generally 
accepted view. (2) Conversion and authenticity: An alternative 
view of love, and (3) The synthesis: Conunonalities between the 
first and second positions. Central to this chapter will be 
the question concerning whether such a fusion is possible, or 
whether, given the conunonalities, we find them too few to 
h h . 10 support a co erent synt esis. 
At the crux of the alternative notion of love in Sartre 
is his notion of "conversion. " What, for Sartre, is the 
conversion? I believe it includes the following: 
9Thomas W. Busch, "Sartre's Use of the Reduction: Being 
and Nothingness Reconsidered, " found in Jean- Paul Sartre: 
Contemporary Approaches to His Philosophy, 26. 
10Again, since I conclude in the 
relation between the two views of 
synthesis, I shall explicate the 
chapter four. 
present chapter that the 
love cannot be one of 
alternate relations in 
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(1) The process by which consciousness moves from the level of 
impure or accessory reflection to the level of pure reflec-
tion. In accessory or impure reflection, consciousness 
attempts to objectify or reify itself so as to be able to 
apprehend itself as some "thing." In this type of reflection, 
consciousness is clouded and misled by its erroneous apprehen-
sion of the "substantive" nature of its self, conflating free 
being (pour-soi) with nonfree being (en-soi). As long as 
consciousness apprehends itself as something other than free 
being, it has still not left the plane of accessory or impure 
reflection and therefore has not experienced the conversion. 
Reflective consciousness, contrariwise, experiences itself as 
11 
a power and not as a substance. 
11s 1 · 1 h artrean onto ogy seems in no way to ru e out t e 
possibility of an "inverse conversion" wherein consciousness 
moves from pure to impure reflection. But Sartre does not 
deal with this possibility as a kind of conversion, but rather 
as a degradation of consciousness that consciousness effects 
on itself [See Jean-Paul Sartre, The Emotions: Outline of a 
Theory, trans. Bernard Frechtman (New York: Philosophical 
Library, 1948), 77-91]. The reason that pure reflective 
consciousness is "better" than impure reflective consciousness 
is that in the move from the latter to the former, psychic 
objects, products of consciousness itself, are expelled from 
consciousness. This process of expulsion allows consciousness 
to more fully realize its being-in- the-world, rather than 
remain mired in a world generated, at least in part, by 
itself. As consciousness becomes purified during conversion, 
it at the same time realizes more fully the extent of its own 
freedom. The question concerning how consciousness moves from 
one "form" to another (pure to impure or vice versa) is a 
difficult one. Sartre maintains only that the movement either 
way must necessarily be a free project of the for-itself. But 
if one remains on the pure/impure reflective planes and one's 
project is at one with consciousness (nonreflective), the 
shift in projects remains inexplicable. 
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(2) The process by which consciousness becomes aware of the 
extent of its own freedom. This comes subsequent to the turn 
to reflective consciousness and is a function of the expulsion 
of psychic objects (constituted through impure or accessory 
reflection, the "substantification" of consciousness) from 
consciousness. 
(3) The process by which consciousness flushes itself of its 
own bad faith. Reflective consciousness is in good faith to 
the extent that it is aware of its own bad faith, but this is 
not synonymous with the expurgation of bad faith from the 
entirety of consciousness, a process realized only in the 
• 12 
conversion. 
(4) The process by which consciousness realizes its own 
ontological reality, viz. that it is the project to be "God" 
(legitimated being, necessary being, the fusion of free and 
essential being) . The question of import at this point 
involves whether this project recognized as such allows the 
for-itself a wider swath of freedom than it had prior to this 
realization of its "essential" nature. This question is of 
concern also for our analysis of Sartre's theory of love as 
well as for a phenomenological theory of addiction. 
Conversion is the ontological process whereby the for-
i tself repudiates its own God-project. That is to say, the 
12Since consciousness in bad faith contains both the truth 
and the lie (thus, bad faith), such consciousness is always 
aware on the reflective and/or nonreflective level(s) of its 
own dissimilitude. 
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converted for-itself no longer pursues being, it no longer 
seeks to necessitate its own existence. Conversion, if it is 
possible in a Sartrean world, involves a shift in conscious-
ness, volition, and praxis for the for-itself. In terms of 
consciousness, a reflective katharsis in which consciousness 
is purged of all self-deceptive residue resultant from impure 
and nonreflective consciousness must occur. The for-itself 
must "know" itself for what it is. In terms of volition, the 
converted for-itself must be willing to cease from engaging 
itself as a project to ground its own being, in whatever form 
this project may take. In terms of praxis, the for-itself, in 
fact, must cease from engaging itself in this same cooptive 
effort to "acquire" being. The converted individual is one 
who can hang in the balance between being and nothingness, one 
who can navigate the narrow strait between seeking an essence 
and negating the freedom that one is. 13 
What is the connection between the notions of conversion 
and love in Sartre? This is a question that must be broached 
as I proceed to explicate and critique Sartre's notions of 
love. If the conversion is a necessary precondition for 
authenticity in Sartre, how, in fact, does one bring about 
this seemingly elusive ontological phenomenon? Authentic 
human being has reflectively faced its freedom, has eradicated 
its own bad faith, and has dispensed with the project to be 
13 Sartre's notion of "conversion" will be addressed at 
greater length in chapter four. 
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God. In a characteristically Sartrean way, that is to say, 
with connections that are far from clear, Sartre seems to link 
his notions of conversion, authenticity, and play. To play 
means to create, to seek freedom rather than being as an end. 
One either seeks freedom or one seeks being. One either plays 
or one does not. The playing for-itself utilizes the freedom 
that it is to be free, rather than seeking to be in any other 
mode. 
Could the conversion involve "play?" What would this 
mean? Even in the pages of Being and Nothingness we find 
Sartre stating that "The first principle of play is man 
14 himself; through it he escapes his natural nature." What 
is this "natural nature" to which Sartre refers? Isn't it the 
case for Sartre that the for-itself has no nature but to be 
free, to be a project, to be a point of view on being, a 
nothingness gliding over the surface of being? What could 
this "escape" entail? I would like to submit that this 
escape, if it is possible, allows for authentic woman to be 
born from the very ashes of her inauthenticity. This authen-
ticity would involve some type of pure reflection rather than 
merely accessory reflection. But this would most likely be 
only the beginning. In explaining this "escape" through play, 
Sartre continues, saying that "This particular type of 
project, which has freedom for its foundation and its goal, 
deserves special study. It is radically different from all 
14 • d h' Being an Not ingness, 581. 
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others in that it aims at a radically different type of 
being. "15 
Don't all Sartrean projects have freedom as their 
foundation? If so, the issue must lie with freedom as the 
goal of the project. The "escape" involves freedom as its 
goal, whereas the "natural nature" somehow does otherwise. 16 
The escape involves play. Sartre makes clear here that this 
radically different type of being - the aim of play - is not 
dealt with in Being and Nothingness. Indeed, play releases 
another kind of human being not found within the pages of 
Being and Nothingness. The most pressing of questions, I 
believe, is whether such a different type of being is actually 
possible in a Sartrean world, 17 in addition to the question 
15 
• d h. 8 Being an Not 1ngness, 5 1. 
16This "otherwise" could be merely the pursuit of being. 
17Why shouldn't just any type of being be possible in a 
Sartrean world, since the self is wholly freedom? If human 
beings have no "essence" other than freedom, isn't it reason-
able to suppose that all conceivable types of being will be 
tried? These are two distinct questions. The for-itself does 
try to become what it cannot become, therefore in at least 
some cases, it projects itself toward what it can conceive but 
not realize. The for-itself cannot become in-itself or in-
itself-for-itself, since the move to the former would involve 
the cessation of selfhood, freedom, and consciousness, and the 
move to the latter, for Sartre, is an unrealizable ideal. 
Why? Because it would entail the process whereby a contingent 
being created its own necessity (a failure in theory and 
fact), and would involve the fusion of two forever distinct 
modes of being (a Sartrean supposition upon which rests his 
"proof" for the nonexistence of a necessary being, i.e. 
"God"). All conceivable modes of being are not possible even 
in a Sartrean world. Ontological parameters invariably 
obtain. 
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concerning whether such a being is theoretically possible18 • 
It is to these questions that we shall eventually turn. At 
present, we shall tackle section one: The view in Being and 
Nothingness and supporting writings: the generally accepted 
view. 
Part One 
Being and Nothingness and Related Writings: 
The Generally Accepted View, or 
Sartrean Love Type One 
The generally accepted view, which is in the main 
predicated on Being and Nothingness, is that Sartre views love 
as a rotten, insipid, necessary failure, the life of which is 
"solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and 19 short" due to its 
"triple destructability. 11 In Sartre's autobiography, he 
18If such a different type of being is not possible in the 
Sartrean world, if human reality is condemned to repeat, 
reflectively or nonreflectively, the quest for the unrealiz-
able goal of being-in-itself, in what sense can it be said 
that the Sartrean human being has no nature, especially given 
the fact that Sartre tell us that the for-itself has no 
essence but to be free? If this revamped being is not 
possible, so much for freedom. The Sartrean self comes 
conceived in its own metaphysical straightjacket, from which 
one can ne'er extract himself. In this case, the death of the 
for-itself is the beginning of freedom. If freedom, that is, 
is to have any beginning at all. To be freed f ram the 
necessity of a specific project is in no way to be freed from 
the necessity of having a project. 
19Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, found in Classics of Western 
Philosophy, ed. by Steven Cahn (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 
1979), 365. I borrowed this phrase from Hobbes because it 
seemed too good to pass up when describing the Sartrean love 
relation. Sartrean love does, in fact, seem to occur in the 
(a) 11 state of nature. 11 
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recounts that while a youth, he "found the human heart insipid 
and hollow, except in books. 1120 This was, of course, by his 
own accounting, before Sartre began to "wake up." In Intima-
gy, one of Sartre's short stories, Lulu exclaims "God how 
1 . ..21 rotten ove is ... Lola, in Sartre's novel The Age of 
Reason, is tormented in her relationship with Boris "simply 
because she loved him. "22 In the same novel, Sartre tells us 
of the love that Mathieu has for Ivich: ... "He realized that 
he loved Ivich, and was not surprised. Love was not something 
to be felt, not a particular emotion, nor yet a particular 
shade of feeling, it was much more like a lowering curse on 
the horizon, a precursor of disaster. 1123 In Sartre's 1951 
play entitled The Devil and the Good Lord, the main character, 
Goetz, says simply, "Good night, we must kill the thing we 
24 love." It seems, on this model, that it would be best to 
greet love with howls of execration. 25 
20 The Words, 35. 
21Jean-Paul Sartre, Intimacy, trans. Lloyd Alexander (New 
York: Berkley, 1962), 9. 
22 • Jean-Paul Sartre, The Age of Reason, trans. Eric Sutton 
(New York: Vintage, 1973), 29. 
23 The Age of Reason, 330. 
24Jean-Paul Sartre, The Devil and the Good Lord and Two 
Other Plays, trans. Kitty Black (New York: Vintage, 1962), 26. 
25 Here I borrow the last five words from Albert Camus' 
The Stranger, trans. Stuart Gilbert (New York: Vintage, 1954), 
154. The stranger welcomed such execration, and viewed love as 
a mythic illusion. The parallels with the Sartrean for-itself 
are only' too striking. 
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Finally, in Kean, another of Sartre's plays, we witness 
another prototype of Sartrean loving. Kean speaks of his love 
for Elena: "I love her and I want to destroy her. That is how 
we actors behave [which is equivalent to every Sartrean for-
itself] . Do you not think I have dreamed of heaping honors on 
the woman I love? But since that is denied me, I accept the 
risk of dishonor for her. If I must destroy myself, and her 
with me, I accept; at least, I shall have marked her for 
1 . f 1126 1 e. Love, in reality, involves the pain and derogation 
f b d . 27 o ran 1ng , although forever unrealized hopes may be 
otherwise. And unrealized hopes are the universal story of 
this version of Sartrean love. 
Why is this the case? To address this question, we shall 
turn to some Sartrean ontology. Sartre tells us in his early 
work, The Transcendence of the Ego, that "consciousness cannot 
conceive of a consciousness other than itself."u This is 
due to the very conditions under which the for-itself comes to 
be, for the first ekstasis of the for-itself involves a 
fissure which is precisely the negation of everything. 29 It 
is nothing except this negation; without this negation it is 
nothing - not even the for-itself. 
26The Devil and the Good Lord and Two Other Plays, 190. 
27An attempt at ontological mutilation or cooptation, 
which, in certain cases, may well amount to the same thing. 
28 The Transcendence of the Ego, 96. 
29Being and Nothingness, 298, 299. 
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Being-for-others, the third ekstasis of the for-itself, 
is a contingent reality and not an ontological structure of 
the for-itself. 30 In Being and Nothingness, Sartre tells us 
that only through my being objectified by the Other can I come 
to be aware of his or her subjectivity. 31 Since this is the 
case, there can be no true intersubjectivity, because one is 
always an object before the Other's subjectivity - or one 
objectifies the Other while becoming a subject for oneself. 
Either way, for Sartre, Mitsein can be only psychological and 




• d h. 282 Being an Not ingness, . 
31 
• d h. 256 Being an Not ingness, . 
32Being and Nothingness, 424. Why doesn't Sartre believe 
in the possibility of intersubjectivity? This is a good 
question, and one with no clear cut answer. Sartre's disal-
lowance of mitsein seems to stem wholly from his ontological 
commitments laid down in Being and Nothingness, namely, that 
I only become aware of the subjectivity of the Other as the 
Other objectifies me. Sartre apparently thinks it makes no 
sense to say that I become aware of the subjectivity of the 
Other when he apprehends me as a subject. Such an experience 
must have been beyond Sartre's phenomenological purview. 
Sartre has already admitted that I can "know" the subjectivity 
of the Other as such, and that I can "know" my own subjectivi-
ty, but I can't know both at the same time. For Sartre, the 
question becomes one of temporality rather than logic - both 
my subjectivity and the subjectivity of the Other are avail-
able to me, but only sequentially. Sartre disallows Mitsein 
based on a kind of ontological/perceptual ruling out, but does 
this ground hold? Isn't it akin to Hume's argument in his The 
Treatise of Human Nature concerning the nature of the self as 
a bundle of sense perceptions? [David Hume, The Treatise of 
Human Nature, ed. T.H. Green and T.H. Grose (London: Longmans, 
Green, and Co., 1886), 533-543)]. Hume could only make this 
claim regarding the "perception" of his own "self," arid was in 
no position to safely and legitimately universalize the claim. 
(continued ... ) 
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The original relation of the for-itself to the Other is 
an "internal negation" - that is to say, originarily, I am 
33 
constituted as not being the Other. The Other, then, is 
defined as the self which is not myself. Negation, then, is 
seen as the "constitutive structure of the being-of-oth-
34 
ers." Because this is the case, the for-itself, as such, 
35 
cannot be known by the Other. That is to say that my 
consciousness, that is, my freedom, can never be experienced 
by the Other; it will always be the Other which is not-me. 
Nevertheless, even though contingently, my being-for-others is 
a structure of my being-for-myself. 36 (Therefore, the 
possibility of shame before oneself) . 
The Other, then, is for Sartre reduced to a "regulative 
concept": "[S]ince a relation between consciousnesses is by 
nature unthinkable, [and] the concept of the Other cannot 
32 ( ... continued) 
Sartre claims that I "know" the subjectivity of the Other only 
when he objectifies me, but how is it that an object knows a 
subject? What sense does it make to say that an "object" 
knows anything? Wouldn't it make more sense to say that only 
a subject can know a subject as such? In terms of epistemolo-
gy, Sartre does seem far too Cartesian here, without suffi-
cient warrant. 
33 . Being and Nothingness~ 232. 
34 . Being and Nothingness, 232. 
3sB . eing and Nothingness, 238. 
36 . Being and Nothingness, 238. 
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• • 1137 h constitute our experience. T e Other appears to me as a 
subject, but only at the expense of my subjectivity for me. 
Because this is the case, there are only two alternatives in 
interpersonal relationships: either I transcend the Other, or 
I allow myself to be transcended by her. In the former case, 
I apprehend myself as subject and the Other as object. In the 
latter case, I am objectified before the presence of a 
subject. Since these are the only possibilities, Sartre 
concludes that all relations between consciousnesses are 
rooted in conflict. 38 
"My original fall is the existence of the Other," says 
Sartre, because it is only in the presence of a subject, a 
freedom, that I can become objectified and experience limits 
on my uni verse 39 (freedom) . When the Other looks at me -
that is, when I apprehend the Other as a subject, I perceive 
myself in a situation in which my transcendence is transcend-
d 40 e . This inherent limitation in the presence of the Other 
is the ground of the conflict noted in all concrete relations. 
Finally, Sartre concludes, concerning my knowledge of my 
37Being and Nothingness, 227.. Granted, the Other as for-
itself in its totality does not and cannot constitute my 
experience, but is a relation between consciousnesses, even 
within a Sartrean paradigm, really "unthinkable?" An unwar-
ranted thesis? How does the latter necessarily follow from 
the former? 
38B ' d h' eing an Not ingness, 429. 
39
cf. Being and Nothingness, 263. 
40B ' d h' eing an Not ingness, 263. 
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being-for-others, that is, how I appear to the consciousness 
of the Other, with the following: "Total opacity, ignorance: 
this is nothing but a description of our being-in-the-midst-
41 
of-the-world-for-Others." When I am perceived by the 
Other, my consciousness of this perception is a "fall, " an 
"alienation," and involves a necessary limitation of my 
42 freedom. 
Confronting the consciousness of the Other gives birth to 
what Sartre calls "the circle. 1143 This circle is comprised 
of the "two primitive attitudes" available when I confront the 
consciousness of the Other, both mentioned previously. Put 
differently, these attitudes entail that I either (A) tran-
scend the Other's transcendence, or (B) incorporate the 
Other's transcendence as transcendence within myself. Since 
these are the only two possibilities, Sartre says that "I am -
at the very root of my being - the project of assimilating 
44 
and making an object of the Other." The circle is forever 
closed. To curtail one approach is necessarily to engage in 
the other. Either/or - but not in the Kierkegaardian sense. 
Since I am either a transcendence-transcending or a transcen-
dence-transcended in relation to the Other, unity with that 
Other is unrealizable in fact and theory, for the fusion of 
41B . eing and Nothingness, 267. 
42B . eing and Nothingness, 275. 
43 . Being and Nothingness, 363. 
44 . Being and Nothingness, 263. 
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transcendences would eradicate the otherness (not-me-ness) of 
45 the Other. Therefore such a fusion is absolutely impossi-
ble. The attempt at such a fusion is precisely the unrealiz-
46 
able ideal of love. I am guilty before the Other, says 
Sartre; my original sin is the fact that I am de trop before 
47 him or her. Such guilt is inexpungable because the circle 
cannot be broken and is the ground for such guilt. I am 
superfluous before the Other, and my freedom constitutes for 
the Other a threat. Thus I am forever guilty, indicted and 
condemned without recourse. 
Why do I seek to assimilate the Other? That is, what is 
the goal of the project? Sartre says that the goal is to take 
the Other's point of view on myself, and thereby make myself 
b 48 _g. Thus all concrete relations with others can be seen as 
variations on the theme of the quest for being. The melody 
may change, the chord progression may be altered with fantas-
tic virtuosity; nevertheless, the ground bass remains forever 
a reverberating quest for being. If I could somehow take the 
Other's point of view on myself, and be, I would be in-itself-
for-itself, freely grounded being, being with an essence, a 
45B ' d h' eing an Not ingness, 365, 366. 
46Being and Nothingness, 366. The impossibility of the 
realization of the ideal of love is a manifestation of the 
impossibility of the unity of the for-itself and the in-
itself. 
47 • d . Being an Nothingness, 410. 
48 • • Being and Nothingness, 365. 
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nature. I would be God (noncontingent). All concrete rela-
tions, for Sartre, are "haunted" by this "absolute being" 
which is [an absent] God. 49 
Since conflict is the basis of being-for-others, both the 
for-itself and the Other (another for-itself) are in constant 
struggle to enslave one another. It is a simultaneous, 
symbiotic attempt on the part of both parties to free them-
selves, while capturing the Other. 50 And since "I am the 
project of h f b . 51 t e recovery o my eing, " the struggle is 
perpetual and perennial, "ceasing" only under a bad faith 
illusion. The unrealizable ideal of love, as noted previous-
ly, is the fusion of freedoms that are the selves of the two 
lovers. But Sartre says that love is a "contradictory effort 
to surmount the factual negation while preserving the internal 
52 
one." That is, I seek ontological union with the Other, 
when such a union would mean precisely my death - since my 
original birth meant my not-being the Other. Underlying love. 
then. would be the project of the death of the self gua self. 
Love, for Sartre, is inherently deceptive because the 
lover necessarily deceives the beloved. This is because the 
beloved perceives the lover as a subject (and not as the 
object he pretended to be) as soon as the lover's love is 
49B . eing and Nothingness, 365. 
50 • Being and Nothingness, 364. 
51 • Being and Nothingness, 364. Underlining mine: 
52 • Being and Nothingness, 376. 
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reciprocated. I recognize the lover as being different than 
he or she appeared to be as soon as I myself love. Thus the 
birth of love is the death (of the very possibility) of love. 
Thus the birth of consciousness is the death of love. Sartre 
says that " • 53 ... to love is to want to be loved. " Yet the 
production of this very love is the demise of the same, for it 
is in the same movement that the beloved becomes the lover 
that he or she subj ectif ies the Other. The lover, every time, 
objectifies herself in the process of subj ectifying the Other. 
This is the movement of love in Sartre. The problem of the 
destruction of love inherent in the roots of love itself is 
53Being and Nothingness, 376. Sartre seems to propose 
this as a kind of partial definition. It seems, at first 
glance, to be a thoroughly passive characterization of love, 
especially for such a philosopher of action as Sartre, until 
one accounts for the praxis involved in the project of 
attempting to lure the Other into the snare of one's own 
"objectivity" that is a necessary aspect of "making" oneself 
be loved. No passivity is evidenced on either the part of the 
lover or the beloved, for each must actively deceive himself 
and the Other in order to produce and perpetuate the precari-
ous illusion that constitutes the Sartrean love relation. 
Sartre never proposes a scenario in which the lover and the 
beloved could/would actively work together to produce a 
relation that might in some sense evade the insecurity and 
weakness of individual contingency. This refers us back to 
Sartre's fundamental arguments against Mitsein. For in the 
Sartrean world, "being-with" is always "merely" psychological 
or illusory. It is never a real ontological phenomenon. 
"Being-against" is the only "real" ontological relation. Why 
couldn't lovers attempt to build a relationship upon the 
psychological experience of Mitsein alone? This they try to 
do, but the metastable project nevertheless disgui-
ses (temporarily) its own underlying ontological unreality and 
impossibility. If consciousness were always reflectively 
aware of its own ontological reality and limits, the project 
of love would become nothing more than anachronous. Full 
lucidity does not enhance but instead diffuses and destroys 
the very basis for the Sisyphean struggle. 
53 
without solution, says Sartre. Sartre claims that I alone 
cannot ever succeed in taking the Other's point of view on 
myself, which is to say that I can never successfully object-
ify myself. If I could, there would be no need to coopt the 
being of the Other for this very purpose. In attempting to 
become an object for myself, I attempt a reflective dissocia-
tion from myself, which is the same as saying that I try to 
take the Other's point of view on myself. Such reflectivity 
comprises for Sartre the "second ekstasis. 1154 Why is such an 
attempt surely to fail? Because, as Sartre says, 11 ••• simply 
because I am my own mediator between Me and Me, all objectivi-
d , I 55 ty 1sappears. ' That is, I cannot dissociate myself from 
myself. The me reflected on is not the same as the me reflect-
ing, nevertheless, the former is what I consider to be 
"myself," as constituted through impure reflection. 
Later, in Sartre's Critique of Dialectical Reason, in 
Book I, Chapter III, Part I ("Scarcity and the Mode of 
Production"), Sartre states that the freedom of the Other is 
an "alien force," "de trop. 11 The goal of such a relation is 
to suppress the freedom of the Other - or, better said, 
control/utilize it for one's own purposes (not necessarily a 
reflective 56 endeavor). This is quite akin to concrete 
~B ' d h' 298 299 eing an Not 1ngness, , . 
55 • d h' Being an Not 1ngness, 274. 
56Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason, trans. 
Alan Sheridan-Smith (London: Verso, 1982), 122-152. Original-
( continued ... ) 
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relations with others as exemplified in Being and Nothingness, 
including the love relation. In the same work, in Book II, 
57 
chapters I and II, Sartre speaks of group dynamics. If we 
consider the dyad to be a group, or even if we consider 
Sartre's comments to have broader extension, this work may 
also show parallels to Sartre's view on love as developed in 
this section of the present work. Sartre says in this portion 
of the Critique that all internal conduct of individuals in 
pledged groups (and possibly, equally true of love relations) 
are powered by terror itself. Is this, possibly, the ground 
of the terrible pursuit of being, that unceasing self-flagel-
lating endeavor that may be here said to be the central and 
primordial bane of humankind? 
For Sartrean love of this type, deception and self-
deception are essential. A number of writers on Sartre have 
pointed this out. I shall mention but a few. Sander Lee, in 
his article entitled "The Failure of Love and Desire in the 
Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre" states that " ... both love and 
sexual desire are doomed to failure because they are, for 
Sartre, analogous to emotional realms necessarily entered in 
'bad faith.' 1158 Here Lee makes a connection between bad 
56 
( ••• continued) 
ly published as Critigue de la raison dialectique (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1960). Hereafter referred to as the Critique. 
57c • • ritique, 345-444. 
58Sander Lee, "The Failure of Love and Desire in the 
Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre," Philosophy Research Archives 
XI ( March 1986): 513. Underlining mine. 
55 
faith and the failure of love. Bad faith (mauvaise foi) has 
been translated by some, among them, Walter Kaufmann, as 
"self-deception," and it is important to highlight the self-
deceptive essence of bad faith.~ Nevertheless, the "faith" 
of bad faith should also be kept securely in mind. Linda 
Bell, in her recent book entitled Sartre's Ethics of Authen-
ticity, maintains that love and desire, for Sartre, are both 
projects in bad faith and remain as such unless a "radical 
conversion" from such bad faith obtains. 60 Iris Murdoch, in 
her work entitled Sartre. Romantic Rationalist, states that 
Sartrean love is "a battle between two hypnotists in a closed 
61 
room." Here, the telically deceptive aspect of love is 
highlighted, that is, deception as a goal. 
Sartre himself also speaks directly to the question of 
deception and self-deception. If love, for Sartre, is 
reducible to the project of making oneself be loved, what does 
this entail? The beloved becomes the lover, says Sartre, when 
the beloved "projects being loved. 1162 What does this mean? 
For one, it means that the beloved experiences the lover as a 
subject, for how is it possible to experience the love of an 
59For Kaufmann' s rendering of mauvaise f oi, see Walter 
Kaufmann, Existentialism From Dostoevsky to Sartre (New York: 
New American, 1975), 299-328. 
60Linda Bell, Sartre's Ethics of Authenticity (Tuscaloosa: 
University of Alabama Press, 1989), 81, 83. 
61Iris Murdoch, Sartre, Romantic Rationalist (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 1953), 65. 
62Being and Nothingness, 374. 
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object? When this occurs, the beloved experiences himself as 
object. I become an object for myself only when I experience 
my being-for-others. My self as being-for-others, as object, 
cannot love because it (I) is (am) a transcendence-transcend-
ed. Thus my "fall" is the existence of the Other, even if 
that Other is the lover, apprehended as such. To project 
being loved, and therefore, for Sartre, to give birth to my 
own love is the same as to announce the death of my own 
subjectivity for myself. Therefore, in becoming the lover 
through experiencing the Other as subject and myself as 
object, I engage in the same deceptive practice as that of the 
Other when he initiated the project of making himself be 
63 loved. At least, this is the way Sartre tells the story in 
Being and Nothingness. Sartre states in Being and Nothing-
ness that love is an "illusion, " a "game of mirrors." To 
awake from this illusion is to apprehend the evanescent nature 
of love as it dissipates before one's reflective gaze. 
Sartre concludes that love is in essence a deception which is 
relativized by others outside the love dyad, and that love 
contains its own internal instability in that either partner 
can "wake up" to the reality of the illusion at any time. 64 
As this is the case, I would ascribe to Sartrean love the 
category of "metastability" - which is precisely Sartre's 
~cf. Being and Nothingness, 376. 
64 • d h' Being an Not 1ngness, 377. 
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description of the ontological structure of bad faith con-
• 65 
sc1ousness. 
Sartre concludes that the project of love is useless 
because one can ultimately never lose himself in his own 
objectivity, or his being-for-others. 66 This is the case 
because if one apprehends oneself in one's objectivity, this 
very apprehension is nothing other than the apprehension 
of (by) a subject, i.e. oneself. Thus the only absolute loss 
of subjectivity would involve the death of the for-itself. 
This could be said to be the implicit ideal of this type of 
Sartrean love. 
In Literature and Existentialism (1947), Sartre writes 
that "To speak is to act; anything which one names is no 
longer quite the same; it has lost its 
• . 67 
innocence." In 
relating this passage to love, I would like to turn it on its 
head: to act is to speak, since for Sartre, the body is 
language. The body that seeks to become a fascinating object 
for the Other so as to freely capture her freedom veils 
65In what sense is the Sartrean type one love relation 
metastable? It is less stable than some modes of being -
which means it is more precarious - because it depends not 
only on deception but self-deception. This is not true of all 
Sartrean relations, at least according to Sartre, and if it is 
true. then all relations are necessarily in bad faith. 
66
cf. Being and Nothingness, 377. A successful attempt 
at one's own "objectification," in this sense, would entail 
the witnessing of the cessation of one's own subjectivity, an 
obvious impossibility. 
67J 1 . d . . l' ean-Pau Sartre, Literature an Existent1a ism, trans. 
Bernard Frechtrnan (Secaucus, NJ: Citadel Press, 1980), 22. 
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unsuccessfully the fact that this project of self-objectifi-
cation is the project of a subject. For Sartre, my original 
upsurge in a world where there are others is my originary loss 
of innocence. 68 Innocence is the ideal of being-in-itself-
for-itself, essential being, yet free being. Innocence is 
unrealizable in such a Sartrean world. As is non-illusive 
love. 
In another passage in Literature and Existentialism, 
Sartre says that "Once you enter the universe of significa-
tions, there is nothing you can do to get out of it. 1169 
This, to me, is reminiscent of the circle in all concrete 
relations with others. We are born in the circle in which 
everything is signification, and we cannot opt out of this 
. 1 70 circ e. We can merely be the project of assimilating or 
transcending the freedom of the Other. Ontologically, we are 
trapped within the universe of significations because we have 
given birth to this universe ourselves, as well as being born 
into it. Indeed, we are this universe of significations. Our 
ontology is a cage, for we are language. Linguistically, we 
68This loss of "innocence" could be the result of the fact 
that deception (the "lie", "sin") entered the world concur-
rently with the Other, as did the realization of one's own 
self-deception (the lie that one has no "outside," that one is 
infinite). More aptly said, when the Other comes to be before 
me, I realize that I am not innocent. This realization then 
allows for the idealization of innocence, as well as a 
possible quest for its recovery. 
69L' d ' ' l' iterature an Ex1stent1a ism, 24. 
70At least, not without conversion. 
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can exist for the Other as a subject or as an object. But 
since, as Sartre says, a look cannot be looked at, we cannot 
1 b . t b. . 71 re ate as a su Ject o a su Ject. Deception is inherent in 
our project to capture the subjectivity of the Other as 
subjectivity, given that this project is the free project of 
a subject attempting to appear as an object. All attempts at 
(self - ) objectification are necessarily deceptive. Love is but 
one variation on these attempts. 
In The Devil and the Good Lord, Goetz becomes the revered 
and loved leader of the people within the "City of the Sun." 
Nevertheless, Goetz expresses his sadness ruefully: "The more 
they love me the more I feel 72 alone." The loneliness 
stemmed from the fact that Goetz elicited the love of his 
constituents through deception, in fact, it appears that he 
could do so in no other way. Of course, this is but one 
character in a Sartre play. Yet he appears as the main 
character, and it appears that Sartre is using him as a foil 
to make a strong philosophical point in a poignant way. In 
the same play the following dialogue takes place: 
Goetz: "Hilda, I need to be put on trial. Every day, 
every hour, I condemn myself, but I can never 
convince myself because I know myself too well 
to trust myself ... I need someone to lend me 
his eyes." 
71See pp. 252-302 of Being and Nothingness for a complete 
characterization of this "look." Intersubjectivity as "myth" 
may seem unsatisfactory, yet this is a basic ontological tenet 
of Being and Nothingness. The question, of course, is whether 
this tenet holds throughout the remainder of Sartre's works. 





d I , 1173 "You on t see me either; you love me. 
Evidenced here again is the concept of love based on illusion, 
lack of knowledge. The lover must necessarily be deceived 
about the nature of her beloved. Only those who don't love us 
have the possibility of knowing us. Therefore, in this 
Sartrean world, to be surrounded by those who love us is to be 
abjectly lonely, known and knowable by no one. For love and 
knowledge of the Other are mutually exclusive, while love and 
deception are forever coupled, the former based upon and 
rooted in the latter. Truth is not only not an ideal of 
Sartrean love, but is quite certainly excluded from such a 
loving world. 
In another of Sartre's plays, The Condemned of Altona 
(1959), Leni proclaims the following: "The right of love? How 
insipid you are! I would give my body and soul to the man I 
loved, but I would lie to him all my life if it were neces-
74 
sary." And this is precisely what she does in her incestu-
ous love relationship with her brother Franz. Indeed, the 
relationship is rooted in falsehood and unreality. It is very 
difficult to ascertain who loves whom in Sartre's fiction, 
because it is always a matter of capturing someone before they 
"wake up" to the reality of the Other. Such Sartrean love 
relationships are, to say the least, precarious, quite 
73The Devi' l and the Good L d d Tw 0th Pl 136 or an o er ays, . 
74 Jean-Paul Sartre, The Condemned of Altona, trans. Sylvia 
and George Leeson (New York: Vintage, 1963), 17, 18. 
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metastable. In a Sartrean love relation, one must subject 
herself to the freedom of the Other, and, for Sartre, this 
seems to be the most harrowing position of all, albeit 
unavoidable. A very stark example of a Sartrean love relation 
is evidenced in the same play at a much later juncture in the 











"Is it still possible to love me?" 
"Unfortunately, yes." 
"I shall never be alone again ... I beg your 
pardon, Johanna; it's a little too soon to 
corrupt the judge whom I have appointed over 
myself." 
"I'm not your judge. One doesn't judge those 
whom one loves." 
"And suppose you stop loving me? Won't that 
be a judgement? The final judgement?" 
"How could I?" 
"BY LEARNING WHO I AM." 
"I already know." 
"Oh, no! Not at all! A day will come just 
like any other day. I shall talk about myself 
and you will listen. Then, SUDDENLY, love 
will be shattered. You will look at me with 
horror, and I shall again become ... a 
crab. 75 
Possibly, Sartre has some type of fascination with 
crustaceans, as evidenced here and even more strikingly in 
Nausea. But this is an aside. Love, again, is seen to be 
excruciatingly fragile because it is based on illusion -
deception and ignorance. In this particular case, Franz was 
a closet Nazi who had previously engaged in the systematic 
torture and extermination of the Jews. In spite of this (or, 
75 Jean-Paul Sartre, The Condemned of Altona, 134, 135. 
Caps mine. 
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maybe, because of it), I believe Sartre wants to universalize 
the scenario and say that Franz's/Johanna's love is no more 
fragile or based on illusion than anyone else's. Such 
fragility goes with the territory. The lover, whether he be 
a torturer or otherwise, is a person who has not faced himself 
fully and reflectively, hence he is engaged in the pursuit of 
being through the conduit of the Other. If he loves in a 
fashion other than that which involves the pursuit of being, 
he is not a Sartrean lover (at least not in the sense of 
Sartrean type one love) . Love of a different stripe is not 
evidenced in this Sartrean world. 76 
As underscored previously, love for Sartre involves the 
"pursuit of being," the attempt to legitimate oneself, ground 
oneself, make oneself necessary, give oneself an essence, 
become God. At the beginning of this chapter, we quoted 
Sartre from Cahiers saying that the "pursuit of being is 
hell." 77 Love as a concrete formulation of this pursuit of 
being would therefore be hell. Love as hell. Hell as the 
perpetual pursuit of the unrealizable ideal. Ideality as 
unreality. In the love relation, we pursue being by trying to 
76This illustration from a dramatic work of Sartre's alone 
is insufficient to warrant a universal claim regarding the 
nature of Sartrean love. Nevertheless, coupled with Sartre's 
philosophical works as well as other dramatic writings, we may 
come to note a conspicuous absence of other forms of love 
relations in the Sartrean world. 
77Cahiers, 42. 
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appropriate the Other as a subject. 78 What we seek to 
capture is the freedom of the Other, or "alienated free-
d 1179 om. But the lover alienates her own freedom in the 
enterprise of becoming an object for the Other. So, the lover 
alienates her own freedom through the attempt to incorporate 
the alienated freedom of the Other. Thus, this self-contra-
dictory attempt is deemed "hell" by Sartre. 
In Sartre's early and extremely interesting work, The 
Psychology of Imagination, he writes the following lines which 
I find applicable for an analysis of love: "Thus we can 
recognize two distinct selves in us: the imaginary self with 
its tendencies and desires and the real self. 1180 If the 
human being is defined as freedom, if the for-itself has no 
essence, what do we mean when we delineate a "real" from an 
"imaginary" self? 
To begin with, if such a distinction is possible, we can 
say that the imaginary self must be the project of the real 
self, but not vice versa. That is, the imaginary self must be 
a free project of the for-itself. This imaginary self, if 
taken to be the self, would be the for-itself in love. The 
illusion of love is the illusion of the imaginary self, which 
78B ' d h' eing an Not ingness, 375. 
79B ' d h' eing an Not ingness, 375. 
80 Jean-Paul Sartre, The Psychology of Imagination, trans. 
anonymous (Secaucus, NJ: Citadel, n.d.), 210. Originally 
published in French as L' lmaginaire: psychologie phenomenolog-
igµe de l'imagination (Paris: Gallimard, 1940). 
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is a project of the real self aimed at ontological alteration. 
The alterity of the imaginary self seeks to realize this 
altered ontological condition. Nevertheless, this imaginary 
self is metastable in that it could always "wake up" (via 
purifying reflection) to the freedom of the real self that has 
projected the imaginary self. Without the imaginary self, 
Sartre's type one conception of love would not be possible 
because the necessary condition of self-deception would not be 
realized by the for-itself. With the notion of the imaginary 
self we can make sense out of the deceptive/self-deceptive 
nature of love in this sense, yet also understand its ongoing 
allure. 
In The Age of Reason, Sartre details Mathieu's love for 
Ivich: "'But I love you, Ivich ... ' He eyed her dubiously, he 
felt his desire revive. That sad and resigned desire was a 
d . f h. 81 esire or not ing." This nothing is the freedom of the 
Other - the unrealizable goal of love. What is "loved" is the 
freedom of the Other qua freedom. What is loved is nothing. 
I desire what I cannot have (and what is in essence nothing) , 
and I "realize" this in the failed enterprise of love. If one 
desires something other than the freedom of the Other, then 
this is not a love relation in the type one sense. The 
nothing of alienated freedom is the goal of love. 
Why does the lover seek to objectify herself in the love 
relation? How does this function in the interest of the 
81The A f 3 3 ge o Reason, 73, 74. Underlining mine. 
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lover? If the lover becomes an object for the beloved, says 
Sartre, the lover becomes "unsurpassable," the lover becomes 
"the whole world" for the beloved. So what? Of what benefit 
is this to the lover? To this, Sartre says that if I become 
an object, I become "the absdlute limit of freedom... the 
82 
absolute source of all values ... the absolute value." This 
means that I function as the ground of being for the Other. 
I, as an object, have an essence from which value can be 
derived. Thus I serve as an irrefutable guide to the Other, 
an oracle, a functional limit to her freedom. I create a 
world for the Other because I am in my very being the parame-
ters of that world. This occurs only as long as I am an 
object, and collapses simultaneous with the collapse of my 
objectness for the Other. 
Therefore, obviously, I as the lover have a vested 
interest in maintaining my objectivity for the Other. This, 
of course, collapses as soon as the beloved projects being 
loved and apprehends me as subject. Thus if I realize my 
goal, i.e. loving the Other, I destroy that very realization 
in the Other's realization of my realization of that goal. If 
one could control the freedom of the Other, one could possibly 
succeed in maintaining for quite a long time this metastable 
illusion. But in any Sartrean world there is certainly one 
thing that no one can do - be she the lover or otherwise, and 
82B ' d h' eing an Not 1ngness, 367, 369. 
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that is control the freedom of the Other. Therefore, love is 
perpetually precarious. 
The lover wants to be perceived by the beloved as an 
"absolute choice," casting a light of "fatalism" upon the 
relationship as it is perceived by the beloved. 83 This is 
84 because, as Sartre says, "the beloved cannot will to love." 
Why is this? Simply because if the beloved wills to love - as 
the lover has already done - the beloved would in this very 
willing seek to make an object of himself for the lover. In 
so doing, the beloved would "wake up" immediately to the 
subjectivity of the Other. And this, above all, the lover 
seeks to prevent. Therefore, the lover seeks to prevent the 
beloved from willfully engaging in the project of loving the 
lover. Thus, for love to be "successful," the beloved cannot 
will to love. The only way the lover can "produce" love in 
the beloved is by "seducing" him, by inducing within his 
phenomenological purview the experience of "fatalism" in 
relation to the lover. Thus the "fatedness" of "falling in 
love" - beyond choice, beyond reason. Love demands "freedom's 
85 
self-enslavement" says Sartre. Only free beings can love, 
but free beings only partially recognized as such. For the 
~cf. Being and Nothingness, 370. 
84 • d h' Being an Not ingness, 371. 
85 • d h' Being an Not ingness, 403. 
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full realization of such beingness would crush forever the 
S6 
endeavor. 
The idea of love as "fatalism" can be seen vividly in 
Mathieu's relationship with Ivich in The Age Of Reason: "He 
smiled and was conscious of a timid but refreshing sense of 
regret, he looked affectionately at that passionate, frail 
body on which his freedom was aground. 'Beloved Ivich, 
87 beloved freedom. '" In this novel, love is most certainly 
evidenced experientially as the loss of freedom, the mooring 
of a ship, the ending of incessant drifting upon the vast 
ocean of freedom, the horrifying clank of the anchor, the 
inability to set sail again. 
This theme of "loss of freedom" is again noted in 
Sartre's Critigue. In Book II, Part II of this work Sartre 
holds that the group, which is the product of men and not a 
given "essence of men," implies a progressive alienation of 
f d . SS ree om to necessity. What does this mean? If the group 
dynamic can be transposed upon the love dyad, we may say that 
as the lover exercises her freedom to seduce the beloved, she 
discovers the necessity of the alienation of her own freedom 
through her objectness in being-for-others. The realization 
of this necessity and its attendant "constriction" of freedom 
s
6The context of these comments must be kept firmly in 
mind. In this section, I am discussing Sartrean type one love 
and no other. 
S7 The Age of Reason, 245. Underlining mine. 
SSC • • k ritigue, Boo II, Part II, 405-444. 
68 
lead to the realization of the failure of the project. Thus 
the attempt at group fusion (love fusion) ferrets out for the 
lover the necessity that is inherent in the project, the 
(self-)alienation of one's freedom even as one seeks the 
(self-)enslavement of the Other's freedom. One must utilize 
one's freedom to realize its limits; one must utilize one's 
freedom to run up against its necessity, beheld in the freedom 
of the Other. Both the group and the love-dyad characterize 
this process. 
The type one love relation, for Sartre, has as its goal 
"salvation." "Salvation," as Sartre utilizes the term, 
comprises the justification of my existence, the founding of 
myself as subject-object, or the creation for me of an 
essence. It entails the infusation of meaning within my 
being: since I am the "whole world" for the beloved, my 
existence is necessary and no longer contingent. The love 
relation, as every other concrete relation with others in 
Sartre, is an exemplification of the attempt to overcome the 
contingency of one's being. To overcome such contingency 
would be to be; to be would be to be necessary. Thus I become 
"saved" through the Other in the love relation. Once again, 
it is important to note that "salvation" (at least telling the 
Sartrean story in the manner in which we have been telling it) 
is an unrealizable ideal of the for-itself. In The Age of 
Reason, Sartre narrates Mathieu's potential salvatiop, to be 
found in the love of Ivich alone: "Fear shook him and he 
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turned towards Ivich. Malicious and aloof as she was, in her 
lay his sole salvation. 118s 
In this Sartrean world, there can be no mutual recogni-
tion of freedoms in the love relation. Therefore, there can 
never be equality between lovers. Inequality in this and all 
other concrete relations with others is necessarily part of 
the ontological framework of the for-itself (at least, before 
conversion) . Any prima facie equality between oneself and the 
Other in the love relation is merely another facet of the 
deception and self-deception inherent in love.so The experi-
ence of equality or intersubjectivity can be only a psycholog-
ical apparition, since it can never correspond to ontological 
1 . Sl rea ity. Concerning the impossibility of ontological 
fusion, Sartre has some things of value in his Critigue. sz 
Sartre speaks in this work of the "double failure" of being-
in-the-group. These two kinds of failure may be described as 
akin to the failure inherent in the two primitive attitudes 
toward the Other as delineated in Being and Nothingness: I 
fail to be able to dissolve the group in myself (or, incorpo-
rate the Other's transcendence, or transcend the Other's 
transcendence) and I fail to be able to be dissolved in the 
group (or, lose myself in my objectivity or my being-for-
asThe Age of Reason, 218. Underlining mine. 
so . d h' Being an Not ingness, 408. 
Sl • d h' Being an Not ingness, 424. 
s2c . . k ritigue, Boo II, Part III, 445-504. 
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others). This double failure, according to Sartre, which 
manifests the contradiction of ontological unity, is the basis 
. 1 . 93 of practica unity. Practical unity is seeming but not 
being, since it is based on praxis and psychological concerns 
alone, masking the hollowness of its diasporatic (fragmented, 
perpetually elsewhere, pursued-pursuing, transcendent) 
ontology. In this same section, Sartre goes on to say that 
the fact of this discrepancy between being and praxis is the 
basis of terror. It is the praxis of a nonexistent totality, 
precisely as the playing at love in this Sartrean world is a 
game of mirrors played by this nonexistent totality. 94 
In the Critigue we also find other concepts and nomencla-
ture readily transferable to the love relation - the "group in 
fusion" is based upon "freedom-terror": the love relationship 
is a project of freedom to overcome the terror of contingency. 
"Allegiance-terror" can be seen as the struggle against 
seriality: the devotion seen in the love relation is the 
struggle against the very superfluity of one's existence 
outside this allegiance-fusion. Within such a "fusion," one 
is "saved" from seriality. In either case, the allegiance-
terror stems from the fact that my being-ness (as necessity) 
93 
cf. R. D. Laing and D. G. Cooper, Reason and Violence (New 
York: Pantheon, 1964), 158. 
Mcf. Reason and Violence, 159. 
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can only be granted (surreptitiously) within the confines of 
h 1 . 95 t e re ation. 
Love, for Sartre, is forever a failure because the 
factual negation cannot be negated while at the same time 
maintaining the two internal negations which comprise the for-
itselfs (sic) in love. For each individual can ek-sist only 
as ontologically isolated, forever. Love, for Sartre, is 
forever a failure because any attempt to relate to the Other 
as object (as the beloved does in the love relation) refers 
one to the subjectivity of the Other, inexorably. For we 
could at any time apprehend the look of the Other, and so 
glimpse his subjectivity. All our relations with others are 
inconsistent because they are partializations of reality. The 
only fully accurate characterization of the Other would be a 
characterization of her as subject and object. This would 
mean, says Sartre, that we would have to experience her 
freedom in two ways: as transcended by mine, and as transcend-
ing mine. Put differently, I would have to experience her as 
a freedom both capturing mine and captured by mine. For 
Sartre, this is impossible. 96 Therefore, I can never really 
know the Other, and I can never experience her as she really 
is. All experience is a partialization, a finite experience 
of the Other's freedom, which is infinite. Any finite 
perspective on the infinite is a partialization, a distortion, 
95See the Critigµe, Book II, Chapters I and II. 
96 • Being and Nothingness, 408. 
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f 1 . f. . 97 a a s1 1cat1on. This is precisely the situation of my 
love relation with the Other. 
To conclude section one, I would like to gloss two 
passages in Sartre's fiction, both taken from The Devil and 
the Good Lord. In this play, Heinrich states simply that "If 
God does not exist, there is no way of escaping men. 98 As 
with most fiction, this can be read in a number of ways. 
Given the Sartrean world portrayed in the preceding pages, I 
would like to offer an interpretation that intersects with our 
discussion of love. God is absolute A. Man is absolute B. 
Since there can be only one absolute, both A and B cannot 
exist. Nevertheless, an absolute must exist or we must create 
one. Otherwise, all being is de trop. Therefore, either A or 
B. 
For Sartre, since A does not exist, B is the absolute. 
Nevertheless, since B is de trop it is not really the 
absolute, but only seeks to be such. It is the-project-to-be-
the-absolute. This is the pursuit of being seen in Sartrean 
love type one. But "man" as such is an abstraction. Only 
individual men and women exist. Therefore, each individual is 
97Here follows an interesting Nietzschean gloss on this 
sentence: "There is only a perspective seeing, only a 
perspective 'knowing'; and the more affects we allow to speak 
about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can use to 
observe one thing, the more complete will our 'concept' of 
this thing, our 'objectivity,' be." Friedrich Nietzsche, On 
The Genealogy of Morals, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: 
Vintage, 1969), 119. 
98The Devil and the Good Lord, 142. 
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a project-to-be-the-absolute. Love, as the project to be the 
absolute, negates God in its very telos. And my love, in 
attempting to become the absolute, negates the very love of 
the Other, since there can be only one absolute and there can 
be no ontological union. This is why the birth of love in the 
beloved is the death of my love - there can be only one 
absolute, and two absolutes cannot join to become one. The 
birth of one entails the death of the other. Thus love is the 
phoenix of the death of love; love is the reincarnation of the 
death of the project of love. "If God doesn't exist, there is 
no way of escaping men": If there is no uncontestable abso-
lute, each for-itself is the project of becoming the absolute. 
There is no escape from men because for men there is no 
escape from the project. This is because the history of men 
is the history of eternal return: from being to being, 
separated temporarily by {being) consciousness of being. All 
consciousness is the project-of-becoming-being once again, 
albeit with the modification of the addition of consciousness. 
Such a project, realized, would be the absolute, if it were 
attended by consciousness. The cessation of consciousness 
within being is again to reveal the superfluity of being; 
consciousness unable to be is also revealed to itself as 
nonessential, de trop. If God doesn't exist, there is no way 
of escaping men because each one is the project of the 
recovery of his being. Love, of course, is but one variation 
on this project. The pursuit of being is hell. Love is the 
74 
pursuit of being. Therefore, love is hell. If God doesn't 
exist, the pursuit of being is necessary because it is 
necessary that there be an absolute, and such an absolute can 
only exist if free-and-necessary-being exists. Therefore, the 
indelible pursuit. 
The second passage is a conversation between Hilda and 






"We shall not go to heaven, Goetz ... Here you 
are: a little flesh, worn-out, rough, misera-
ble - a life, a wretched life. It is this 
flesh and this life I love. We can only love 
on earth. and against God's will. 
"I love only God, and I am no longer on 
earth". 
"Then you don't love me"? 
"No. Nor do you, Hilda, love me either. What 
you believe to be love is hate. 99 
We can only love on earth and against God's will because if 
God exists, there is no need to pursue being - and love is the 
pursuit of being. Either God or love. Both would coexist 
unnecessarily because the goal of love has already been 
realized by God. Thus, in this Sartrean world, love is 
forever a desperate and clandestine affair. "What you believe 
to be love is hate" because you can only love at my expense, 
through the spilling of my blood, through the sacrifice of my 
life (freedom). In this Sartrean world, there is no other way 
to love. Or is there? It is to this question that we now 
turn in section two. 




Conversion and Authenticity: 
An Alternative View of Love in Sartre, or 
Sartrean Love Type Two 
As mentioned in the initial pages of Chapter Two, Sartre 
stated that he saw more positivity in love from the time of 
Saint Genet onward. He sets the stage for another type of 
love relation as early as 1943 with the footnote in Being and 
Nothingness that we noted earlier: "These considerations do 
not exclude the possibility of an ethics of deliverance and 
salvation. But this can be achieved only after a radical 
conversion which we cannot discuss here. 11100 We also noted 
that Sartre wrote in Cahiers that Being and Nothingness was an 
1 b f . 101 onto ogy" e ore conversion." 
Some commentators on Sartre equate pure reflection with 
• • 102 h h d 103 radical conversion, w ereas ot ers o not. Just what 
is this [radical] conversion that Sartre speaks of? In 
Cahiers Sartre spells this out fairly clearly, at least not in 
the manner of an aside (as it appeared in Being and Nothing-
ness) : " ... [T] he conversion consists of renouncing the 
100 • d h. Being an Not ingness, 412. Underlining mine. 
lOlC h, a iers, 13. 
102 For example, see Bell, Sartre's Ethics of Authenticity, 
118ff. 
103 For example, see Kerry s. Walters, "A 
Innocence: The Dynamics of Sartrean Radical 




category of appropriation ... Sincerity is therefore excluded 
because it bears on that which I am. Authenticity bears on 
what I will ... Pure and authentic reflection is a will for that 
h . h I . 11 II 104 W ic wi .... Some writers hold that the conversion 
involves a necessary social dimension, that one "cannot make 
h . 1 105 t e conversion a one. " This is because, in the words of 
Sartre, "Morality isn't possible unless all the world is 
106 
moral." We can glean from the longer excerpt from Cahiers 
that Sartre links conversion and authenticity, and that the 
pursuit of being is not linked with authenticity. A converted 
individual is an authentic individual; an inauthentic individ-
ual is not converted. What then is authenticity for Sartre? 
This has been a thorny issue for Sartre scholars for quite a 
long time, and it is no wonder. I shall recount but two 
instances of Sartre's explication of the concept. 
First, in Cahiers we note a passage that seems to be in 
direct opposition to the above passage, that the "authentic 
individual cannot through conversion suppress his pursuit of 
Being because there would be nothing else [car il n'y aurait 
1 . ] 107 p us rein . How, then, is the authentic individual dif-
f erent from anyone else? In an interview with Benny Levy at 
the very twilight of Sartre's life, Sartre tells us that 
104c h. a iers, 495, 496. 
105 Bell, Sartre's Ethics of Authenticity, 178. 
lose h. a iers, 16. 
107c h. a iers, 42. 
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authentic individuals "no longer want to be God ... no longer 
b . 11108 want to e causa sui. Is this incompatible with the 
preceding claim, or is it just the case that authentic persons 
no longer want what they nevertheless must pursue inexora-
bly?109 In this case, the claims would not be incompatible, 
but would simply express in a poignant way the nausea, 
anguish, and failure of the Sartrean world. The question is 
certainly far from resolved. 110 
One noteworthy difference between the authentic and the 
inauthentic individual is that the latter is reflectively 
unaware of her causa sui project, whereas the former, in not 
wanting to be causa sui, must be at least reflectively aware 
of such a project. Thus the latter is in bad faith, whereas 
the former is not. The type one Sartrean love relation 
108 Benny Levy, "The Last Words of Jean-Paul Sartre," 
Dissent (Fall 1980): 397-422. 
109This seems to echo quite well the "lucidity" of Camus' 
Sisyphean hero as he "surmounts" his fate through this very 
lucidity. Existential conditions have not been altered, they 
have merely been consciously rejected: "There is no fate that 
cannot be surmounted by scorn." [Albert Camus, The Myth of 
Sisyphus and Other Essays (New York: Vintage, 1955), especial-
ly 88-91.] This attitude of conscious rejection (or, 
"metaphysical rebellion" as it is labeled in The Rebel [Albert 
Camus, The Rebel, trans. Anthony Bower (New York: Vintage, 
1956)]) is the very antithesis of the Nietzschean cry of amor 
fati, found throughout Nietzsche's works. See, in particular, 
Nietzsche's 1888 work entitled Ecce Homo [ trans. Walter 
Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1969)]. 
110Nevertheless, such a resolution is necessary to give a 
fair reckoning of Sartre's philosophy as a whole. No other 
issue may harbor more import for a fair rendering of the 
Sartrean corpus. I will focus on this specifically in chapter 
four. 
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exhibits such "unawareness" (otherwise, "waking up" would not 
be an issue), but a causa sui project recognized as such would 
not fit within the parameters of the Sartrean type one love 
relation. Why is this? Because if the lover engaged in the 
project of making herself be loved with a reflective awareness 
of the pursuit of being (and its necessary failure) , then the 
illusion of love would be shattered at the very initiation of 
the project. Even if the praxis were the same, the telos 
would invariably be different, since the lover can no longer 
"believe" in (the project of) love. 111 Love, like bad faith, 
is a phenomenon of belief. To love is to believe that one 
loves. To not-believe that one loves is not-to-love. The 
love relation is a "game of mirrors" because it is a phenome-
non of belief (not ontology), just as, for Sartre, if emotion 
is a joke, it is a joke we believe in. 112 
111 fl ' f I ' ' Re ective awareness o one s proJect is a necessary 
but insufficient condition to make one authentic, since 
authenticity must include a volitional component. Even if one 
could never, finally, succeed in "being" authentic (since one 
can never be anything), the project to flee one's own inau-
thenticity toward the unrealizable ideal of authenticity would 
then constitute authenticity. That is, if one is to speak of 
authenticity at all in a Sartrean world. What I want to get 
away from is reducing the notion of authenticity to merely a 
matter of reflective awareness. If authenticity were merely 
a matter of reflective awareness, then the person with the 
most self-knowledge would be the most authentic. Knowledge is 
a kind of being, but being is not reducible to knowledge. 
Authenticity, therefore, is not simply a kind of conscious-
ness. 
112 
cf. Jean- Paul Sartre, .... T""'h""'e~~E=m~o-t_1=· ~o=n=s_: __ o~u~t=l=i=· n=· =e-=o=f-~a 
Theory, trans. Bernard Frechtman (New York: Philosophical 
Library, 1948), 61. 
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Sincerity is ontological and impossible. Authenticity is 
volitional and involves reflectivity. 113 Sincerity is unre-
alizable in the Sartrean world, because human being can never 
simply be what it is; it always transcends itself. Sincerity 
implies a state of being - and states of being are unrealiz-
able for the for-itself. Authenticity involves a relationship 
to one's own praxis, one from which deception, self-deception, 
and claims of sincerity are 114 expunged. Therefore, the 
1
uI argue in chapters two and (particularly) four that 
authenticity, in fact, involves more than this, that ontology, 
reflectivity, and volition are involved. 
114Take, for example, two cynical people who have an 
affair, each telling the other that s/he is loved, each 
knowing that s/he is lying, and each knowing that the other is 
also lying. Three questions crop up: (1) Would this be a 
praxis of love from which deception, self-deception, and 
claims of sincerity are expunged? (2) In which case, would 
this be an example of authenticity? (3) How is this form of 
self-consciousness "better" than bad faith? 
In response to the first question: 
(A) Cynicism is ruled out by definition in Sartrean type one 
love, since this form of love is a phenomenon of belief and 
necessarily involves deception and self-deception for its 
precarious existence. 
(B) Sartrean type two love is based upon honesty and therefore 
rules out cynicism. 
Therefore, two people who lie about the existence of their 
love relation are in fact not lovers at all, but merely 
actors. How is this different from any other Sartrean 
relation? It is different simply because it is a matter of 
the actor's relation to his own consciousness and the con-
sciousness of the other: All concrete relations with others in 
Sartre are phenomena of belief because they are based upon 
emotional and imaginary consciousness. The cynical "lovers" 
have eliminated the component of belief. (based upon emotion-
al/imaginary consciousness) in their relation, and with it the 
risk. It is no longer a "real" love relation, but an "imagi-
nary" one. Sartre has stood the love relation on its head: The 
imaginary "love" relation is based upon full lucidity, whereas 
the "true" "love" relation is based upon deception and self-
deception. 
(continued ... ) 
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sincere individual is necessarily she who is inauthentic, and 
the authentic individual makes no claim to sincerity. 
What are some of the characteristics of Sartrean love 
which are based upon authentic human being? Sartre gives us 
far from a full blown view, but he has given us some important 
guidelines. It is to these that we shall now turn. 
In Cahiers Sartre states simply "That which will define 
its [the for-itself 's] love is the concrete sacrifice that it 
makes today and not what it intends or what it feels. 11115 
Here we can see a volitional notion of love focusing on 
sacrifice as the essence of love. But active willing is seen 
as insufficient (if not converted into praxis) , and execution 
is necessary. Therefore, we can see here a conception of love 
114 ( • d) 
... continue 
In response to the second question: 
I am sure that Sartre would wish to say that authenticity 
involves honesty to all individuals concerned, and since the 
cynical "lovers" lie to others concerning the nature of their 
relationship, they are not authentic. But it is not clear to 
me why these lovers could not be authentic (at least in some 
sense) within the Sartrean paradigm, since Sartre seems to 
relegate authenticity to the self's relation to itself. At 
this point, I will leave this an open question. 
In response to the third question: 
Given the fact that there are no pre-existent values in the 
Sartrean world, the only way we can judge concerning whether 
cynical self-consciousness is "better" than bad faith is to 
know the project ( s) of the cynics. There seems to me to be no 
clear cut sense in which we can say, a priori and in a 
universal sense, that cynicism is a "worse" or "better" mode 
of consciousness than bad faith. Cynicism and bad faith may, 
respectively, have their own brands of positivity - at least 
on the Sartrean playground. · 
115C h' 9 a iers, 4 4. 
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. { . t . 1 . f . . 1 . ) 116 as praxis in par icu ar, "sacri icia " praxis . Else-
where, it has been said that Sartre sees respect also as 
. 1 h 1 1 . 117 essentia to t e ove re ation. 
In Cahiers, Sartre describes what he would consider to be 
"Utopia": " [W] here each treats the other as an end, that is to 
118 
say, takes the enterprise of the Other as an end." This, 
of course, would be a mutual recognition of freedoms, precise-
ly that which Sartre said was in principle unrealizable under 
the earlier description of love. Therefore, if such a 
"utopian" existence is realizable, we could say that this 
would involve the negation of the unrealizability of love. 
Love if the above scenario were realizable - would be 
realizable and manifested in the very description of the 
"utopia" noted above. Love would be the mutual recognition 
116How do these feature guarantee authenticity? If one 
reduces the notion of love to praxis, as Sartre does here, 
there is no guarantee of authenticity. A person engaging in 
such "loving" sacrificial praxis could still exist at the same 
time in bad faith and could be, knowingly or unknowingly, 
deceiving others. To reduce love to praxis is to say nothing 
of the consciousness with which it is attended. Since 
authenticity bespeaks of a certain kind of consciousness, no 
claims can be made concerning the relation between authentici-
ty and Sartre's notion of love as "sacrificial praxis." 
117 See Bell, 156. Bell mentions the relation between 
Hilda and Goetz in The Devil and the Good Lord which I have 
relegated to type one love. She also focuses in Hoederer in 
Dirty Hands. She may be right in saying that Hoederer 
exemplifies a love laced with respect if one can swallow the 
notion that this type of "respectful" love sees murder as 
legitimate and necessary. See Jean-Paul Sartre, Dirty Hands, 
found in No Exit and Three Other Plays, trans. Stuart Gilbert 
{New York: Vintage, 1955) . I happen to think Bell is mistak-
en. 
118C h · s a iers, 4. 
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among persons that persons are to be regarded categorically as 
ends and not as means. Of course, the question as to whether 
such a scenario is possible is still at issue. 
In The Age of Reason, Daniel thinks to himself that "One 
could only damage oneself through the harm one did to oth-
ers. "
119 If we could say that deceiving the beloved in the 
type one love relation is injurious to the beloved, then the 
above thought would bring the self-damaging aspect of this 
type of love to the fore (as well as call it into question) . 
Conversely, we might be able to say that the only way to 
insure the absence of such self-damage is to refrain from 
deceiving the Other (attempting to coopt his freedom) and 
treat the freedom of the Other as an end. If my fate is so 
inextricably intertwined with that of the Other, then I must 
treat his freedom as I treat mine. But this could only be 
possible after conversion, since, ontologically, it is not 
possible in the type one relation (because I am the project of 
the recovery of my being). So whether such a possibility is 
a possibility hinges on_ whether or not the conversion is 
possible. 
In The Family Idiot, Sartre states tersely that " ... [M] a-
ternal love is a relation and not a feeling. 11120 Again, we 
can see the sentiment expressed by Sartre that love is (should 
119 The Age of Reason, 111. Underlining mine. 
.. 
120Jean-Paul Sartre, The Family Idiot: Gustave Flaubert. 
1821-1857, trans. Carol Cosman (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1981), vol. I, 57. 
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be? normative? descriptive?) a matter of volition, a matter of 
praxis. Why even call such a relation a love relation, unless 
due to the fact that one treats the Other as an end, has 
respect for his freedom, "loves" him? If love is reducible 
merely to a social relation, then love is only a special kind 
of praxis, nothing more and nothing less. At least nothing 
more that we can here reflectively delineate. This praxiolog-
ical notion of love, with its inclusion of respect for the 
freedom of the Other, can be based only upon authentic human 
being. 
In "Self-Portrait at Seventy," Sartre relates to us his 
belief that transparency, honesty, and truth are essential for 
"social harmony." Such a view gives us further basis for our 
construction of a type two Sartrean love relation: "A man's 
existence must be entirely visible to his neighbor, whose own 
existence must be entirely visible in turn, before true social 
harmony can be established. 11121 This type of social harmony 
cannot rest on love relations which are "in essence" deceptive 
and "in principle" a failure. A new type of love relation is 
called for, a new type of ontology, a conversion in human 
being. 
The necessity of honesty in the love relation is exempli-
fied in the relation between Marcelle and Mathieu in The Age 
of Reason: "When Mathieu had pledged himself to Marcelle ... He 
121Jean-Paul Sartre, Life/Situations, trans. Paul Auster 
and Lydia Davis (New York: Pantheon, 1977), 13. 
84 
could not love Marcelle save in complete lucidity ... 'If I lied 
to myself,' said he, 'I should have the feeling I was lying to 
122 you as wel 1 . ' " Love here, in the eyes of Mathieu, is 
based upon transparency, honesty, and truth, and is undergird-
ed with the notion of treating the Other as an end. This is 
not type one Sartrean love. A new, revamped notion is called 
for. For my freedom is not imperiled before yours, but is 
contained within yours. This is exactly what Sartre says in 
Cahiers: "He discovers it [the Other's freedom] at the heart 
of his freedom as a free movement accompanying [him] toward 
his ends ... [Each] freedom is totally in the other. 11123 
Before conversion, my freedom is in the Other in the 
sense that I can attempt to "ground" my being through the 
utilization of her freedom. It is in this sense and in this 
sense only that my freedom is in the Other (although psycho-
logical aberrations may indicate otherwise) . This is in no 
way treating the Other as an end, but as a means to the end of 
my own "justification" of being. But this "being-justified" 
(as a project) does not recognize the freedom of the Other as 
an end in itself. It is merely a tool utilized to enhance the 
end of my freedom. Therefore, if my freedom is going to be 
"in the Other" in any other way, an ontological alteration is 
necessary. 
conversion. 
This, if such a thing is possible, would be 
122 The Age of Reason, 113. 
123Cahiers, 299. Underlining mine. 
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The Age of Reason is noteworthy in that it was written 
prior to Sartre's transitional period (the novel appeared in 
1945) in which he began to see "more positivity" in love. I 
believe that Sartre characterizes both type one and type two 
love in this work. First, the following passage: 
And He [Mathieu] was suddenly seized with the desire to 
talk to Marcelle about it: it was to her alone that he 
could talk about his life, his fears, his hopes. But he 
remembered that he would never see her again, and his 
desire, not yet actual or defined, slowly dissolved into 
a kind of anguish. He was alonx···'The truth is that I 
gave up Marcelle for nothing. ' 12 
In the last section, we noted that Mathieu loved Ivich and 
believed that in her lay his only possible salvation. This 
love relation, that between Mathieu and Ivich, exemplifies the 
type one Sartrean love relation. Mathieu gave up Marcelle for 
nothing, save the freedom of the Other (Ivich), the freedom 
that is nothing, the illusive freedom that would be his 
salvation if he could capture and incorporate it within 
himself qua freedom. The relationship between Mathieu and 
Marcelle is based upon "honesty" (at least as an ideal), 
transparency, sacrifice, and freedom. It is this relation 
that is the type two relation. The relations are mutually 
exclusive. Either/or. The truth is that Mathieu gave up 
Marcelle for nothing. 125 
124 The Age of Reason, 394, 395. -
125In fact, the ideals presented by Mathieu and Marcelle 
are just that, for both had been engaged in long term self-
deception in terms of their relation to each other: Their 
"hatred" for one another and wallowing inability to chose 
(continued ... ) 
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The preceding points indicate clearly that for a type two 
love relation to be possible, an ontological shift/alteration 
is necessary in the for-itself. Such a possibility is opened 
up in the very pages of Being and Nothingness. This type of 
126 being would have freedom rather than being as its goal. 
125 ( • d) 
... continue 
themselves reduced them to effectual muteness before one 
another. They both failed to recognize and accept the 
implications of their freedom(s) in the face of the relation-
ship, and it was upon this refusal of recognition that the 
relationship endured. Honesty would have led to its rapid and 
sordid demise, ,which was exactly what happened as they both 
began to progressively face themselves before the backdrop of 
the behavior of the other. I think Sartre makes it clear with 
this relation that a love based on honesty, transparency, 
sacrifice, and freedom was not possible for either Mathieu or 
Marcelle. Any such relation was absent throughout the course 
of the novel. Mathieu is seen as free only to engage in 
either the covertly self-deceptive/deceptive relation with 
Marcelle or the more expressly overtly self-decep-
tive/deceptive relation with Ivich. Either way, both rela-
tions fail to exhibit the "positivity" Sartre is beginning to 
accord to the love relation. Here we find the Sartrean world, 
once again, loveless and peopled with naught but bad dreams. 
126How is having freedom for a goal different from having 
nothing for a goal, especially since Sartre uses the terms 
"freedom" and "nothing" interchangeably? If freedom is 
something different from nothing, Sartre does not explicitly 
clarify this. But he certainly implies a difference between 
the two throughout the corpus of his work. This difference, 
it may seem, is to imply that freedom, no longer nothing, in 
fact has an "essence, " that to which we are called to account, 
for we are freedom. The way Sartre painstakingly details how 
we can be untrue to our own freedom sounds as if we are being 
untrue to our own "essence," our own self. 
If having freedom for a goal is the same as having 
nothing for a goal, how is this different from having no goal? 
Since, according to Sartre, we are not free not to have a 
project. This project, which is the ontological "goal" of the 
for-itself, signifies that "nothing" cannot be the project of 
the for-itself, that freedom cannot be aimless, that freedom 
cannot aim at nothing, and that freedom is not reducible to 
nothing. Although Sartre uses "freedom" and "nothing" 
interchangeably, they do not amount to the same thing within 
(continued ... ) 
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This type of being is the being of play: "The first principle 
of play is man himself; through it he escapes his natural 
127 
nature." Man's "natural nature" is the pursuit of being; 
the shackles chaining man to this pursuit are opened through 
play. Such play can only occur after the for-itself moves 
from accessory to pure reflection. 
We must again remember the distinction Sartre makes 
between accessory and pure reflection. In accessory reflec-
tion, the for-itself seeks to become a "psychic object" for 
itself. In pure reflection, the for-itself abandons this 
quest for self-objectivity, as it recognizes that it has no 
essence other than to be free. It is the self still caught in 
accessory reflection that seeks internal "reasons" for its own 
behavior (as a function of a substantive "self"). The self 
engaged in pure reflection realizes instead that it is 
responsible for who it is and what it does, therefore taking 
responsibility for its own being and praxis. The self caught 
in its own gaze of accessory reflection has not yet expelled 
all "contents" from consciousness, but still seeks at least 
some motivation for its own praxis in something other than its 
126 ( . ' ) 
... continued 
the body of his philosophy. Therefore, having freedom for a 
goal is not the same as having nothing for a goal. Further-
more, having freedom for a goal is not synonymous with having 
no goal. Freedom is the uncoiling of being in the face of 
itself, a process enhanced or impeded by the complicit for-
itself. 
127Being and Nothingness, 581. Any reading of Being and 
Nothingness which ascribes to Sartre an ontology which 
excludes this possibility is a misreading of the text. 
88 
own freedom. Therefore, those engaged in accessory reflection 
have not fully exited the realm of bad faith consciousness, 
whereas those engaged in pure reflection have. 
Sartre makes clear that the essay in phenomenological 
ontology which is Being and Nothingness does NOT deal with the 
type of being that is the being of play: "This particular type 
of project, which has FREEDOM FOR ITS FOUNDATION AND ITS GOAL, 
DESERVES A SPECIAL STUDY. It is RADICALLY DIFFERENT from ALL 
others in that it aims at a RADICALLY DIFFERENT type of 
being. 11128 I find this entire passage highly illuminating, 
and recommend that the reader go directly to Sartre's text for 
a fuller understanding. I submit that this radically differ-
ent type of being is that which is aimed at through play, and 
that play is only possible through conversion. Conversion 
necessitates authenticity, a volitional and praxiological 
shift in being. The goal of this project is a radically 
d . ff k . d f b . . . b . . 1 129 1 erent 1n o eing - 1t 1s eing 1n ove. This is 
not possible for the unconverted Sartrean woman, for love in 
such a world, as we have shown, remains merely an illusive 
game of mirrors . Can love be any other way in a Sartrean 
world? It is to this question that we turn in Section Three. 
Part Three 
128 • d h. Being an Not 1ngness, 581. Caps mine. 
129But certainly not in the Sartrean type one sense of the 
term. 
On the Possibility of a Synthesis of 
Sartrean Love Types One and Two 
89 
Are type one and type two love mutually contradictory or 
can there be a synthesis of the two? Are there salient 
commonalities? What does Sartre have to say about these 
. . f h. ?130 issues, 1 anyt 1ng. 
In Being and Nothingness, Sartre states forcefully and 
succinctly that "I am the project of the recovery of my 
being. " 131 If this is necessarily and not contingently true 
130 Sartrean type one and type two loves seem to represent 
two distinct modes of being-in-the-world, and the purpose of 
this short section is to illuminate this appearance. It may 
be said that, because both types of love represent distinct 
modes of being in the world, they are therefore mutually 
exclusive a priori. But this does not seem to follow as a 
self-evident truth, since it is theoretically possible that 
these "two" "modes" of being are such based only upon a 
conceptual confusion, and that they can be reduced to one 
another following a more thoroughgoing analysis. It is the 
aim of this section to show that they cannot be reduced to one 
another, that these two modes of being are, so to speak, 
incommensurable. Why is it of such great import to demon-
strate this? Because it has far-reaching implications for the 
theory of addiction, in particular, whether for Sartre a 
nonaddicted mode of being is realizable. What I go on to show 
in chapter 4, after a more lengthy analysis, is that both 
types of love are not alternative human possibilities, but 
that type two love in a Sartrean world is an unrealizable 
ideal. Both types of love are not grounded in a basic human 
reality. In fact, Sartre must positively negate his concep-
tion of basic human reality in order to posit his conception 
of type two love. Sartre is very tricky on these issues, and 
it seems wise at this point to step carefully. 
131Being and Nothingness, 364. How can this passage be 
reconciled with the passage on page 531 of Being and Nothing-
ness, which I cited at the end of part two of the present 
chapter? We have (A) The being of play, and (B) The being who 
seeks to be God. If we read the above passage as a necessary 
truth about the for-itself, then (A) is negated, since the 
for-itself cannot simultaneously aim at freedom and being. 
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(like the vast majority of Sartre scholars seem to believe), 
then changes in volition or changes in praxis will have no 
effect on the basic project. Therefore, one would not be free 
to be being, but also would not be free to dispense with the 
attempt at being being. Since, for Sartre, the "law" of 
identity is only contingently true (since it does not apply to 
the being of the for-itself), it may well be that the "law" of 
the pursuit of being may likewise be only contingently true. 
As long as I continue the project of attempting to make myself 
be, I continue to attempt to take the Other's point of view on 
myself, which means I continue to attempt to be a fascinating 
object for the Other so as to capture his subjectivity qua 
subjectivity. As long as my being-for-others is haunted by 
the absolute being ("God"), do I have to seek to be this 
b . ?132 eing. Can I refuse to be that being which perpetually 
haunts my being? In Being and Nothingness, unity with the 
Other, as we noted, is unrealizable in fact as well as theory, 
yet this remains the unrealizable ideal of love. Is the 
These two positions are irreconcilable, unless each is only 
contingently true. In chapter 4, I argue that the conversion 
is not possible. Therefore, the radically different type of 
being achieved through play is unrealizable, since play is 
possible only after conversion. Finally, then, only (B) 
remains possible in a Sartrean world. Sartre was unable, 
after all, to reconcile the possibilities of freedom and being 
as ends, given his limited ontological understanding of the 
for-itself. 
132
cf. Being and Nothingness, 365. 
91 
nature of this triple ekstasis which is the for-itself such 
133 that it is free being, but free only to pursue God? 
At this point we turn back to Cahiers and observe once 
again that according to Sartre, the "authentic individual 
cannot through conversion suppress his pursuit of being 
because there would be nothing else. 134 From Sartre's inter-
views, it appears as if he wishes there were something else, 
but this something else fails to appear in the Sartrean world. 
Again, is this fact necessarily so? It is certainly not the 
only conceivable state of affairs, and Sartre himself does not 
view present reality as ideal (witness Nausea!), yet concep-
tion in mente falls far short of existence in re. Despite the 
fact that my being is perpetually haunted by the absolute 
being of God, there is no God and I cannot ever become God, 
says Sartre. In Sartre's popular essay, "Existentialism, " he 
explicitly states that "Existentialism is nothing else than an 
attempt to draw all the consequences of a coherent atheistic 
position. "135 God is functionally indelible in the Sartrean 
system, but also nonexistent. 
133 f ' d h' 298 299 c . Being an Not ingness, , . 
134c h. 2 a iers, 4 . Underlining mine. 
135 d ' 1 E ' t ' 1 ' d H Foun in Jean-Pau Sartre, xisten ia ism an uman 
Emotions, trans. Hazel Barnes and Bernard Frechtrnan (New York: 
Philosophical Library, 1957), 51. Also, note Sartre's 
relevant and interesting discussion of Heidegger's notion of 
"forlornness" on pp. 21ff. of this same work. 
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Since authenticity bears on what I will and what I do 
(volition and praxis) , authenticity is a category which 
overlaps the sphere of ethics. Is authenticity possible? 
Possibly, we could take the approach of asking whether or not 
a Sartrean ethic is possible. In Saint Genet, Sartre writes 
tersely that 11 ••• any ethic is both impossible and neces-
136 
sary. 11 Is this the case with authenticity? Is this the 
case with the Sartrean conversion? How can this be? Self-
contradictory, this can only occur in the Sartrean world where 
contradiction is not an argument against existence, but is, in 
some circumstances, a condition for existence. How else could 
it be said that the for-itself is not the opposite of being, 
b . . d. . ?137 ut is its contra 1ct1on. 
In Sartre's discussion of The Devil and the Good Lord, he 
states that "First, every love is in opposition to God ... Every 
love is in opposition to the absolute because it is itself 
absolute ... If God exists, man does not exist; and if man 
exists, God does not exist. 11138 Harkening back to the earli-
er discussion of a passage from this play (see section one), 
136Jean-Paul Sartre, Saint Genet, trans. Bernard Frechtman 
(New York: New American Library, 1964), 247. This statement 
is a prime example of why Sartre is often so difficult to 
decipher. 
137B . d h. eing an Not 1ngness, 14. 
138Michel Contat and Michel Rybalka, eds. The Writings of 
Jean-Paul Sartre: Volume 1. A Bibliographical Life, trans 
Richard C. McCleary (Evanston, Il: Northwestern University 
Press, 1974), 254. Sartre made these comments on 7 June 1951 
during an interview with the Paris-Press-L'Intransigeant. 
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we remember that, for Sartre, there can be only one absolute. 
If more than one exists, one must take precedence and func-
tionally negate the other(s). For Sartre, God does not exist, 
and man exists as freedom. As freedom, man tries to create 
(become) the absolute through love (or other concrete rela-
tions with others) . This attempt to create the absolute 
through love functions as the absolute because it is exclu-
sionary. The love relation in Sartre is the absolute because 
it seeks to do what the absolute would do if the absolute did 
in fact exist - ground being, make being necessary, provide 
meaning. Sartre made these comments about the time that he 
began to see "more positivity" in love, indicating the 
overlapping of the type one and type two love projects insofar 
as they are both projects toward absolutization - and absolu-
tion. For my being-guilty will cease if my being is "justi-
fied" through being-in-love. For I shall execrate my own 
being unless it can be "justified" from within or without, or 
unless I can give up the project with impunity. 
The following dialogue between Goetz and Hilda is the 
final excerpt taken from The Devil and the Good Lord. In it 
we can find type one and type two love exemplified, by Goetz 
and Hilda, respectively. 
Goetz: 
Hilda: 
"Sleep with you under the eye of God? No, I 
don't care for coupling in public. Oh, for a 
night deep enough to hide us from his re-
gard .... " 
"Love is that deep night; when people love 
each other, they become invisible to God ... I 
still love you. If you die, I will lie down 
beside you and stay there to the very end, 
Goetz: 
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without eating or drinking; you will rot away 
in my embrace, and I will love your carrion 
flesh; for you do not love at all, if you do 
not love everything." 
"Whip me. "139 
We can note here again the opposition between love and God. 
Both potentially serve the same function. Hilda is trying to 
hide from God through love, whereas Goetz is trying to expunge 
his own guilt through the love relation. Hilda's ideal is 
unrealizable in that (A) If God exists, love would be insuffi-
cient to "hide" her from His gaze, and (B) Since God does not 
exist, one becomes invisible before nothing, that is, the 
attempt is superfluous. Goetz's ideal is unrealizable in 
that, since all being is contingent (in love or otherwise), it 
is forever unjustified and unjustifiable, and, therefore, 
"guilty" (de trop) . 140 
In "Existentialism," Sartre delineates the parameters of 
legitimate choice: "One may choose anything if it is on the 
grounds of free involvement. 11141 Type one love involves 
belief in its own reality - hence the illusion. The belief is 
a tributary from the stream of bad faith consciousness. Bad 
faith always involves a limited recognition of one's own 
freedom. Therefore, the project of type one love can only be 
chosen through a necessarily limited perspective on one's own 
139The Devil and the Good Lord, 133. 
140 '1 d 1 ' ' 1 Gui t an superf uity are not strict y synonymous, 
nevertheless, phenomenologically, they may be experienced as 
overlapping or equivalent. 
141 • • l' . 8 Existentia ism and Human Emotions, 4 . 
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freedom, and cannot be chosen on the grounds of free involve-
ment. Type one love is therefore necessarily ruled out. 142 
We never relate on a plane of equality because I never 
recognize the freedom of the Other as freedom for the Other, 
nor does the Other recognize my freedom as such. 
Type two Sartrean love is based on transparency, honesty, 
truth, sacrifice, freedom, and play. In such love, the Other 
is treated as an end. We have said that such a love is 
possible only if the conversion is possible. If the conver-
sion, for Sartre, is the equivalent of authenticity, then type 
two love is not possible because even the authentic individual 
f h . f B . U3 cannot opt out o t e pursuit o eing. But in this very 
passage, located in Cahiers, Sartre states that the authentic 
individual is the converted individual. 144 What this means, 
quite simply, is that type two love is not possible in a 
Sartrean world, because even authentic, "converted" individu-
als are not free not to engage in the pursuit of Being. 
Therefore, Sartre gives us two clearly different views of love 
throughout the body of his works. The first is possible but 
142This is independent of the deception inherent in love, 
as the lover tries to appear only as an object for the 
beloved, granting a limited perspective which brings forth a 
limited range of consciousness of freedom-possibilities for 
the beloved - precisely what the lover intends. Type one love 
is also ruled out as a legitimate choice on these grounds. 
143In chapter four I shall attempt a new rendition of 
Sartrean "authenticity." For now, we shall adhere closely to 
Sartre's own proclamation. 
144c h. 2 a iers, 4 . 
96 
a failure in principle, since the possibility rests on the 
possibility of an illusion. The second is an impossible love, 
but one that would not be a failure if it were to exist. So 
Sartre has conceptualized quite clearly what non-illusive love 
would be 1 ike. He is also quite aware of the ontological 
145 impossibility of such love. Type one love, then, is that 
actually occurring in the Sartrean world. It is descriptive. 
Type two love is Sartre's ideal. It is normative. Neverthe-
less, the norm is unrealizable, just as descriptive love aims 
at the unrealizable. 
Illusive/delusive love 146 is Sartrean love. It is in 
essence a deception. One may do well to question whether 
S h h f 1 t all147 artre as a t eory o ove a To conclude this 
section, as well as chapter three, I would like to replicate 
a passage from The Family Idiot in which Sartre shows clearly 
and eloquently the deceptive, illusive nature of love. 
Let the word love be pronounced ... the change is radical. 
The emotion, the tenderness, even the sexual excitement 
were their own end ... A shift in view: Love becomes the 
145That is, assuming the validity of his presuppositions. 
146The full grounding of this conclusion will have to 
await the lengthier analysis of Sartre's phenomenological 
apparatus in chapter four. In that chapter, I explicate and 
analyze in more detail Sartre's notions of the phenomenolog-
ical reduction, conversion, and authenticity. Following upon 
the additional insight gained through the analysis appearing 
there, it will be all the more evident that Sartrean love can 
be only of type one. 
147 One may be reminded of Stendhal's famous "theory of 
crystallization" in which love is regarded as, in essence, a 
deception. See Jose Ortega y Gasset, On Love, trans. Toby 
Talbot (New York: World, 1968), 19-78. 
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end. The tender emotion, the desire are means to 
maintain it in being; that is, to remain faithful to the 
vow. They are proofs ... nourishments for that abstract 
flame of love ... For love is nothing but a vow extracted 
by society from each member of the couple with the 
complicitv of the other ... One will therefore nourish the 
• 14'fl 
vampire. 
The vow: certainly it is a shackle, a rusty chain for the 
being who is only freedom. For freedom is faithless except to 
itself, it has no continuity except to be infinite, to be 
freedom. Love's flame is only as abstract as that of freedom. 
But freedom's burns brighter and extinguishes that of love 
149 
since the ultimate goal is freedom, always freedom. When 
the bell tolls I will no longer nourish the vampire of love, 
instead I will feed that of freedom. When the bell tolls I 
will be free, for that is all that I am. The rest is sheer 
trickery, mere subterfuge. I am free, but not in love. I am 
free, but not in love. I am free. For freedom and love are 
both absolutes, and the one must be sacrificed on the altar of 
the other. I am the forever recurring avatar of freedom. I 
am ethereal, haunted even by myself. I live on the blood of 
love. Freedom. Yes, I will be free. For that is all I am, 
for I am nothing. 
At this juncture, we shall plunge into chapter three, 
wherein I develop an existential theory of addiction. It is 
148The Family Idiot, vol. 1, 783, 784. 
149That is to say, freedom is the only legitimate ground-
ing or meta-value in the Sartrean paradigm. Freedom is the 
source of all value, and, as such, must be preserved. The 
origin of "anti-value" is the suppression of freedom. 
98 
to this central task that I now turn. Later, in chapter four, 
I shall demonstrate that based upon the existential theory of 
addiction advanced in chapter three, Sartre's theory of love 
is in fact not a theory of love at all, but a theory of 
addiction. 
CHAPTER 3 
AN EXISTENTIAL THEORY OF ADDICTION 
Introduction 
The Culling of a Theory 
Chapter three is divided into two main parts: (I) 
Kierkegaard on addiction, and (II) Sartre on addiction. Both 
parts will be laced with insights from other thinkers, where 
appropriate, the majority of these insights to be contained in 
footnotes to the text. 1 The texts of both Kierkegaard and 
Sartre shall be, generally speaking, dealt with in a chrono-
logical manner. I make no claim to present a comprehensive 
account of their works in relation with developing a theory of 
addiction. I merely claim to have begun such an arduous 
project, plowing the ground, so to speak. The bulk of Being 
and Nothingness is relegated to chapter four, wherein I seek 
to view love and addiction conjointly. The views of both 
Kierkegaard and Sartre on addiction I find to be compatible 
1As specified in the introduction to chapter one, the 
footnotes in this chapter offer another voice - or, other 
voices in the development of an existential theory of 
addiction. These voices often raise issues outside the scope 
of this dissertation - issues which are nevertheless worthy of 
mention. It is with this understanding and in this spirit 
that the following footnotes are presented. · 
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and complementary. Connections between the two shall be noted 
in both parts one and two. 
One major difficulty in extracting a theory of addiction 
from the works of Kierkegaard and Sartre is that neither of 
them dealt with the issue specifically. Furthermore, the 
concept of "addiction" itself is mentioned quite infrequently. 
Since it is the case that both leave the region of addiction 
ostensibly untouched, I am left to construct a theory from 
their texts in philosophical anthropology and phenomenological 
psychology. I believe the seeds for such a theory are 
numerous in the writings of both thinkers. The time has come 
to lay the groundwork for such a philosophical theory. The 
format and style I employ may appear unorthodox. Neverthe-
less, there is to be found here a clear and consistent full-
blown theory of addiction. Every effort and therefore every 
possible writing style and characterization of addiction are 
utilized to foster the reader's understanding of the tragedy 
that is addiction. 2 
2
"Belief in freedom of the will is a primary error 
committed by everything organic." [Friedrich Nietzsche, 
Human. All Too Human, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987), 22.] Belief in the 
phenomenon of addiction, under this description, would be a 
twofold error, involving: (1) The belief that the "will" is 
"free," and (2) The belief that somehow this "free will" has 
become entangled, disjointed, or in some sense ruptured. 
"····[A] brazen wall of fate: we are in prison, we can only 
dream ourselves free, not make ourselves free." [Human. All 
Too Human, p. 223.] Also: "The theory of free will - the 
hundred times refuted theory." [Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond 
Good and Evil, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 
1966) I 25.] 
(continued ... ) 
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The notions of "addiction" and "the addict" operative 
throughout this dissertation shall be clarified contextually, 
that is, their meanings shall be slowly unraveled as we 
proceed through the various aspects of the phenomenon of 
addiction. As Ortega said well in his Meditations on Ouixote 
and with which I thoroughly concur, the way to "tell" what 
something is is to show what it is, to bring the reader on a 
journey. 3 Therefore, I ask the reader to have patience as the 
2 ( ••• continued) 
Finally: "The creed of man's free will was only invented to 
forge that of grace." [The Marquis de Sade, "Dialogue Between 
a Priest and a Dying Man (1782)," trans. by Paul Dinnage, 
found in The Existential Imagination, ed. by Frederick Karl 
and Leo Hamalian (Greenwich, CT: Fawcett, 1963), 52.] 
It must be remembered that I am attempting to construct 
a theory of addiction within a Kierkegaardian-Sartrean 
paradigm. Certainly, there are other paradigms antithetical to 
this project. However, I do believe it is possible to make 
sense of the notion of "addiction" even within the Nietzschean 
paradigm, albeit in a different manner. I shall attempt to 
clarify what I mean by this in subsequent references to and 
explications of Nietzsche. Certainly, it would be nothing 
short of chimerical to attempt to "legitimate" a theory of 
addiction suitable to all paradigms of thought, or to develop 
such a theory "free" from all paradigms. I merely seek to 
develop a theory within the strictures of an existen-
tial/phenomenological ontological framework, knowing full well 
that this approach has limitations when viewed from other 
perspectives (I, too, embody some of these perspectives). 
Nevertheless, I must choose (or, be) a perspective; I cannot 
help but do so, and this is precisely what I have tried to do, 
adhering to this choice as closely as possible. Given this 
fact, I cannot hope to "show" that the theory of addiction 
contained herein is "true" in some universal sense, or even 
that it is a theory of "addiction," also in that same sense. 
From a Nietzschean-Spinozistic-Sadean deterministic paradigm, 
the very belief in the reality of addiction would be, as I 
have outlined earlier in this footnote, delusional. 
3See Jose Ortega y Gasset, Meditations On Quixote, trans. 
Evelyn Rugg and Diego Marin (New York: W.W. Norton~ 1963), 
31-52. See also Julian Marias' introduction, 13-26. Existen-




Addiction is a Function of Missing One's Self 
In Either/Or, vol. 1, Kierkegaard includes a section 
entitled "The Immediate Stages of the Erotic or the Musical 
Erotic." In this section he explains three kinds of desiring, 
comprised of three stages. The sensuous merely awakens in 
stage one, it is a dolorous desire without a specific object. 
Desire is melancholy because it is not specified as the 
desiring of a particular object. In stage two, desire becomes 
specified, it seeks the object of desire without, Kierkegaard 
says, "desiring" it. 4 Stage three desire is· exemplif~ed by 
desiring the particular absolutely. The addict fallaciously 
desires5 the object of addiction, while her actual desire 
4Eremita, Victor, (ed.) [Soren Kierkegaard], Either/Or, 
vol. 1, trans. David F. Swensen and Lillian Marvin Swensen 
(Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1959), 79. 
5The addict "fallaciously desires" in the sense that she 
fallaciously believes that the ostensible object of her desire 
is in fact that which she desires, which it is not. The 
ostensible object of desire is nothing other than a reflective 
symbol or sensate manifestation of an unknown (nonreflective) 
object of desire. The addict seeks to circumvent the process 
whereby she would come to recognize the three stages of desire 
in herself and instead deems by fiat the object of addiction 
as her stage three desire. This object is fallacious in the 
sense that it is misleading and deceptive, impeding progress 
toward the realization of a genuine stage three desire, since 
the object functions surreptitiously as the same. This 
confusion about the object of desire is not inherent in desire 
itself, but is a self-delusion belonging to the aesthetic mode 
of consciousness. This is the case because the aesthetic 
desirer has, as previously mentioned, circumvented the process 
whereby she would come to recognize the three stages of desire 
in herself. That is, she has impeded the process whereby she 
(continued ... ) 
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remains unknown to her. Desire for the object of addiction 
expresses a stage three desire, which is operative in lieu of 
the real object of desire, which is merely dreamt about (stage 
one) . Thus the addict settles for the object of addiction, 
hoping to thereby create a stage three desire, when in fact 
the addict has not succeeded in leaving the plane of stage one 
desire. The addict's consciousness, as such, is still asleep 
to itself. The addict wants to think herself awake - thus the 
object of addiction. 6 But the object is fallacious, 7 since 
5 ( ••• continued) 
would come to realize the meaning of her own desire. Because 
this is the case, her desire is "fallacious," meaning that it 
fails to realize (cognize) its own end, but instead stops 
short and latches upon - something unworthy of itself, that 
which becomes the transient object of addiction. But it is 
not specifically the object that creates the addictive 
relation, but the way in which the object is desired. 
6Another way to state this would be to say that the 
addict wishes to fully constitute her selfhood without meeting 
the necessary preconditions for the possibility of selfhood, 
i.e. consistently and systematically utilizing her freedom to 
become a self. Addiction is seen (nonreflectively, in the 
manner of a dreamer) as a short cut to becoming a self. The 
object of addiction, a "thing, " is therefore necessary for the 
"constitution" of the self, since the addict treats herself as 
if she were a thing, attempting to construct herself thusly 
(after the manner of a thing) . Since the self cannot be 
apprehended or constituted as a thing, the entire project of 
the addict to constitute herself after the manner of a thing 
is, therefore, a failure in principle. The "thingness" of the 
object of addiction is important here, for the attempted 
internalization of the same gives rise to the dynamic of 
attempted self-constitution I am outlining. This is true even 
of addictions involving forms of praxis (e.g. sports, war, 
music, love, sex, thinking), since all involve attempts at 
activity based self-constitution and the bleeding of the self 
into the praxis-de-jour. 
This form of desiring (aesthetic) is not addictive 
because it lacks self-consciousness, but because it is 
predicated upon self-deception (Self-consciousness alone lacks 
(continued ... ) 
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the desirer is still only at stage one. Thus the lugubrious-
ness since the addict is nonreflectively aware of her 
condition. This affective condition may or may not be 
manifested empirically. 
Desire, as Sartre says, is a lack of being. 8 It is also 
a choice of being, here (in the case of addiction) unrecog-
nized as such. That is, without desire, choice would appear 
superfluous. Desire is the impulsion to choice, the latter 
being a function of the former. For Sartre, the desire and 
its object may equally well be a function of choice. That is, 
inasmuch as the object of desire is a choice, so is the desire 
itself, at least in the sense that one chooses to be at all. 
For Kierkegaard, however, desires and their objects can 
in no sense be merely a function of choice, as the self is not 
fully self-constituted, but is co-constituted along with the 
6 ( ••• continued) 
the efficacy to deliver us from addiction) . In the case of 
aesthetic desire, it is not merely a question of being 
mistaken in taking a particular object of desire as what is 
desired, but a case of misinter.preting the meaning of one's 
own desire, and therefore seeking a "fallacious" object. 
Although the aesthetic desirer does progress beyond stage one 
(dreaming), through stage two (seeking) and stage three 
(desiring the particular absolutely) , aesthetic desire remains 
forever encapsulated in the dream, and it is within the 
context of the dream that the aesthete operates. The meaning 
of the desire itself has completely escaped the aesthete 
because she has failed to face the structure of her own 
consciousness, but instead remains trapped in its mesmerizing 
surface. The aesthete dreams when she believes that through 
self-deception she can arrive at the truth of her self. 
7It is "true" only in the sense of being a subterfuge. 
8Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. 
Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), 87ff. 
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Power or Ground (God) . 9 This distinction in Sartre and 
Kierkegaard concerning the concepts of desire and choice 
brings with it ramifications concerning the genesis, exodus, 
and revelation of addiction. The basic underlying question in 
play in the dialogue between the two thinkers concerns the 
nature and extent of human freedom. Stated simply, this is: 
"How free are we, really?" This underlying question will be 
in play throughout the course of our discussion of the 
phenomenon of addiction. 
The third stage of desire is the synthesis of the first 
(dreaming) and the second (seeking): The particular object is 
specified and desired absolutely. 10 All three levels of 
desire detailed by Kierkegaard in Either/Or, vol. 1 are levels 
of aesthetic desire. Aesthetic desire, put simply, is the 
desire of an aesthete. The aesthete, for Kierkegaard, is any 
individual (not properly called a "self") that does not exist 
in ethical and/or religious categories, but instead relegates 
"good" and "bad" to a personal calculus of the plea-
sant/unpleasant or the desirable/undesirable. The aesthete 
cannot properly be called a self, says Kierkegaard, because 
the aesthete lacks the necessary preconditions for becoming a 
self. Such preconditions involve the voluntary placing of 
ethical/religious obligations upon oneself so as to allow for 
9
cf. Anti-Climacus [Soren Kierkegaard], The Sickness Unto 
Death, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Prince-
ton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 13, 14. 
wEither/Or, vol. 1, 83. 
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the inf initization and constitution of the self through its 
originary Creator (Power, God). The aesthete lacks such self-
. . d. 11 constituting groun ing. 
Aesthetic desire, as such, creates the condition of 
addiction. The culmination of aesthetic desire (desiring the 
particular absolutely) is addiction. 12 To be a certain kind 
11In order to hold at bay the copious amount of metaphysi-
cal baggage entailed by Soren Kierkegaard's notion of the 
self, we could reformulate his conception of the Ground 
(Power, Creator, God) and its relation to the self, stating 
that: 
(A) The "Ground" is a psychological construct erected by the 
culture/self with a view to producing an integrated/coherent 
version of the self, i.e. a self that can narrate its own 
existence, and can place such a narration within the framework 
of a metanarrative. [cf. Alasdair Macintyre' s After Virtue 
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981)]. With 
this reformulation, we restrict our "metaphysical" claims to 
the nature of the self itself. 
(B) As a result of (A), the self places "ethical-religious" 
obligations upon itself, allowing for the processes of 
infinitization and constitution within itself. These process-
es occur via the self's relation to itself, not via the self's 
relation to the nonself. An "ethico-religious" obligation 
would be that which lifts the self beyond a random succession 
of moments into a sphere where reflectivity and the imputation 
of meaning can transpire. 
It seems clear that no "philosophical" "justification" 
for Kierkegaard's theological commitments is possible. 
Nevertheless, given a shift in the ontological status of the 
commitments, we can reformulate his position to interface our 
own phenomenological reality. 
12If desiring the particular absolutely is addiction, is 
it then the case that desiring the nonparticular absolutely is 
not addiction? This is possibly but not necessarily the case. 
This would entail the notion that the object itself is of 
import in determining the addictiveness/nonaddictiveness of 
the relation. The answer to this question depends upon (A) If 
in fact a nonparticular exists, and (B} The nature of that 
nonparticular. Is it conceivable to have an addictive 
relation with a (the) nonparticular? Certainly? Why is this? 
Because it depends upon the nature of the desirer - not what 
is desired. Therefore, if a (the) nonparticular exists, the 
(continued ... ) 
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of desirer is eo ipso to be(come) an addict. A non-grounded 
desirer (i.e. an individual with a truncated relation to the 
Ground) can do none other than desire the particular absolute-
ly, since there is no absolute object of (aesthetic) de-
sire.13 This creates the metastable condition of being noted 
by Sartre in relation to bad faith. Don Juan, says Kierke-
gaard, represents the power of sensuousness . 14 incarnate. 
Such desire cannot be expressed in words, but only in mu-
. 15 
sic. The desire is reflectively inexpressible. Because 
the desire (project) is at one with consciousness, it can only 
12 ( ... continued) 
relation of desire to this being could be either addictive or 
nonaddictive. It is the constitution of the self itself which 
has decisive bearing upon the addictive/nonaddictive nature of 
the relationship. 
1311 In the end one loves one's desire and not what is 
desired." [Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 93.] 
Addicts desire the object of addiction infinitely because they 
"love" the desire rather than its object. Thus addiction is 
a failure in principle because the infinite desire cannot be 
discharged qua infinite desire. Note that such an ontological 
condition would obtain regardless of object, since addiction 
involves the how rather than the what. Whatness and the 
consequent nonaddictive relation only comes into view subse-
quent to the conversion. We could, of course, deny the 
possibility of "infinite" desire on the grounds of impossibil-
ity or incoherence. This Kierkegaard does not do. I shall 
address this issue specifically at a later point in my 
argument. 
14Either/Or, vol. 1, 87. Don Juan represents the perfec-
tion of aesthetic desire, or, the achievement of wholly 
aesthetic desire. For the aesthete, such a scenario is an 
unrealizable ideal. Therefore, one must be careful not to 
draw parallels in too tight a fashion between Don Juan and the 
addict. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to note that both the 
former and the latter are unrealizable ideals. 
15Either/Or, vol. 1, 100. 
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be nonthetically aware of itself, and therefore cannot be 
consciously aborted as a project. 
' 16 Don Juan's energy is represented by dread. This is a 
psychological condition indicative of a substantial (ontologi-
cal) condition (despair). As with Don Juan, the addict becomes 
one with the object of addiction through dread, and through 
dread cannot separate himself from it. 17 The dread must be 
dealt with as dread, that is, in terms of the subject's 
relation to himself and the Power, as a precondition for the 
possibility of a decathexis (release, unbonding) from the 
object of addiction. Dread (psychological dis-ease) reveals 
despair (ontological/psychological dis-ease); it is not itself 
d ' 18 espair. Yet ongoing dread precipitates despair, just as 
faced dread allows for the possibility of nondespair. 
Despair, unabrogated, precipitates the cognizance and continu-
ance of addiction. Dread is the thread that can lead to the 
16Either/Or, vol. 1, 128, 129. 
17Given the backdrop of The Concept Of Anxiety (angest is 
translated alternately as "dread" by Walter Lowrie [The 
Concept of Dread (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1957) and "anxiety" by Thomte and Anderson; see below) and The 
Sickness Unto Death, this dread certainly need not be reflec-
tive, but such dread is, of course, not ruled out. See 
Vigilius Haufniensis [Soren Kierkegaard], The Concept of 
Anxiety, trans. Reidar Thomte and Albert B. Anderson (Prince-
ton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), and Anti-Climacus 
[Soren Kierkegaard] , The Sickness Unto Death, trans. Howard v. 
Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1983). 
18
cf. The Concept of Anxiety, 73-80. 
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experience of one's own despair and the cognizance of the 
ontological dis-ease that is addiction. 19 
"Don Juan is ideality [imagination] over against actuali-
ty [sensation, perception] ... 1120 Likewise, what the addict 
gets out of the object of addiction is not contained in the 
object itself, but rather is a function of the imagination. 
The same goes for what the addict thinks she gets out of the 
object, also a function of the imagination. As Don Juan is 
ideality over against actuality, so is addiction. 
19This passage is in no way meant to suggest that dread 
(anxiety) is a function of the aesthetic outlook alone. Dread 
signals the experience of the possibility of one's own 
freedom, and, as such, is an indelible aspect of the human 
being. Since this is the case, dread is, to varying degrees, 
present in all spheres of human existence aesthetic, 
ethical, religious, or other (if such exists). Anxiety and 
freedom are co-original. Given that the human being is 
freedom, the psychological manifestation of this realization -
anxiety - is an ever present possibility. 
To say this is also to say that all anxiety is not 
indicative of the ontological condition of despair. Only the 
self that probes the meaning of its own anxiety can come to 
understand whether its anxiety originates from despair, or 
whether it does not. The aesthete, rather than seeking this 
knowledge, flees her own anxiety, and in this flight loses the 
possibility of grasping the meaning of this anxiety. 
Furthermore, to say that all persons experience anxiety 
is not to say that addiction is inevitable. That individual 
who faces her own anxiety with a view to "knowing" its meaning 
is not engaged in a self-deceptive flight from self, but 
rather, utilizes her own anxiety to grapple with her own self-
constitution. The nonaddicted self, like the addicted self, 
is an unrealizable, the teloi of which are, respectively, 
either a flight toward freedom, or a flight from freedom. 
wEither/Or, vol. 1, 133. 
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"An individual does not become happy until he has had the 
tragic. 1121 We, as human beings, are ontologically being-as-
addicted, or addicted-being. That is to say, we are not 
ethically/religiously embodied unless we make the choice (s} to 
be so. Our self-constitution is a function of choice and 
involves ethical/religious categories, lest the self fail in 
the task of inf initizing itself and thus fail to discharge its 
own infinite passion in its relation to the Infinite (God) . 
Aesthetic self-constitution is circular and nonsubstantive in 
that the self seeks to be-come (come to be) via drawing into 
itself (introjecting) the necessary constituents of self-ness, 
among them nonsuperfluity, justification. But in so doing, 
the aesthetic self, as such, experiences a surfeit of exis-
tence, which it must disgustedly spew forth in a contrary (to 
that of self-constitution as detailed heretofore) effort to 
mitigate the experience of becoming engulfed in being. 
This seesawing between introjection and spewing forth is 
an ontological dynamic the aesthetic self cannot help but 
participate in, as its "self" is naught but nothingness 
gliding over the surface of being. The ideality of total 
freedom involves the negation of the possibility of selfhood, 
linked with the ceaseless ontological current of introjec-
tion/extrojection. Being-addicted (that ceaseless and 
ambivalent malaise of introjection/extrojection) is a neces-
sary ontological structure, just as are the original fissure 
21Ei ther /Or, vol. 1, 143. 
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with being (the birth of the for-itself) and the reflective 
ekstasis (the birth of reflective thought and the "objectivi-
ty" of the "self"). When we become conscious of this condi-
tion and its tragedy, we have acquired the necessary but 
insufficient conditions for "happiness." Sufficient condi-
tions would necessitate the conversion. 22 
"The bitterest pain is manifestly remorse, but remorse 
has ethical, not aesthetic reality." 23 Realization of one's 
condition as being-addicted, with the subsequent perpetuation 
of this condition, leads one to an ethical pronouncement 
regarding oneself, i.e. "I should not be this way." In this 
way, the is-ought gap is bridged. We move from ontology to 
ethics, within the unity of a single consciousness. One 
describes this perpetuated condition to oneself as a condition 
of guilt. Once the stage of reflective grief is reached, 
consciousness "ethicizes" itself. 24 Thus ensues the struggle 
of the will (reflective) against the project to-be-addicted 
(nonreflective) . 
Reflective grief, says Kierkegaard, can become "perma-
11 d h ' d f umb 1 ' f 25 nent an t us provi e a "sense o n re ie . " In 
reflective grief, sorrow constantly and unsuccessfully seeks 
2211 Happiness 11 as "self-alignment." More on "conversion" 
in chapter four. 
nEither/Or, vol. 1, 146. 
24
cf. Either/Or, vol. 1, 163-211: "Shadowgraphs." 
~Either/Or, vol. 1, 169, 170. 
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its object. This is certainly true of the addict, who 
experiences this "object" as necessarily external to herself. 
The reflective grief which creates and sustains addiction is 
a function of missing one's self. There is no external way of 
rectifying this ontological condition. 
Kierkegaard's aesthete expatiates on the character of 
Donna Elvira (from the opera "Don Juan") in Either/Or, vol. 1. 
He states regarding Elvira's love for Don Juan that "Her love 
is even from the beginning a kind of despair; nothing has any 
significance for her, either in heaven or on earth, except Don 
26 Juan." Don Juan functions as the object of addiction for 
Donna Elvira. Were she to lose Don Juan, she would lose 
"herself. 11 Thus her relation to the object is rooted in 
despair; the despair of seeking the "self" in the object 
(other) and the fear of the possibility of the loss of that 
object ("self"). Her "self" is not consciously grounded in 
her own freedom, consequently, she is in an ontological 
condition of despair. She is not the locus of her own 
selfhood; she seeks this selfhood (despairingly) in the object 
(other) . 
Such 11 selfhood 11 is always open to collapse before the 
freedom of the other, or before the reflective apprehension of 
one's project in relation to the object (other) . Thus 
incessant, necessary despair, at least at the nonreflective 
level. When reflectivity is involved, consciousness "ethici-
uEither/Or, vol. 1, 189. 
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zes" itself. Thus Donna Elvira experiences her own being as 
"damned" as a result of her inability to separate herself from 
the object of her passion, Don Juan. She cannot effect the 
disunion (praxiological); for her, this is because she is 
damned (ontological) . 27 
Returning to the aesthete, we come upon Kierkegaard's 
notion of the "unhappiest man." The unhappiest man, writes 
Kierkegaard, cannot love because he is always absent, never 
present to himself. "He cannot love, for love is in the 
present, and he has no present, no future, and no past ... he 
27Donna Elvira desires Don Juan alone. It may be said, 
therefore, that she has "purity of heart," due to the fact 
that she desires one thing, and one thing alone. Again, it 
must be stated that it is not the what of the desire that 
makes the relation addictive, but the how of the desire. It 
is clear that Donna Elvira was willing to sacrifice even her 
"true self" for Don Juan - precisely a drive operative in the 
addicted relation. She sought herself through Don Juan, thus 
attempting to utilize him as a conduit for her own self-
consti tut ion. This dynamic, which is a component of the 
Sartrean love relation, shall be discussed at length in 
chapter 4. 
Could Donna Elvira be subsumed under Kierkegaard's 
aesthetic type? If one can shoulder the position that nothing 
in heaven or earth has any significance for Donna Elvira 
except Don Juan, and that this could be an ethical/religious 
type of existence, then the answer is no. Can she "love" Don 
Juan in an apparently ethical/religious way and still not be 
ethical or religious? How is it that her relation to her soul 
object of desire is ethical or religious? How can we know the 
answer to this question, in any case? This question points to 
the need for a phenomenology of desire, that which can ferret 
out the essential characteristics of each kind of desire. 
In any case, it seems to me that the (aesthetic) addic-
tion which characterizes Don Juan is categorically different 
from the addiction of Donna Elvira, be the latter aesthetic or 
no. Don Juan is addicted to an experience which he produces 
via many objects, whereas Donna Elvira is addicted to an 
experience which she believes can be produced only through a 
single object, Don Juan. 
115 
has no passion, not because he is destitute of it, but 
b ' 1 1 h h h ' ' II ZS ecause simu taneous y e as t e opposite passion. The 
unhappiest man is the aesthete, says Kierkegaard. The 
aesthete as addict is he who attempts to anchor his conflic-
tual passional nature in the object of addiction. He becomes 
"present" to the object to the degree in which he "loses" 
himself in it, and such "losing" vitiates his conscious need 
for the construction of his own selfhood. 29 He only recog-
nizes himself as the unhappiest man when the project of 
addiction breaks down, that is, becomes reflective. The 
unhappiest man attempts to give himself ~ nature (essence) 
through the object of addiction, which would be the same thing 
as freedom attempting to freely truncate itself (short of 
death, which in fact would be the success of this very 
project). 
"There is a sadness in the autumn which entirely corre-
spends to the emotion evoked by the thought of the fulfillment 
f I d . 30 o ones esires." So spoke the seducer-in Kierkegaard's 
28Either/Or, vol. 1, 220-224. 
29Addiction as the "unselfing" of man. "Unegoistic" 
morality, for Nietzsche, involves the unselfing of man, it 
involves resistance to "natural instincts." The addict 
unselfs himself in discharging the "will to power" (instinct 
for freedom) vicariously (surreptitiously) into the surrogate 
object (the object of addiction). Power (freedom) is in fact 
not discharged but is instead introjected into one's own being 
- freedom turned back upon itself, trying to tie its own hands 
- making oneself sick. Thus, the "unhappiest" man. Cf. 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New 
York: Vintage, 1969), 292. 
30Either/Or, vol.1, 434. 
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"Diary of the Seducer." The addict desires to perpetuate his 
desire so as to be (surreptitiously) something. One seeks in 
this case to suppress consciousness of one's own freedom so as 
to be something (in bad faith). Addiction, then, as the 
project of forever unsatiated desire, would grant the addict 
a continuity which would function in lieu of the (real 
desiring) self. Addiction here is seen as the (nonreflective) 
perpetual desire to desire perpetually, the desire to immure 
oneself within one's own incessant desiring, to desire 
irresistably so as to have a stage three project. This is a 
necessary failure, as freedom is used to constrict rather than 
31 
expand the self. The self (as addict) is nonreflectively 
aware of this . 32 
The seducer concludes his diary by telling us that in 
aesthetic drugging, aesthetic self-narcosis "Everything is 
31
"Incessant desiring" issuing in a result that is a 
necessary failure involves self-constriction because the 
"incessant desire" is the result of a false self that is 
constructed by the "real" self to mask the self's ambiguity 
and ambivalence. It is a project in bad faith to give oneself 
an essence which constricts the self, not the "incessant 
desiring" or the "necessary failure," per se, were they able 
to come about in other ways. The project to desire incessant-
ly is a project to rein one's own freedom, a project to 
forever captivate (capture) the self via the object of desire. 
It is, again, not incessant desire itself which constricts the 
self, but the project to desire incessantly. 
320n the distinction between "knowledge of" and "con-
sciousness of" see Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 
trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library,n.d.), 
1-lvi. Knowledge contains a reflective compon~nt that 
"awareness" or "consciousness of" lacks. "Nonreflective 
awareness of" is thus a consciousness of but not a knowledge 
of the phenomenon in question. 
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symbol; I myself am a myth about myself." Exactly. The 
object of addiction functions as a symbol for the self-that-
is-not; this myth is grounded in and perpetuated by the self 
that in its freedom chooses not to be a self, but rather an 
addict (mythic self-construct). Addiction is the project of 
symbol-izing the self. rather than creating the self ;Qy being 
34 the self. The object of addiction is the surrogate symbol-
ic self functioning in place of the self I refuse to be. When 
the addict sees this mythology as pathology, the is-ought gap 
is bridged and the addict is at a crossroad which signals two 
33Either/Or, vol. 1, 439. 
34Symbol-izing the self is different from creating the 
self in that 
(A) "Symbol-izing the self" refers to the project whereby I 
seek to become a self that I am not, a false self, the addict. 
Since I chose not to utilize my freedom to become my self, I 
symbol-ize the absent self so as to give the illusion of 
selfhood. The telos of self-symbol-ization is a false 
self/false consciousness. The process of self-symbol-ization 
is a flight from freedom. Self-symbol-ization is addictive 
because it is a process of masking/entangling one's own 
freedom. 
(B) Creating the self is the process whereby I utilize my 
freedom, within the given parameters of my existence, to 
become my self. The telos of self-creation is the self/lucid 
consciousness. The process of self-creation is a utilization 
of and movement toward freedom. Self-creation is not an 
addictive process, because it involves this utilization 
of /flight toward freedom. 
Because I am freedom, a movement away from freedom is a 
movement away from my self, and a movement toward freedom is 
a movement toward myself. My freedom is the only power I have 
with which to constitute myself, and, therefore, inso.far as I 
move away from my freedom, I drain from myself the power 
necessary for self-constitution. 
118 
d · 1 · 1 d' · 35 isparate onto ogica imensions. In the stage of (nonre-
flective) denial, of course, the mythology is functional 
reality. Therefore, I am an addict. I no longer have to 
grope for an essence. 
The aesthete, for Kierkegaard, lacks selfhood: "He [the 
aesthete] does not possess himself; only when the world 
trembles before him is he tranquilized. 1136 To not-be oneself 
is to-be-addicted. One can either discharge freedom to become 
a self, or to become an addict. The polarities of discharge 
are oppositional; one cannot simultaneously achieve the status 
of addict and self. The constitution of selfhood involves 
sustained reflective ekstatic facing of the self (freedom) . 
The constitution of addiction as a mode of being involves 
sustained aversion to the imagined fruits of this very 
reflective ekstasis. Self-constitution involves a necessary 
journey into self-understanding and awareness. The journey 
into addiction involves the necessary obscuring and blotting 
out of the truth about the self. The journey into addiction 
35
"What is the seal of attained freedom [alternate 
translation: liberation]? No longer being ashamed in front of 
oneself." [Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter 
Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974), 220 (aphorism 275) .] 
The addict, as such, is ashamed in front of herself, exhibit-
ing the fact that she has not attained freedom [liberation] ; 
nonaddiction appears to her as a necessary prerequisite for 
this liberation, the floating of detachment among the "ob-
jects" which people her existence. 
36Victor Eremita, (ed.) [Soren Kierkegaard], Either/Or, 
vol. 2, trans. Walter Lowrie and Howard A. Johnson (Garden 
City, NY: Anchor, 1959), 191. 
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is built upon this very blotting out. Self-constitution is a 
journey into truth; addiction is a journey into falsehood. 
One cannot move simultaneously into truth and into falsehood. 
The addict makes a bold epistemological claim in the staking 
of her ontological condition: "I do not want to know myself." 
In fact, when the addict realizes (reflectively) that she 
would rather destroy herself than know herself, consciousness 
has reached the level of ethical pronouncement regarding 
itself. Consciousness here recognizes the abysmal and 
destructive nature of its own project. It can in no sense 
call the project "free" or "good," but only the choice of a 
37 
coward who refuse to know and be herself. In summary: 
addiction involves a movement away from the freedom that one 
is, whereas self-constitution involves a utilization of and 
movement toward or with this very freedom. 
The addict: only when she trembles before the world is 
she tranquilized. Tranquilization is the goal, and it is only 
achievable through the narcotic art of addiction. Thereby, 
37Perhaps we should pity rather than judge the addict who 
flees herself because she either knows or fears the poverty of 
herself. Could such an addict's "cure" be some decisive 
action on her part? Only if she can overcome the fear of the 
nature of herself to the degree that she can cease to flee 
herself. The question thus becomes one concerning how the 
addict overcomes her own "self"-fear. I would like to suggest 
that self-love is essential for this to transpire, and that 
such self-love can be achieved only subsequent to (or concur-
rent with) the experience of being loved. The attempt to 
demonstrate these contentions is beyond the scope of this 
work. Nevertheless, I believe that they are of major import 
and cannot be easily sidestepped when focusing on the issue of 
the movement from an addicted to a nonaddicted mode of being. 
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the anguish of freedom is made nonreflective while the anguish 
of addiction is reflectively apprehended. The addict thus 
focuses on the reality of her addiction, rather than on the 
fact that she has no self. 
Would such an addicted "self" have reason to be melan-
cholic? How could it be otherwise? Melancholy, for Kierke-
gaard, is a meaningful experience. Melancholy signals the 
presence of hysteria of spirit. 38 Why hysteria? It is due 
to the damming up of the spirit (freedom} within oneself, and 
the consequent damning of the self. Addiction is an attempt 
to regain control of this spirit out of control, without 
allowing freedom to take itself as an end. Hysteria is 
preferred to the anguish entailed by the apprehension of 
h . 39 not 1ngness. The disabusing of the self would necessarily 
. 1 . h' b 40 1nvo ve peering over t is a yss . 
38Ei ther /Or, vol. 2, 193. 
39 And the consequent necessity of freedom. 
40
cf.: "Ah, mon cher, for anyone who is alone, without God 
and without a master, the weight of days is dreadful. Hence 
one must choose a master, God being out of style." [Albert 
Camus, The Fall, trans. Justin O'Brien (New York: Vintage, 
1956) I 133 •] 
Freedom is too great a burden to bear. Slavery is preferable. 
Since the human person, for Kierkegaard, is a relation, he can 
relate to himself in a slavish manner. But since he is the 
relation, there remains only a fear-induced relation of 
slavery to oneself, a scenario devoid of a master. Freedom is 
not truncated, but only unrealized, and since being is a 
function of doing, the addict is not free in fact. He has 
abnegated his own freedom by means of that very freedom, one 
of the dizzying possibilities of the infinitude that is 
freedom. One can therefore destroy one's own being [freedom] 
by means of that very freedom. This is a form of auto-
cannibalism, and, as Sartre says is true of all vice, involves 
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The Judge in Either/Or, vol. 2, states that "Every 
aesthetic view of life is despair .... 11 41 The despairing 
being is capable only of relating to "objects" in an addictive 
way - he cannot maintain a proper distance to them, viz. he 
cannot even maintain the distance to them that he wants to 
maintain. Here Kierkegaard equates despair with being 
42 
constantly "beyond yourself." This is the definition of 
transcendence for Sartre, which is the self. The self as 
necessarily in despair. This, again, would be the natural, 
43 
unconverted self, as opposed to the converted self. The 
transcendence that is freedom cannot get beyond itself, yet 
also it cannot be contained within the self, it cannot be 
self-possessed. The slippage of the self; the self runs away 
from itself in freedom. 
"Doubt is a despair of thought, despair is a doubt of 
h 1 . 44 t e persona ity." Despair is ontological, not psychologi-
the desire to fail. [see Being and Nothingness, p. 379.) 
The paradox expressed in The Fall hinges on the horns of 
freedom and guilt. Jean-Baptiste Clamence finds himself 
guilty (by his own reckoning) in a world devoid of any pre-
established moral values. Since there is no God to expiate 
this guilt, freedom is seen as the culprit: If one is not 
free, she cannot become guilty. Therefore, Clamence preaches 
universal guilt and the "salvation" of collective slavery. 
The slave can only say yes or no. The freedom of the rebel as 
addict. cf. chapter two, part two of the present work. 
41Either/Or, vol. 2, 197. 
42Either/Or, vol. 2, 199. 
43 I will develop this claim further in chapter four. 
44 • h I Eit er Or, vol. 2, 215. 
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45 
cal. It is indicative of something other than itself; it 
is a meaningful experience, it is a sign. " .... [T] he true 
point of departure for finding the absolute is not doubt but 
despair" 46 because despair is ontological, and knowledge (for 
Kierkegaard and Sartre) is not psychological, but rather, a 
mode of being. Despair is the starting point for choosing 
oneself, choosing oneself is the starting point for knowing. 
The addict is in despair whether she knows this or not, just 
like the self that has an improper relation to itself and the 
Ground, since the addict is this self. 47 
"Every finite despair is a choice of finiteness. 1148 In 
addiction, one chooses the finite with infinite passion - a 
necessary failure. One cannot choose finiteness infinitely 
without choosing failure. Why infinite passion? Because 
freedom is infinite and thus must be directed to an object 
' h ' lf 49 commensurate wit itse . In psychological terms, the 
infinite passion is directed toward the object of "ultimate 
45See The Sickness Unto Death, 25. 
46Either/Or, vol. 2, 217. 
47
cf. The Sickness Unto Death, 15. 
48Either/Or, vol. 2, 225. 
49Addiction is an attempt to finitize the object of 
infinite passion in order to control it (a circuitous attempt 
at self- control) . It is an attempt to (re) capture s·elfhood, 




concern." Such an object allows for the gathering together 
of the fragments of the would-be personality. But the 
fragmentation remains if the object is inconunensurate with the 
passion with which it is attended. 51 
Addiction, as can be seen from an analysis of Kierke-
gaard's Either/Or, vols. 1 and 2, is a function of missing 
one's self. Addiction involves a flight from self towards the 
object of addiction, the object of addiction functioning as a 
surrogate for the self the addict has failed to be. 52 Fur-
therrnore, the aesthetic desirer is the addict because she does 
not meet the necessary preconditions for the possibility of 
self-constitution. The tools necessary for the acquisition of 
selfhood have been bartered away for the experience of "unity" 
with the object of addiction - an ephemeral, illusory experi-
ence. It is for this reason that I contend that addiction 
50See Paul Tillich, The Courage To Be (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1964), 47. 
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•••• [L] ife is not a product of morality: it wants 
deception, it lives on deception." [Friedrich Nietzsche, 
Human, All Too Human, 6.] 
The addict self-deceptively seeks to ground her being (over-
come her contingency) via finitely infinitizing herself, 
without being infinitized by the Infinite. For Kierkegaard 
(and I believe him to be correct), this is an impossibility. 
52Addictive "self"-creation is a movement toward being; 
real self-creation is a movement toward freedom. At times, 
only an acute observer can ascertain the difference. This is, 
of course, because the reality of the situation isn't always 
reflectively evident even to the addict herself. In nonaddic-
tive self-creation, will and intention move together in union 
toward possibilities of freedom, whereas in addictive "self"-
creation, will may or may not be synchronous with intention. 
Intention, in the latter case, however, remains directed 
toward being. 
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involves the sacrifice of the real. It is to this topic that 
we need to turn next, and it shall in fact be the focus of our 
inquiry in the next section. 
Section B 
Addiction Involves the Sacrifice of the Real 
Addiction and erotic (aesthetic) love are alike in that 
they both have as an ideal the legitimation of being and the 
synchronous negation of the real. Regarding love, Kierkegaard 
says it like this: "The idea is the life principle in erotic 
love and, if necessary, one must sacrifice life for it and 
even erotic love itself. "53 Thus, the project based on the 
(nonthetic) idea shall decimate the real even beyond the 
failure of the project, even beyond the death of love itself. 
This destructive and self-destructive behavior is addiction. 
Notice that one sacrifices the real for the ideal, yet only 
the real does and can exist. Herein lies the destruc-
tive/self-destructive dimension. It is the equivocation of 
two noninterchangeable, forever separate realms. The real 
fuels the fire of ideality. The burning of one's being. 
Addiction, as a flight from the real, involves the addict 
in behavior aimed at self-narcosis. Since the pain of 
existence is too great to bear, the addict engages in self-
anaesthetizing behavior, behavior once sedimented she cannot 
53R ' ' 40 epet1t1on, 1 . Underlining mine. 
125 
dispense with, for fear of facing her own pain (that is, her 
self). "A person can achieve a sameness [of behavior]," says 
Kierkegaard, "that has a far more anaesthetic power than the 
most whimsical amusements, and becomes more and more power-
ful. "54 This inflexibility of behavior is precisely the 
empirical manifestation of the nonthetic project to-be-
addicted, a project of the weak. "The weak 11 is a category 
that comprises any individual who "cannot" be herself or 
himself, any individual who "cannot" face his or her own pain. 
This pain is, at least in part, the consequence of failing to 
face oneself. And, the failure to face oneself itself creates 
this pain. Therefore, the self-effacement (non-self-facement) 
operative in addiction compounds the pain the addict feels as 
a consequence of not facing and becoming herself. Yes, as the 
54Repetition, 179. cf. also Nietzsche's Genealogy of 
Morals, 2nd essay, section 17: 86, 87: "The instinct for 
freedom, forcibly made latent and vented upon itself is the 
beginning of the bad conscience." Addiction can be seen, 
utilizing Nietzsche's nomenclature, as the weak man's enter-
tainment: cruelty turned inward, coupled with narcoticization. 
Once one accepts (nonreflectively) the premise that one's 
instinct for freedom should be made latent, she is complicit 
in creating in herself her own bad conscience. The addict 
sees the object of addiction as a way to exercise her "latent" 
freedom in an "innocuous" way, but ends up by projecting the 
"addiction" as the source (cause) of her bad conscience. If 
the addict breaks with the object of addiction, she continues 
to experience the bad conscience as a result of her (still) 
latent freedom and so seeks a new object for her latent 
freedom - which then becomes the new object of addiction - in 
order to attempt to truncate the bad conscience and exercise 
her freedom. This circular exercise perpetually results in 
failure. The instinct for freedom, for Nietzsche, equals the 
"will to power." The "will to power" may be utilized as an 
alternate conceptualization when discussing the free-
dom/addiction paradox. 
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pain increases, the likelihood that one will achieve a 
nonaddicted mode of being decreases. 
Following this line of reasoning, one may say that the 
addict had no pain prior to the time she refused to face 
herself. The question as to the motivation for addiction then 
comes to the fore. But, for Kierkegaard, all individuals are 
born in "untruth" ( II ' II ) 55 sin , meaning that they have not yet 
thetically (reflectively) faced themselves. Therefore, the 
refusal to face oneself must be a reflective endeavor, 
following upon the heels of the realization of the possibility 
of thetic self-knowledge. The self, therefore, is born into 
untruth about itself, meaning that it has no understanding of 
its own nature. Pain is an unavoidable response to the 
realization that one has heretofore had no understanding of 
one's own nature (and the recognition of the consequent poor 
choices this must have entailed) . Conclusion: Pain is 
inevitable in the process of waking up to oneself. Addiction 
is a "way out" of this pain by an attempted reversal of this 
waking process - a self-induced somnambulism. 
"I am completely convinced that he does not know the girl 
at all ... she is the girl - period. 1156 So said Constantin 
Constantius, the "writer" of Kierkegaard's Repetition, of a 
55Johannes Climacus [Soren Kierkegaard], Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments, trans. 
David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1968), 186-191. Hereafter referred to as 
the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. 
56R • • 8 epet1t1on, 1 5. 
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young man once smitten with erotic love in the pages of the 
same work. The girl is a category, a representation-object, 
a symbol. That is to say, the girl functions for the lover as 
the object of addiction functions for the addict. This is the 
case because the relations are identical - they are both cases 
of addiction. The girl is symbol-ized by the young lover and 
thus made valuable as a conduit for the potential recovery of 
his being. Thus the idealizing project that is erotic love is 
impelled by the same metaproject as that underlying addiction. 
Repetition (renewal) in Kierkegaard is the possibility of 
freedom, and involves a transcendent religious movement "by 
virtue of the absurd. "57 The possibility of freedom becomes 
a (reflective) possibility only after the (reflective) 
experience of 58 bondage. This experience of bondage is 
57Repetition, 305. In addition to this explication on 
page 305(draft), Kierkegaard advances and seeks to legitimate 
these claims throughout the entirety of this short volume. 
Since it is beyond the scope of this work to replicate 
Kierkegaard's arguments here, I suggest that the curious 
reader consult Kierkegaard' text (as well as Sartre's texts on 
conversion. See the section in this present work on the 
conversion in Sartre) for a more full-bodied comparison. 
58What is the origin of the experience of bondage? Some 
of its origins may be delineated as follows: 
(A) The fact and realization that one is born into "untruth," 
meaning, effectively, that one's knowledge about oneself is, 
to some degree, obscured. Since this is necessarily the case 
before one wakes up to the nature of her self through 
sustained reflectivity (reflective ekstasis), insofar as it is 
the case, the self is in bondage to its own ignorance of it's 
self. One misinterprets one's own 
thoughts/desires/intentions/emotions/behavior - necessarily. 
(B) The fact that the nonconverted for-itself seeks being as 
its end. Having the project of the recovery of being as an 
underlying intentional telos circumscribes the freedom of the 
for-itself, preventing it from unleashing itself to the 
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precisely the experience of addiction. Without the experience 
of bondage, repetition would not even become an issue; it 
would appear superfluous. 
The notion of repetition in Kierkegaard has striking 
similarities to the notion of conversion in Sartre. First, 
both involve a reflective awareness of one's personal ontolog-
ical condition and one's ontological condition vis-a-vis 
existence in tote. Secondly, both repetition and conversion 
become issues following the experience of bondage to a 
metaproject that was heretofore outside the realm of one's 
reflective awareness. Thirdly, both repetition and conversion 
involve ontological reconstitution. Finally, both are 
likewise valuable and necessary when deciphering Kierkegaard-
ian and Sartrean texts on love and addiction. 
Addiction is at-one-ment (with the object of addiction) 
without atonement (ontological reconstitution) . Repetition is 
the true atonement, and is absent from the addictive experi-
59 
ence . This means that the addict has sought ontological 
reconstitution (restructuring) by means of the object of 
realization of the full scope of its freedom. The for-itself 
is in bondage to the degree that it fails to achieve reflec-
tive awareness of its own intentional project to be. 
(C) The dread (anxiety) and guilt that surround the perception 
of one's own finitude and mortality, as well as the realiza-
tion that one's self has no substantive essence, is "nothing." 
Dread may also arise from the perception of one's own super-
fluity or contingency, especially as one perceives these in 
the face of the Other. 
{D) The experience of bondage may also result from engaging in 
behavior that one considers to be unethical. 
59 f . . 3 c . Repetition, 11, 312. 
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addiction in lieu of reconstitution within the self itself in 
relation to the Power. The object of addiction merely 
functions as a subterfuge to prevent ontological reconstitu-
tion proper, which could occur via the transcendent movement 
that is repetition. Repetition is the process by which the 
self is born unto itself, the very process addiction vitiates. 
The at-one-ment of addiction, as "nonwilled" union, is 
accompanied by experiential negativity. Kierkegaard tells us 
that "If freedom here [in repetition] now discovers an 
obstacle, then it must lie in freedom itself. 1160 This means 
that 11 nonwilled 11 union is precisely this obstacle - a function 
of freedom itself! Addiction, then, is a project of freedom. 
In a draft of the Concept of Anxiety, Kierkegaard views 
61 habit as including "the . disappearance of self-awareness. 11 
When habit becomes addiction, it involves a painfully acute, 
heightened sense of self-awareness, albeit unwelcomed. It is 
h b ' h h b l' 62 a 1 t t at as ecome ma 1gnant. Such heightened self-
60Repetition, 320 (Deleted from margin} . 
61 ' ' Repet1t1on, 327. 
62How is habit different from addiction? Are some habits 
addictions? Addictions are different from habits in that 
(A} Addiction, in contrast to habit, involves painful self-
awareness, that from which the addict seeks to flee. Habit, 
contrariwise, involves the loss of self-awareness. Habit is 
thoroughly nonreflective, whereas addiction is not. 
(B} Addiction involves the project to be, whereas habit does 
not. This means, simply, that one cannot tell through 
behavior and its frequency alone whether or not addiction is 
present. It is the intention and the will of the for-itself 
that determine whether habit or addiction (or neither} are 
present. Habit is addiction if and only if they are teleolog-
ically synonymous, and, if this is the case, the habit is no 
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awareness the addict tries to extinguish. Addiction, again, 
is seen as the project of the self to extinguish itself (a 
failure in principle, short of suicide, if this is not in fact 
also a failure on the same or different grounds). Indeed, it 
is the project to extinguish that very self-awareness that 
would lead to the possibility of ontologica1 reconstitution 
through the transcendent movement that is repetition. 
Section C 
Addiction Involves Freedom's Auto-entanglement 
and the 
Refusal to Face One's Own Anxiety 
Anxiety is the trembling of human being as it beholds its 
own possibility, as it recognizes its unavoidable and inexora-
ble task of becoming a self, its self. Lucid awareness of 
ourselves and our existential condition brings with it the 
experience of anxiety, which the addict tries to circumvent 
through her object of addiction. 
Addiction is "entangled freedom" where "freedom is not 
free in itself but is entangled, not by necessity, but by 
longer habit, but is reducible to an addiction. 
(C) Is the experience of bondage present? If not, the case in 
question is a case of habit alone. The difficulty, it may be 
noted, arises when we ask whether bondage must be a reflective 
experience. Bondage may be experienced as a systemic and 
amorphous dis-ease, and may not be consciously linked in any 
way to the object of addiction. Therefore, if such a case 
transpires, bondage is not reflective. 
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. t lf 1163 1 se . Anxiety is entangled freedom, which is neither a 
64 
category of necessity nor of freedom. Nothing gives birth 
to anxiety, that is, the apprehension of the nothing (freedom) 
that we are. Addiction is the flight from this nothing, 
toward being. Anxiety involves both a "sympathetic antipathy" 
d II t ' th t ' th II d dd ' ' 65 an an an ipa e ic sympa y - as oes a 1ct1on. The 
ambivalence inherent in the addictive relation: desire and 
repulsion, yet all the while being in the grip of an "alien 
66 power." Addiction is an attempt to mask this nothing which 
we are - which we have to be - by a "necessary freedom, " which 
is, in fact, freedom entangled in itself but unrecognized as 
such. Spirit relates to itself and its possibility via 
anxiety. Addiction is the attempt in bad faith to suppress 
63
cf. The Concept of Anxiety, 49. 
64The Concept of Anxiety, 49. 
65See The Concept of Anxiety, 42. 
66The Concept of Anxiety, 235 (from Kierkegaard's Jour-
nals). For an illuminating post-Freudian discussion of 
ambivalence within the context of family systems, see Alice 
Miller, The Drama of the Gifted Child: The Search for the True 
Self, trans. Ruth Ward (New York: Basic Books, 1990), 23-34. 
[Originally published as Das Drama des begabten Kindes 
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag Frankfurt am Main, 1979) . ] Miller 
underscores her belief that "True liberation can only be found 
beyond the deep ambivalence of infantile dependence." [pp. 23, 
24.] The addict as such has not as yet proceeded beyond her 
fundamental infantile ambivalence in terms of her object 
relations with the world. Therefore, she can iri no way 
experience liberation, it being the case that she lives in a 
world filled only with alluring webs of entrapment. 
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the anxiety of this conditionality, 67 to parry our anxiety 
over the nothing that is our being. 68 
"Anxiety is the dizziness of freedom. 1169 Addiction is 
a project to overcome (suppress) this dizziness. Dizziness 
is indicative of one's ontological condition, blotted out 
(relegated to the nonreflective) from the addict's subjectivi-
ty. The process is a failure, as fear transplants anxiety 
with the object-relation fear the addict experiences in 
relation to the object of addiction. The particular, specific 
object-relation fear is transposed upon the universal (nonspe-
cific) experience of anxiety. Even if the former is experi-
enced as preferential, the latter cannot be wholly suppressed. 
67 
cf. The Concept of Anxiety, 44. 
68
"Man would rather will nothingness than not will." 
[Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, 3rd essay, section 28: 
162, 163.) 
As a result of the existential vacuum that he is [the nothing-
ness of freedom, the valuelessness of being prior to free 
determination], man experienced no meaning in life [that is, 
he experienced the inherent meaninglessness of existence] , and 
thus acted so as to create meaning and thereby overcome this 
lack. Addiction is an attempt to create meaning by the 
repeated process of willing the same thing. The addict 
persists in this behavior, fearfully believing that it is 
better to have a "negative" [self-indicting, "evil"] meaning, 
than to risk the possibility of having none at all (or, that 
it is preferable to the risk involved in the attempt to go 
outside oneself to another, or to the Ground). Such "quanti-
fication" of willing in no way affects the existential 
qualification of the will, which is always tertiary to (a 
tributary of) the project. The will to power as the will to 
quantification. 
69The Concept of Anxiety, 61. 
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Thus the counterpoint of fear-anxiety which harrows the being 
of the addict. 70 
Fear is in relation to guilt because guilt is the only 
source of the loss of freedom. 71 The relation of freedom to 
guilt is that of a continuum: I am responsible for the 
diminution of my self (loss of freedom), and I am responsible 
for the expansion of the self (utilization of freedom) . Guilt 
involves the loss of freedom. The loss of freedom involves 
the loss of self. The loss of self involves one in addictive 
relations with one's world in order to recoup this self (a 
/ 
necessary failure) . The task of the self, according to 
Kierkegaard, is to become itself. Failing this, the self 
accrues guilt and the loss of freedom. As one is responsible 
70This passage is not meant in any way to suggest that all 
attempts to escape from the anxiety of freedom are addictions. 
One can seek escape through taking two Xanax, a couple of 
Valium, watching a Woody Allen film, eating two boxes of Pop 
Tarts and washing them down with two liters of Coca Cola. One 
could ride 120 miles on a bicycle, call fourteen people in 
succession on the telephone, or watch MTV for three hours. 
One could play an album of Roxy Music, followed by albums of 
Hank Williams, Stan Kenton, and Frankie Widder. Or, one could 
get married. In all of these ways, anxiety may be terminated, 
lessened, or masked. Does this make the behavior addictive? 
I am not prepared to say so. Behavior alone is always 
insufficient to determine the existence of addiction. The 
marks of addiction are specified throughout this chapter, and 
the above behaviors may or may not in fact be addictions. It 
depends, again, on the object of the behavior in question, the 
telos of the actor. 
71The origin of guilt is the suppression of the self. It 
is also a function of the decision of the self not to be 
certain possible selves, these possible selves being negated 
by the self in the very act of choosing a self. That is to 
say, the destruction of possibility creates guilt within the 
self. To live is to choose, and to choose is to destroy 
possibility. Therefore, to live is to incur guilt. 
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for becoming oneself, one is responsible for the consequences 
of the failure to become oneself, i.e. guilt and loss of 
freedom. 
Freedom and guilt are antithetical: " .... the opposite of 
f d ' 'l 72 ree om is gui t." Fear, loss of freedom, and guilt are 
always intertwined, but always in an ambiguous, ever-changing 
way. Addiction, as the experience of the loss of freedom, is 
also the concomitant realization (recognition) of one's own 
guilt. Guilt, as utilized here, does not have to be defined 
ethically (at least not initially), but ontologically. Guilt 
is the ontological recognition of the discrepancy between the 
73 
way things are and the way things ought to be. Existence 
' lf ' ' f ' 74 itse is seen as an imper ection. The recognition of 
addiction per se involves the simultaneous recognition of 
"bondage" or "limited" freedom. The recognition of guilt 
involves the simultaneous recognition of one's own freedom and 
culpability. Addiction is thus the absurd, the unthinkable, 
72The Concept of Anxiety, 107, 108. 
73 
cf. Cervantes' Man of La Mancha: "True insanity is to 
accept the world as it is and not as it should be." If this 
were the case, the truly guiltless would be she who is 
thoroughly insane. 
74 
cf. Jean-Paul Sartre's Nausea, trans. Lloyd Alexander 
(New York: New Directions, 1964), lOlff. Also note the 
following, taken from the same work: 
" .... I find the same desire again: to drive existence out of 
me ... " [p. 175] 
" .... the sin of existing." [p. 177] 
" .... I was In the way for eternity." [p. 129] 
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75 the paradox. The place where reason does not penetrate. 
Addiction as hell. To think the paradox that is addiction 
would be to eradicate the mythical belief that the locus of 
bondage is outside the self. 
"The good is freedom. 1176 This is true for both Kierke-
77 gaard and Sartre. Addiction, as the experience of the loss 
of freedom ( 11 unfreedom 11 ) is negated as good by this standard. 
Good and evil, for Kierkegaard, are always in concrete and 
never in abstracto, therefore, freedom cannot be thought. The 
object of addiction becomes an object for thought, "masking" 
freedom, which cannot become an object for thought, cannot 
become abstract, but must be real-ized (not thought) concrete-
ly. Thus the object is intended to "block" the vision 
(experience) of the nothingness of freedom. The object 
functions as a device for surrogate self-objectification via 
projection. 78 Addiction is thus an attempt to circumvent the 
impossibility of self-objectification. 
7511 Absurd 11 and "paradox" as here utilized are meant in no 
way to designate that specific "object" which Kierkegaard 
often denoted by them, namely, the Incarnation of the son of 
God. I am using "absurd" and "paradox" here to suggest a 
situation of apparent irrationality, contradiction, senseless-
ness. For it is, in part, precisely because the addict can 
make "no sense" of her predicament that she remains trapped 
within it. 
76The Concept of Anxiety, 110. 
77It is also true for de Beauvoir. See Simone de Beau-
voir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, trans. Bernard Frechtman 
(Secaucus, NJ: Citadel Press, 1980), 70-80, 156. 
78 
cf. chapter one on the impossibility of becoming an 
object for oneself. 
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"Freedom is infinite and arises out of nothing. 1179 
Sartre's view exactly. The end of all legitimate action is 
freedom itself, for Sartre, showing clearly that freedom 
functions as the infinite within the Sartrean paradigm. 
Freedom functions as an infinite within the Kierkegaardian 
paradigm. Freedom, for both Kierkegaard and Sartre, is 
viewed as the only legitimate and appropriate object of 
infinite passion 80 (freedom) . The kosher (legitimate) 
. . f f d . f . . . f . . 81 circuit o ree om: in inity to in inity. 
Kierkegaard delineates a concept he calls "inclosing 
reserve" in The Concept of Anxiety. As the term suggests, an 
individual of inclosing reserve remains tacit regarding some 
aspect of herself before both herself and others. Such an 
individual refuses to fully face herself, or even to acknowl-
edge that this is the case. This individual seeks to avoid 
even the knowledge that she seeks to avoid certain knowledge 
about herself, and thus she lives in a world of falsehood 
brought on by her own self-deception. Inc losing reserve, 
then, signifies a lie or untruth: "But untruth is precisely 
82 
unfreedom." The bondage of unfreedom is addiction. The 
addict is the· individual of inclosing reserve, the solitary 
79The Concept of Anxiety, 111. 
80To this we shall turn more extensively in chapter four. 
81The importance of this paragraph for any viable theory 
of addiction cannot be overestimated. 
82The Concept of Anxiety, 128. 
137 
one, even amidst the multitude . 83 This reserve signifies 
that "there is something that freedom is unwilling to per-
84 
vade." Such a person has "two wills": the stronger, which 
wills inclosing reserve, and the weaker, which wills revela-
• 85 tion. Addiction is promulgated by this intrapsychic 
polemic. Precisely, addiction is a nonreflective project 
("strong" will} in opposition to the weaker reflective will. 
Therefore, the ontologically "irremediable" nature of addic-
• 86 tion. 
"Whoever is educated by anxiety is educated by possibili-
ty [freedom] , and only he who is educated by possibility is 
educated according to his infinitude. 1187 Addiction is the 
failure to be educated by anxiety, and the corresponding 
experience of the loss of possibility (freedom} . "Whoever 
does not wish to sink into the wretchedness of the finite is 
83The person of inclosing reserve is the addict because 
such a person exists in untruth, and untruth is unfreedom. 
This person is bound to her own untruth about herself, and 
experiences the unfreedom of the lie. This person may have, 
in fact, no "external" object of addiction. Instead, she is 
addicted to her own psychic constructs, produced via impure 
reflection. The person of inclosing reserve is addicted to 
her own self- concept. Such an addiction is insidious and 
extremely difficult to treat. Inclosing reserve, then, is a 
special case of inauthenticity. 
84The Concept of Anxiety, 130, 131. 
85The Concept of Anxiety, 129. 
86
"Irremediable," that is, from within the fundamentally 
deceptive/self-deceptive framework of the individual of 
inclosing reserve, because inclosing reserve is itself a 
choice. 
87The Concept of Anxiety, 156. 
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constrained in the most profound way to struggle with the 
. f. . 1188 
in ini te. The infinite, here, is freedom itself, and the 
Ground of that freedom. Struggling with freedom alone never 
allows one to get outside of the circuit of freedom, but 
necessitates one's remaining within the circuit, since the 
circuit lacks a Ground. 
Put differently, freedom per se is unable to fully 
penetrate itself in order to appear to itself in its full 
lucidity. Freedom must be referenced in terms of something 
other than itself in order to embody and grasp (not under-
stand) its own infinitude. This is because one is what one 
wishes to apprehend, and this apprehension can occur only 
subsequent to the coupling of the self into a circuit of 
infinitude that draws one outside of the self (metaphysical 
ekstasis). Thus the infinite struggle with addiction must be 
fought on two fronts. One must run the gauntlet on both the 
"Eastern" (self) and the "Western" (Power) fronts, always, and 
at once. Put differently, to struggle fruitfully with one's 
own infinitude necessarily involves one also in a struggle 
with the Ground of this infinitude. 89 
88The Concept of Anxiety, 160. 
89The reader is encouraged to review part one, section A 
of the present chapter for an elucidation of the metaphysi-
cal/theological overtones contained in this paragraph. In 
addition, it will be helpful to again quote Otto Rank: "For 
only by living in close union with a god-ideal that has been 
erected outside one's own ego is one able to live at all." 
[Modern Education: A Critique of Its Fundamental Ideas 
(Agathon Press, 1968), 142.) See chapter 1, part two of this 
dissertation for the earlier discussion surrounding Rank's 
Section D 
Addiction Involves One in the Contradictory Effort 
of Attempting to Absolutely Will the Finite 
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"It is a contradiction to will something finite absolute-
ly, since the finite must have an end. But to will absolutely 
is to will the infinite, because this is an end which can be 
willed at every moment. 1190 The addict engages in the strict-
ly contradictory behavior of taking her object of addiction as 
an absolute telos, although it is but contingent and not 
91 
necessary. An "absolute telos," as utilized here, is 
anything (person, object, activity, cognitive construct) a 
person feels they cannot live without. To "live without," 
such a person feels, would necessitate a radical change in 
selfhood, self-definition, human being. And this is precisely 
contention. I am interpreting this quote in such a way that 
no "metaphysical"/"theological" claims need be posited. That 
is, the god-ideal set up by the self need only be transcendent 
to consciousness, but not external to it. 
If the god-ideal and the object of addiction are equally 
the products of imaginary consciousness, how is it that the 
former is the answer to the problem of addiction? Some 
imaginary constructs are imprisoning, whereas others are 
liberating? 
9
°Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 353. 
91
"Infinite passion" as directed toward the "absolute 
telos" could be rendered, alternately, as simply that ·which is 
the preeminent value or source of value in any given person's 
Weltanschauung. 
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the case, due to the psychic function the object of addiction 
plays in the life of the addict. 
Addiction is the incommensurability between the object 
and the passion with which it is attended. "It would be 
irrational to yield absolute devotion to a relative [contin-
92 gent] end." The only legitimate ends for infinite passion 
are God and freedom qua freedom, because only these are 
commensurate with that passion. All other ends convolute that 
freedom and turn it inward upon itself. Addiction is the 
pathology (suffering) of this turning inward, the suffering of 
introjected freedom/inclosing reserve. 
Can freedom take itself as an end? What would be the 
structure of such praxis? How is freedom "known" as an end? 
Is "freedom" a "self-evident" end? What could this mean? Can 
the knowledge of what it means to be free be universal? How 
do I know that what you mean by "being free" is what I mean by 
"being free? 11 Must conceptions (perceptions) be held in 
common or at least overlap? Why? If the human being does not 
have freedom but is freedom, how can he or she do otherwise 
than be free? Thus, the prima facie legitimacy of all action. 
Nevertheless, the phenomenological experience of bondage. 
Therefore, even though I am freedom, it is possible for me to 
93 be less than myself. 
92Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 355. 
93This lessening of the self being a function of aesthetic 
desire, hysteria of spirit, inclosing reserve, and bad faith. 
Section E 
The Mutual Exclusivity of Addicted 
and Nonaddicted Modes of Being 
141 
The addict is in despair because she relates herself with 
infinite passion (ultimate concern, or, even, "seriousness") 
to the addiction-object, but with infinite passion one can 
relate oneself - if one is not in despair - only to the 
94 Eternal. The ontology of the addict is necessarily an 
ontology of despair. Despair is a disrelationship in one's 
inmost being, precisely that condition that obtains when a 
human being seeks to discharge her infinitude solely in that 
which is finite. 95 A man despairs because he lacks the 
Eternal, which is equivalent to Sartre's in-itself-for-itself, 
h f b ' 96 t e necessary, ree eing. Despair precedes and yet is 
94This is an obvious revamping of Soren Kierkegaard's 
Works of Love, trans. Howard and Edna Hong (New York, Harper 
and Row, 1964), 54. 
95See The Sickness Unto Death, 13ff. 
96Can one be in bondage to her own idea of "God?" 
Definitely. Not every case in which an individual erects a 
god-ideal outside of her ego is clearly not a case of addic-
tion. The god-ideal functions as an object of addiction 
insofar as it constricts the freedom of the self. A nonaddic-
tive god-ideal must be a function of imaginary/emotional 
consciousness, since a conceptual ideal precludes the possi-
bility of infinitization. To attempt to conceptualize the 
god-ideal is to attempt to contain the ideal; to attempt to 
contain the ideal is, simultaneously, to hem in the self. To 
hem in the self through the god-ideal is to produce for 
oneself an addictive god-ideal. To seek to conc.eptually 
delineate a nonaddictive god-ideal would effectively erase 
both the ideal and its nonaddictive nature. In order to 
142 
addiction, despair promulgates addiction, and despair perpetu-
ates addiction. The woman who has no disrelationship in her 
inmost being is not in despair, this acquired equilibrium 
being the result of discharging her freedom (infinitude) in 
relation to an object with which it is commensurate, that is, 
Freedom itself. Therefore, addicted and nonaddicted being are 
ontologically mutually exclusive97 • 
Section F 
Addiction is a Function of Despair, Which is 
a Disrelationship in One's Inmost Being 
"Necessity's despair is to lack possibility. 1198 · The 
despair of addiction is the experience of the "necessity" of 
the object of addiction - and the lack of the possibility of 
the cessation of the addiction - short of death. This is a 
description of the addict's phenomenological field. "It is 
indeed freedom which despairs. 1199 h lf , I 100 T e "se -accusation' 
of despair is freedom freely despairing over freedom. This 
ontological contradiction is experienced phenomenologically 
prevent a disrelation in one's inmost being, the nature of the 
god-ideal must be such that it is a function of imagi-
nary/emotional consciousness, an ideal infinitude to corre-
spond with the infinite nature of the self. 
97This exclusivity will be addressed in chapter four. 
98The Sickness Unto Death, 38. 
99The Sickness Unto Death, 145 (draft) . 
100The Sickness Unto Death, 146 (draft) . 
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but not known, as it cannot ever become an object for con-
sciousness. Thus the addict "knows" (experiences) what she 
cannot know, and it is this "knowledge" which brings torment. 
Add . . d . h' 101 1ct1on: espair over somet ing earthly. This is 
"pure immediacy" (and, as such, is subject only to aesthetic 
categories), it has an "external" motivation. Despair here is 
experienced as a submitting (to the object of addiction, upon 
which the addict bestows magical powers). Consciousness 
progresses dialectically from despair over something earthly 
(the particular object of addiction) to despair over the 
earthly (in toto, as a category of totality) . The latter is 
experienced as despair over one's total existential condition, 
including one's own ontology, which appears irremediable. The 
object of addiction makes the despair "bearable" for some 
period of time by focusing and particularizing it. Better to 
despair over one's relation to the object (externality) than 
over oneself (internality). The internalized threat is seen 
as more horrifying; therefore, projection onto the external 
b . f dd' . 102 o Ject o a 1ct1on. 
rn
1See The Sickness Unto Death, 50-60 for a discussion of 
despair over the earthly (the particular) . 
10211 ! first guessed how an activity [selfhood] chosen in 
defiance of one's instincts ... is related to the need for 
deadening the feeling of desolation by means of a narcotic art 
[addiction] ... " [Ecce Homo, 286, 287. Underlining mine.] The 
concept of "defying one's instincts" in Nietzsche's works 
certainly overlaps with Kierkegaard's concept of "refusing to 
be oneself" as explicated in The Sickness Unto Death. Both 
can be interpreted to show the "necessity" of addiction to 
anaesthetize oneself against the pain of failing to be 
oneself. Nietzsche speaks of "my task" repeatedly in Ecce 
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"Not until a self as this specific individual is con-
scious of existing before God, not until then is it the 
' f' 't lf II 103 in ini e se .... The addict seeks the expansion of the 
self, seeks the infinite self, but is crushed beneath the 
finite (the addiction-object) in its finitude - unless he 
seeks the Ground. The infinite self can only be real-ized 
through such a relation. For how can finitude spawn infinity? 
Infinitude is "spiritual" reality (nonmaterial), as is 
freedom. Each species gives birth only to its own kind. "The 
wind blows where it will, you hear the sound of it, but you do 
not know where it is coming from or where it is going. So 
with everyone who is born of spirit. 11104 Such birth allows 
freedom (spirit) to be free. 
Homo (e.g. pp. 286, 288, 289ff.), signaling the need to become 
oneself while performing it and in order to perform it, a 
sentiment likewise expressed in The Sickness Unto Death (Of 
course, for Nietzsche, the "self" is certainly not the 
unfolding of the creative Spirit of God. Nietzsche's unfold-
ing would have more to do with allowing oneself to acquiesce 
within the inexorable nature of the Eternal recurrence). 
Failure to become oneself (perform one's task) brings about 
the "need" for "idealism" (meaning producing belief) and the 
concomitant (necessitated) rituals by which these meaning 
producing beliefs are maintained. This cycle of flight from 
oneself into ritualized meaning producing praxis-belief 
involves the necessity of perpetuating these rituals to 
sustain the web of belief and consequent continued flight from 
the self. This cycle is the addictive behavior pattern, which 
results from a flight from self and produces a flight from 
self. cf. "Fundamentalism" as addictive meaning producing 
praxis-belief. 
103The Sickness Unto Death, 80. 
~4John 3:8 (New English Translation). 
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"The human being as spirit simply cannot have equilibrium 
in himself. "105 S . . . 106 1nce most persons are in despair, non-
equilibrium is the normal "state" for most persons. This 
metastable condition is the self in bad faith, that self which 
fails to recognize and draw implications from the fact that it 
is spirit. The thread that can be followed from the heart of 
the self will make this evident if one has but ears to 
107 hear. 
From the thought of Kierkegaard I have culled part of my 
theory of addiction. Kierkegaard, believing that the funda-
mental ontological nature of the human person is spiritual, 
has focused on the self's (freedom's) relation to its own 
Ground (God) . Kierkegaard has operated within categories of 
truth/untruth, inclosing reserve, repetition (renewal), 
anxiety, and despair. These concepts already broached in 
Kierkegaard, in addition to others found in Sartre's philoso-
phy, have given me the necessary tools for the groundwork of 
an existential theory of addiction. It is to Sartre's 
conceptual contribution to the theory that I now turn. 
105The Sickness Unto Death, 146 (draft) . 
106
cf. "The Universality of the Sickness (Despair) " in The 
Sickness Unto Death, 22-28. 
107 See Matt. 11:15, 13:9, 43, Mark 4:9, 23, 7:16, 8:18, 
Luke 8:8, 14:35. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Sartre's nomenclature as well as his atheistic viewpoint 
are both radically different from the thought of Kierkegaard. 
Nevertheless, through the utilization of Sartre's ontology in 
connection with that of Kierkegaard, I am able to flesh out 
and complete an existential theory of addiction. In particu-
lar, I wish to focus on Sartre's notion of the imagination and 
his notion of self-deception, both being indispensable for the 
construction of my theory. The coupling of these two Sartrean 
concepts with the fundamental ontological nature of the for-
itself in Sartre results in the existential possibility of 
being-addicted. It is this very being-addicted that I wish to 
describe in Sartrean terms in part two of the present chapter. 
Section A 
Addiction as a Phenomenon "Undergone" 
By an "Imprisoned" Consciousness: 
The Addict Experiences the Spontaneity 
That is Consciousness as "Beyond Preedom" 
Impure reflection exists, for Sartre, whenever the self 
seeks to apprehend itself through self-objectification. In 
impure reflection, the self seeks within itself a substantial 
nature, an essence, a being from which its thoughts, feelings, 
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. 1 
and indeed its very actions emanate. Impure reflection, 
then, does not and cannot ascertain the true nature of the 
self, which is to be free, to have no essence or substantial 
being. Insofar as the self seeks and 11 apprehends 11 such a 
substantial self, it is self deceived. All objectifications 
of the for-itself are blockages created by the for-itself to 
allow for the nonapprehension of its own nonessence (freedom). 
In pure reflection, contrariwise, the self achieves a lucid 
apprehension of itself as free being, having no substantive 
essence. 
In impure reflection, consciousness "imprisons 11 itself in 
the world in order to flee from itself (this is only too true 
of the addict); consciousnesses are "given" as "emanating" 
from states, and states are apprehended as a function of the 
ego. Thus the substantive ego, phenomenologically, appears to 
have primacy. But, in actuality, the order is reversed: 
consciousnesses are first. Through consciousnesses, states 
come about, and, through states, the ego is "produced. 112 The 
lebenswel t of the imprisoned consciousness is made up of 
1This is not to deny that the self must act, must engage 
in praxis. What is at issue is the nature of this self, and 
the locus of the action. Freedom, being primordial, acts to 
create the self. The self has no essence from which freedom 
is derived; the self, instead, is reducible to freedom. The 
goal, here, for Sartre, is to get away from the positing of a 
(substantive) "metaphysical" entity known as the "self . 11 
Impersonal freedom is sufficient, in lieu of "self." 
2 Jean-Paul Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, trans. 
Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick (New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, n.d.), 81. 
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"magical objects" which are simultaneously objects of the 
world, and through memory, spontaneous artifices of conscious-
ness: "··· [M]an is always a sorcerer for man. 113 
Consciousness of addiction, then, for the addict, is 
given as emanating from the "state" of being addicted, rather 
than the "state" of being addicted being recognized as a 
project of (a) consciousness attempting to imprison itself in 
the world. The magical object of addiction retains, as it 
were, a memory of the spontaneity of consciousness while 
remaining an object in the world. Addiction experienced as a 
"state" or a function of the "ego" is merely the secondary 
description of a more primary phenomenon, which can only be a 
free project of the for-itself. 4 
"The [addict's] 'me' [or, ego, which is a construct 
3 The Transcendence of the Ego, 82. 
4The claim here presented concerning addiction based on 
the state/fluidity (impure/pure) dichotomy is phenomenological 
to the degree that Sartre's dichotomy is phenomenological. 
Phenomenology, as the descriptive study of the nature of 
consciousness and its contents (noesis) and the surrounding 
"world" (noema), allows procedural/ontological room within its 
parameters for the advancing of the above claim. Phenomenolo-
gical description is not reducible to conceptual analysis and 
"cognitive" epistemology, being instead an intuitive existen-
tial process (see Being and Nothingness on knowledge, pp. 216-
218) . The intuitive apprehension of truth is not always 
amenable to non-intuitive "justification" (nor is such 
"justification" warranted or appropriate within such an 
epistemology). Is the previous statement open to non-intu-
itive "justification? 11 Intuitive "justification?" These 
questions, of course, leave aside the question concerning what 
would count as a "justification" to begin with. And - why 
"justification" at all? Is the question of "justification" an 
appropriate one after all? Or is it the case that we've got 
it all wrong? What would this even mean? And - how would we 
know? 
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produced through impure reflection] can do nothing to this 
spontaneity [(of) consciousness], for will is an object which 
constitutes itself for and by [is consequent to] this sponta-
neity. "5 This spontaneity frightens consciousness, as it is 
6 
"beyond freedom." This spontaneity is perceived as "beyond 
freedom" because it is experienced by the for-itself as the 
source of its freedom, that is, its very being. Whence cometh 
the being of the for-itself? Insofar as the for-itself has no 
easily accessible answer to this question, since it is beyond 
the for-itself 's phenomenological purview, this spontaneity 
(source of being) is a source of fear to the for-itself 
because it is shrouded in mystery. 
The addict, too, experiences her own spontaneity that is 
consciousness as "fixating" (cathecting, obsessing, being 
spontaneously "unfree") on one "thing," a state of affairs 
experienced as being beyond freedom. The addict feels "free" 
only in her response to this (spontaneous) consciousness, but 
not free to determine this consciousness as a matter of will. 
The spontaneity, as such, is outside the scope of the will. 
"It is an essential necessity that one not be able to distin-
guish between voluntary spontaneity and involuntary spontane-
. t 117 llY· The Sartrean "category" of "involuntary spontaneity" 
as noted in The Transcendence of the Ego is precisely the 
5The Transcendence of the Ego, 99. 
6The Transcendence of the Ego, 100. 
7The Transcendence of the Ego, 101. Underlining mine. 
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category of addiction - from the addict's phenomenological 
vantage point. 
Involuntary spontaneity is beyond freedom, but this is 
not really the realm in which addiction originates, it merely 
"appears" there so as to mask the underlying nonreflective 
project of voluntary spontaneity. Regardless of this fact, 
Sartrean consciousness cannot distinguish the two (at least 
not prior to the reduction or reduction/ conversion) , thus 
addiction is a phenomenon "undergone" by an "imprisoned" 
consciousness. 8 Absolute and irremediable dread is the result 
of pure consciousness apprehending this "fatality of its 
spontaneity. "9 Consciousness degrades itself to the level of 
8Addiction: Freedom (voluntary spontaneity) being 
discharged predictably in an "unfree" manner (involuntary 
spontaneity). This can be a result of the addict's nostalgia 
for her lost childhood, a period when she did not know the 
exigencies of freedom, these being concealed from her by pre-
anguished childhood subjectivity. The addict's world, in 
terms of freedom, is the child's make believe world of dolls 
and trucks and trains, a controllable system of "finite 
freedoms" (freedom discharged in an "unfree" - i.e. controlled 
or controllable - manner) . This of course is contradictory in 
theory and in fact and is a necessary failure. It is freedom 
freely recognizing not to realize its own essence and the 
demands of that essence. One cannot become free by circum-
scribing (via prescience) the boundaries of one's own freedom. 
This is not within the jurisdiction of freedom itself, but 
rather that of involuntary spontaneity. The attempt at such 
circumscription is self-manipulative and repressive, it is an 
attempt to rise above oneself (get "outside" of one's own 
freedom) , take an external point of view on oneself, meet 
oneself ahead of oneself and so coincide with oneself. It is 
an attempt to turn freedom into a thing. See Simone de 
Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, trans. Bernard Frechtman 
(Secaucus, NJ: Citadel Press, 1980), 35-42 for the.child's 
relation to her own freedom. 
9 The Transcendence of the Ego, 102. 
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impure reflection (which entails the absence of this spontane-
ity) to submerge this anguish: this is precisely what the 
addict does with his "state" of being addicted. In consci-
ousness' frenetic "escape" from itself, it seeks refuge and 
dissolution in the "me" (a psychic object, a bid for "thing-
10 
ness"). The addict attempts this very projection of 
consciousness into the me. The resultant consciousness is 
particularly precarious in that it can "wake up" to itself via 
purifying reflection at any time. Thus the addict is perpetu-
ally insecure. 
Section B 
Addiction is a Habitual Way of Being Emotional 
and a Phenomenon of Belief 
Addiction is "incantatory behavior" carried out with 
seriousness (as is the case with Sartrean emotional conscious-
ness) : it is an attempt to alter (reperceive) a world that we 
cannot control, it is a reversion to the level of magic when 
the "instrumental" approach is seen to be a failure. Being 
addicted is g, habitual way of being emotional, unrecognized by 
the addict as such, as the project of emotional consciousness 
is only nonthetically conscious of itself as such, and 
10 The Transcendence of the Ego, 103. 
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thetically conscious of the object of addiction. 11 We set up 
the "magical" world by using the body as a means of incanta-
ti on and the physiological manifestations subsequently 
appear. Consciousness simply has "reversed" (reperceived, 
interpreted inversely) the order of causation. Consciousness 
believes, thetically, that it is the result of physiologi-
cal/deterministic factors, rather than the physiologi-
cal/"deterministic" factors being the result of the project of 
emotional consciousness (addiction) . "The image [of imagi-
nary, that is, addicted consciousness] is a sort of ideal for 
feeling. "12 Emotions are thus experienced and "known" 
through the circuit that is comprised of the addict and her 
dd ' ' b' 13 a 1ct1on-o Ject. Addiction, then, is the process of 
11For Sartre's views on emotional consciousness which I 
utilize in my description of addictive consciousness, see 
Jean-Paul Sartre, The Emotions: Outline of a Theory, trans. 
Bernard Frechtman (New York: Philosophical Library, 1948), 
52-70. Hereafter referred to as The Emotions. 
12Jean- Paul Sartre, The Psychology of Imagination, trans. 
Bernard Frechtman (Secaucus, NJ: Citadel Press, n.d.), 103. 
13Granted, the claims made here may seem odd, para-doxa. 
They may not seem to reflect the addict's own self-conscious-
ness. Maybe all this Sartrean talk about freedom is a kind of 
existentialist mythology. But then, maybe we need mythology 
in order to live, be human, be "free." What is the function 
of the mythological within the human psyche? Can any cultural 
anthropologist seriously claim that at any time throughout 
human history there were mythology-free civilizations? So we 
aspire to be such? What would this mean? 
Then again, maybe all this Sartrean talk about freedom is 
not a kind of existentialist mythology. Maybe the "biologi-
cal"/"genetic" theories of addiction are truly mythological. 
Or, maybe the existential as well as the "biologi-
cal"/ "genetic" theories are all "true" under some commensura-
ble description yet to be developed. How did the true world 
finally become a fable? 
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objectifying one's own affectivity (in the object of addic-
tion), allowing it to be "known" (as an object for knowledge). 
The final progression of this calculus of affectivity results 
when the addict can no longer feel unless she is "under the 
influence of 11 her object (person, experience, cognitive 
construct) of addiction. 
11 
•••• [B] ehavior pure and simple is not emotion [nor is it 
addiction] , and pure and simple consciousness of this behavior 
is not emotion either .... true emotion [addiction] .... is 
accompanied by belief. 14 Addiction is g phenomenon of 
belief: The seeds of belief (the psychic objects created via 
impure reflection which blossom into a "substantive" self 
[ego]) are necessarily antecedents to the clinging vines that 
are the phenomenological experience of bondage. For one is in 
bondage to oneself, but one feels as if in the grip of an 
alien power. These psychic objects could in no way take root 
in the soil of the consciousness of the for-itself were it not 
for the project of impure reflection vying to ground itself 
through seeking for itself an essence. It is this very 
(created, fictitious) essence which subsequently throttles the 
consciousness of the for-itself with the death grip of 
addiction. How is it that consciousness engages in the 
project of addiction (emotional consciousness) and subsequent -
ly believes in the project, i.e. that its being is being-
addicted, an "immutable" ontological reality not open to being 
14 h E . T e motions, 71, 73. 
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freely amended, altered or truncated? Addiction is a phenome-
non of belief in that the addict believes that (at least) a 
portion of her freedom - heretofore experienced as such - has 
been circumscribed by some reality other than herself. "The 
origin of emotion [addiction] is a spontaneous and lived 
degradation of consciousness 15 in the face of the world. " 
Degraded consciousness (impure reflective consciousness) does 
not experience itself as being-free (having no essence), but 
as being-addicted (having an essence), its actual inver-
' 16 sion. 
Being-addicted is the inversion of consciousness which 
does not recognize its own inversion, lacking any perspective 
on this perspective, 17 save the recognition of the previous 
experience of freedom. This being-free of consciousness in 
the past is separated from present consciousness by a nothing-
ness which it must be and so cannot effect the alteration of 
the inverted consciousness by recourse to this past. Being-
addicted is g species of impure reflection taking itself as 
pure reflection. That is to say, the for-itself believes that 
it is engaging in the project of pure reflection when in fact 
it is engaging in the project of impure reflection. 
How is it that consciousness can produce for itself 
15The Emotions, 77. 
16 Note carefully the phrase "does not experience itself 
as being." This is merely a note to carefully delineate 
ontological reality from perceptions of the same. 
17Th ' 1 k' ' at is, ac ing a metaperspective. 
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believable belief? (The addict as mythologizer) . Conscious-
ness has confused itself regarding its own reflective status, 
and, in so doing, has opened itself up to a wasteland of 
nebulous and noxious fabrications. In this existential 
condition, the for- itself is in grave and ever-present danger, 
yet this is the condition in which the addict perpetually 
exists and maintains herself. The lie (consciousness degraded 
to the level of impure reflection) has become the truth 
(ersatz pure reflection) and the true world has finally become 
a fable. 18 19 Ah! Free at last! 
What happens when consciousness "wakes up" through a 
purifying reflection (the dispensation with impure reflection, 
that is, impure reflection's erasure) to the recognition that 
the "state" of "being-addicted" is an ever-threatening reality 
as long as the reflective apprehension of oneself as freedom 
(in pure reflection) is necessarily accompanied by anguish, 
pure dread? Consciousness perpetually seeks to elude its own 
dread as part of the project of attempting to ground (found, 
18
cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols (1888), 
trans. Walter Kaufmann. In Walter Kaufmann, ed., The Portable 
Nietzsche (New York: The Viking Press, 1982), 485, 486. 
19Freedom being too much of a burden for the addict to 
bear, she finally "realizes" this (free-being) in her own 
mythological construct if she realizes it at all. (She 
would, then, only experience "freedom" when under the influ-
ence of her object of addiction) . Freedom, in this case, 
coincides with the dispensing of the real. One becomes more 
"free" as one becomes less "real." But I caution the reader 
to allow that some addicts become less "free" as they become 
less "real." It all depends upon the mythological constructs 
employed. Not all phenomenological attributes of the experi-
ence of addiction are universal. 
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legitimate, necessitate) its own being. As freedom always 
appears contingent and therefore unaccounted for (unnecessary, 
superfluous), consciousness invariably seeks suppression of 
consciousness of this freedom. Once pure reflection is real-
ized in the face of being-addicted, consciousness is free to 
abandon this particular project of being-addicted (emotional 
consciousness) . It will succumb nonthetically to the next 
project of addiction unless through conversion it can relate 
itself thetically to the Ground. 20 
"Freedom [for the captive consciousness caught in its own 
trap] has to come from a purifying reflection or a total 
d . f h ff . . . 21 isappearance o t e a ecting situation." In addiction, 
the addict denies her addiction (at least at times) because of 
its phenomenological (experiential, existential) discontinu-
ity, which is the result of periodic purifying reflections, 
during which time the addict is "free" of her object of 
"addiction." The addict here experiences a break in freedom 
in relation to the object, but not its total temporal demise. 
The addict is "free" during the reflection only because she 
20Does it follow, then, that we should seek a theological 
rather than a clinical "cure" for addiction? This does not 
necessarily follow, since "theology" can be addictive in 
itself. The "cure" will be "metaphysical" in nature, being 
comprised of clinical, philosophical, and "theological" (god-
ideal) elements. The focus throughout the healing process 
remains the existential condition of the self. Since addic-
tion involves an inadequacy in the self, and the self is 
itself a "metaphysical" construct (although nonsubstantive; it 
is freedom alone) , the "cure" will be, necessarily, "metaphys -
ical." 
21The Emotions, 78, 79. 
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recognizes herself as the author of the project to-be-addict-
ed. Nevertheless, such consciousness does not necessitate the 
abandonment of the project (praxis), but may in fact merely 
alter the project so that it appears in different forms or 
guises. The realization that one is free in relation to a 
given project does not mean that the project is g project to 
be free, a project which aims at freedom as an end. The 
recognition that one has freely engaged in a project is not 
synonymous with the ability to freely abandon that very 
project. The ontological/axiological reality hidden behind 
the original (free) choice must be addressed. 
22 
"Emotion is a revelation of the meaning of the world." 
Addiction, too, is a revelation of the meaning of the "world." 
The addict "realizes" that freedom was the illusion, and that 
h . . f f 23 s e is in act un ree. Her question to herself now becomes 
"Can I become free?" She then sets about attempting to detail 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for her own liberation 
- always within brackets - realizing all the while (based on 
the "deception" of her "pre-addicted" phenomenological 
condition) that the struggle against her own "unfreedom" could 
b 1 . lf 24 ~ mere y g facet of the unfreedom 1tse .. How can an 
22The Emotions, 81. 
23
"The qualities which the emotion confers upon the object 
and the world it confers upon them ad aeternum [forever] . " 
[The Emotions, 80.] 
24That is, the description of the illness is itself part 
of the illness. 
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f b . b f ? c h h. . ?25 un ree eing ecome ree. an sue a t 1ng ever transpire. 
Can such a being free himself? The addict as philosopher. 
"Consciousness can be a transcendent [psychic] object 
only by undergoing the modification of passivity. "26 Con-
sciousness is symbolized (made symbolic, reified, solidified, 
coagulated, objectified) by the addict ;Qybeing projected onto 
the object of addiction. Thus the addict looks at his own 
consciousness when beholding the object of addiction, a vision 
masked as such by the addict. Addiction is yet another 
attempt on the part of woman to flee her own consciousness 
(or, put differently, for consciousness to flee itself), the 
perennial, tragic saga of humankind. Consciousness here 
obstructs itself (its vision of itself) through the utiliza-
tion of the object of addiction. This "works" (functions 
25Note Sartre's discussion of freedom in Jean- Paul Sartre, 
Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: 
Philosophical Library, n.d.), 433-481. Sartre, of course, 
would say that the addict' s "realization" is fallacious, since 
an unfree being cannot even contemplate the idea of freedom. 
Such an idea for an unfree being would be counterfactual. The 
contemplation of such a counterfactual would involve the 
negation of being (current reality) via imaginative construc-
tion. Such negation based on the imagination would never be 
possible for an unfree being, for such a being could only 
operate on the level of what is (the factual) and never on the 
level of what is not (the counterfactual). Therefore, for 
Sartre, to ask oneself "Can I become free?" is a contradic-
tion. One is either wholly and forever free, or not free at 
all. If the question of freedom were not an issue, if it were 
not a question at all, this would not necessarily mean that 
man was not free. But since the question of freedom is an 
issue, man is free. Interrogation involves a distance or 
distancing from what is, which shows, for Sartre, that freedom 
lies at its root. Every question belies the freedom of the 
interrogator, that is, her very being. 
26The Emotions, 84. 
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effectively) as long as the object of addiction is seen as 
such ("nonfreely" beheld). Should this guise of 11 nonfreedom 11 
break down, consciousness will effect a purifying reflection 
upon itself and simultaneously recognize its own previous bad 
faith (self-deception). Or, we may be able to say that this 
breakdown is an integral aspect of this purifying reflection. 
It is evident, then, why the addict has "good reason" to 
maintain her addiction as such. Recognition of one's bad 
faith throws one at the feet of good faith, 27 the realization 
of the real possibility of an alternate project, 28 and this 
realization's attendant necessary conditions - anguish and 
dread. Freedom and anguish are forever intertwined. This 
reality the addict rejects as she seeks evasion and alter-
at ion of the same. She realizes a phenomenological separation 
of the two once she becomes the addict: she is in a condition 
of dread while experiencing herself as "unfree." What she 
sought, of course, was the inverse, freedom without dread. 
The project of addiction delivers only the contrary. Never-
theless, this is a result of the addict's skewed phenomenolog-
ical vantage point, since freedom and dread are forever 
intertwined. The addict has succeeded only in embezzling her 
own experience of freedom, while in no sense successfully 
27All recognition of bad faith is, in fact, an exercise 
in good faith. That is, it is consciousness waking up to 
itself, realizing itself, being itself. In this sense, all 
movement toward good faith is a movement away from addiction. 
28
cf. Being and Nothingness, 70. 
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negating her experience of dread. Even if dread were ephemer-
ally negated, the addict would simply find herself experienc-
ing a second level dis-ease: the dread of dread. This dis-
ease was the originary impetus for the project to-be-addicted. 
The steel jaw trap of addiction closes once again. 
Section C 
Addiction is a Function of the Imagination 
By Way of Self-induced Hypnagogic Imagery: 
The Quest for Simultaneous and Symbiotic 
Self-real-ization and Self-dereal-ization, or 
How Consciousness Creates for Itself Believable Belief 
"What defines the imaginary world and also the world of 
the real is an attitude of consciousness. 1129 Addiction, as 
stated in the previous section, is g phenomenon of belief. 
The object of addiction becomes such based on the confusion of 
voluntary spontaneity with involuntary spontaneity. Voluntary 
spontaneity is a matter of will; involuntary spontaneity is a 
f . . 30 matter o intention. This the addict is conscious of but 
29 The Psychology of Imagination, 27. Underlining mine. 
30Addiction is a phenomenon of belief because impure 
consciousness bestows upon the object of addiction magical 
powers, and it is the resulting consciousness' belief in these 
powers that fuels the phenomenon of addiction. These powers 
are in no way contained in the object itself, and without 
these powers, the phenomenon of addiction would dissipate as 
such. Belief is voluntary to the degree that consciousness 
refuses to face the nature of itself. For Sartre, voluntary 
spontaneity is a matter of will (the scope of our freedom, our 
possibilities, a reflective sphere), and involuntary spontane-
ity is a matter of intention (the conscious but nonreflective 
project that is at-one with consciousness). · [See Being and 
(continued ... ) 
31 
chooses not to know. 
C . h . . . 1 32 onsciousness, as sue , is 1ntent1ona . 
161 
Thus only the 
cessation of consciousness qua consciousness can extinguish 
intentionality (involuntary spontaneity} . 33 The imaginative 
image produced by the addict is beheld quasi-observationally, 
thus it can be infused with "magical" ("addictive"} powers. 
When quasi-observation "becomes" observation (involuntary 
spontaneity}, the observer becomes the addict. This is a 
function of the addict confusing pure reflection with impure 
reflection, and voluntary spontaneity with involuntary 
spontaneity. The reversal of this procedure is much more 
difficult for consciousness, since we now have a bona fide 
phenomenon of belief, whereas the initiation of the imagina-
tive construct did not involve such. Man truly is a "wizard" 
34 to man for himself, and for others in that " ... every 
human being is ... egµally unfree, that is, we ... create out of 
30 
( ••• continued} 
Nothingness, 407, 433-481.] 
In The Psychology of Imagination, Sartre defines "belief" 
as "fascination without existential position." [p. 245] Once 
consciousness is fascinated, it can in no way be said that 
belief is wholly "voluntary." All belief, for Sartre, seems 
to involve elements both of the voluntary and the involuntary. 
31Knowledge of this confusion would necessarily involve 
an antecedent reflective katharsis so as to purge conscious-
ness of impure reflectivity and open it up to a perception of 
the distinction between voluntary and involuntary spontaneity. 
32That is, it is always consciousness of something. 
33 f c . The Psychology of Imagination, 24. 
34The Emotions, 84. 
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f d . 35 ree om a prison." We imagine the walls quasi-observation-
ally, they then appear as a pristine bucolic scene; then, in 
the aftermath and carnage, we observe the walls. 
"We must under no circumstances confuse intention with 
will. To say that there can be an image without will implies 
in no way that there can be an image without intention. "36 
Addiction is an intentional (nonthetic. at one with conscious-
ness) project contrary to the (thetic. conscious) will. This 
is an ontological subversion, an ontological mutilation, a 
splitting of one's being. A schizophrenia. Ambi-valence. 
Since addiction is a project unrecognized as such, the 
schizophrenia does not appear phenomenologically (for the 
addict) to be self-induced. The addict experiences herself as 
"victim." 37 The addict's own Shadow masks the sun. 
The addict's consciousness permits itself to be 
"charmed," she thinks in a new way, her consciousness is 
. . d 38 11 1mpr1sone ." "In normal and pathological cases, the 
constitutive basis of the hypnagogic consciousness is a 
350tto Rank, Modern Education: A Critiaue of its Fundamen-
tal Ideas, trans. Mabel E. Moxon (New York: Agathon Press, 
1968), 13. Underlining mine. 
36The Psychology of Imagination, 24. Underlining mine. 
37 
cf. Carl Jung, The Undiscovered Self, trans. R. F. C. Hall 
(New York: Mentor, 1958), 101-125. The Shadow, for Jung, is 
the destructive/self-destructive aspect of oneself.· 
38The Psychology of Imagination, 59. 
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modification of attention. "39 This modification of attention 
is precisely the situation that obtains in addiction (and 
love) : it is a situation of mania - "an abnormal state of 
40 
attention in a normal person." Consciousness puts itself 
to sleep through the utilization of such hypnagogic imag-
41 
ery. Self-hypnosis is induced by consciousness and "for-
gotten" as such by that very consciousness. Hypnagogic images 
are a way of being conscious, rather than being contemplated 
;Qy consciousness; this fascinated consciousness is in bondage 
to itself, paralyzed by its own constructions. 42 Such is the 
addict' s consciousness: not distracted, but fascinated. 43 
This consciousness is of course not in bondage to objects 
(hypnagogic images) but to itself, since consciousness creates 
for itself its own hypnagogic imagery. Since it is not 
reflectively aware of this, it posits an "external" source of 
bondage. 
39The Psychology of Imagination, 60. Underlining mine. 
"Hypnagogic consciousness", as here utilized, is impure 
reflective consciousness creating for itself a nonexistent 
world peopled with psychic objects, a function of the imagina-
tion. 
40 Jose Ortega y Gasset, On Love, trans. Toby Talbot (New 
York: World Publishing Company, 1968), 47. 
41An "image" is defined by Sartre as "an act that envi-
sions as an actual body an absent or non-existent object by 
means of a physical or mental content, but which appears only 
through an 'analogical representative' of the envisioned 
object." [The Psychology of Imagination, 75.] 
42The Psychology of Imagination, 62. 
43 
• h . f h s 1 As is t e consciousness o t e artrean over. 
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44 Hypnagogic images appear with a certain nervousness, 
because the hypnagogic "state" is unstable (metastable) and 
artificial (constructed of quasi-observational material), 
coupled with the fact that consciousness has allowed itself to 
be charmed and hence is complicit in instigating and perpetu-
ating the "dream". This allowance is the process of con-
sciousness taking nothing (freedom) for something (the 
hypnagogic image) so as to surmount being as the negation of 
being. This charmed consciousness is self-infused with 
45 fatality, the negation of freedom. Consciousness does not 
seem to be able to imagine itself otherwise, it fails to be 
able to take g, point of view on itself, to "suspend judge-
ment;" it seems fated to believe in itself (as the hypnagogic 
negation of freedom) . The representation of the object is 
conflated with the object. 
The addict is constantly haunted by the presence of the 
46 imaginary image as an absence. Thus, the harrowing torture 
of desire for the "object," even in its absence (no, precisely 
in its absence) . The addict truly is haunted by the image 
rather than the object. The addict goes on the rack before 
44 
cf. The Psychology of Imagination, 64, and The Concept 
of Anxiety, 41-51. 
45 
cf. The Psychology of Imagination, 67. 
46 
cf. The Psychology of Imagination, 104. 
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the image. The image is the essence of the addiction. 47 The 
image is the self haunting itself as its own absence of being. 
The image is not (reality) , and yet the addict is pursued by 
what is not, and she falls down in terror before that which 
48 
she cannot evade. "··· [F]or lo, I am with you always, even 
h d f . 49 to teen o time." The beckoning of the Nothing (image) 
to one in Gehenna. "Reason" balks at these abhorrent absent 
50 presences. The absent presence that comprises the quasi-
observational object of addiction is repugnant to far more 
than the reason of the addict. It is both her salvation and 
her damnation. Certainly, this is repugnant to her reason. 
Yet the pain of the ontological circumcision is far greater to 
bear, and it is upon this gibbet that the addict hangs. The 
mirage of addiction as leading to the oasis of truth. 
The object that is the imaginary image does not "obey" 
the "laws" of individuation or identity, 51 says Sartre. 
Hence the addict's belief that she may be able to transcend 
47Ergo, without the "faculty" (power) of the imagination, 
the phenomenon of addiction would not occur, as addiction is 
a function of the imagination. 
48 Cannot from her own perspective, that is. 
49 Matthew 28: 20. 
50
cf. The Psychology of Imagination, 126. God's "absent" 
presence, by this standard, would likewise be repugnant to my 
reason. This is equally the case for Kierkegaard as well as 
Sartre. A possible case for the meaningfulness, via indirect 
proof, of a subcategory in relation to reason designated 
"repugnant." · 
51The Psychology of Imagination, 130, 131. 
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herself into the object of addiction, thus achieving at-one-
ment. Addiction, as a project based on imaginary conscious-
. . . h s 1 52 ness, is a variation on t e artrean "Jonah comp ex." I 
become external to myself while simultaneously internalizing 
the object of addiction. 53 This genre of thought. the 
imaginary. negates the very possibility of perception. since 
the image 1.§. not perceptible, even in principle. 54 "Sensa-
tion" without perception. 11 Contamination 1155 is an essential 
structure of the addictive image, meaning that it has an 
impoverished quality which makes it such that it is not 
perceivable, even in principle. Contamination is essential to 
introduce the magical aspect into the object, which is in turn 
essential to bestow upon it its addictive qualities. 
52Being and Nothingness, 631. Hazel Barnes here defines 
this complex as the "Irrational desire to assimilate and to 
identify with oneself either the object of knowledge or a 
beloved person - without in any way impairing that object's 
character as an external object." In the case of addiction, 
the "object of knowledge" is beheld quasi-observationally (via 
imaginary consciousness) , thus making the Jonah complex doubly 
irrational, since one seeks to assimilate not an external 
object but an imaginative construct of one's own creation (the 
object of addiction as object of addiction, rather than merely 
as object). Here we evidence a desperate bid for connected-
ness in which the addict fails even to get outside of her own 
head. Thus the hypnagogically induced internal circuit that 
is the project to-be-addicted is the ultimate in metaphysical 
impotence. 
53The addict may seek to appropriate the addiction-object, 
become at-one with this object, or both at once, showing forth 
the impossible and contradictory nature of addiction. cf. de 
Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, 47. 
54The Psychology of Imagination, 133. 
55The Psychology of Imagination, 132. 
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The image is neither concept nor percept, nor can it be 
' h 56 eit er. The image is contaminated by an impure imaginary 
consciousness which prevents it from being witnessed clearly 
by consciousness as either a percept or as a concept. Such 
clear comprehension can only be the result of pure reflection, 
which necessarily involves the erasure of impure imaginary 
consciousness. That is to say, impure imaginary consciousness 
and pure reflective consciousness are mutually exclusive: one 
cannot reflect purely and impurely at the same time, and one 
cannot perceive/conceive and imagine at the same time. 
Addiction is a phenomenon originating necessarily in the 
imagination, then emanating from the imagination and flowing, 
surreptitiously, into the "conceptual"/"perceptual" 
57 
realms. The imagination truly is the capacity instar 
omnium, 58 including the capacity for the project to-be-
56See The Psychology of Imagination, 133. 
57Since (A) One cannot simultaneously reflect purely and 
impurely (pure reflection destroys the psychic constructs of 
impure reflection) and (B) One cannot imagine at the same time 
that one perceives or conceives, and (C) Because I am arguing 
that the addictive object becomes such based on the powers 
with which it is infused through the imagination (resulting in 
hypnagogic imagery), any perception/conception of the experi-
ence of addiction is subsequent to the bondage produced via 
imaginatively produced hypnagogic imagery (see earlier 
footnotes in the present section on "hypnagogic consciousness" 
and "imagery") . This in no way means that the addict does not 
experience real bondage. 
My usage of "perceive," "conceive," and "imagine" follows 
Sartre's usage in The Psychology of Imagination. [See pp. 8-
27] For further clarification, please see the remainder of 
the present section. 
58
cf. The Sickness Unto Death, 30, 31. 
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addicted. 
"An image has no persuasive power but we persuade 
ourselves by the very act by which we construct the image. 59 
To be (self)-persuaded regarding g certain state of affairs in 
one's relation to the object is to be an addict. For the 
persuasion is at- one with the addiction. Bondage is the 
result of attempting to dissuade oneself (reflectively) of 
that which is the nonreflective project to-be-addicted. The 
image does in fact have persuasive power, but not qua image. 
"Pure knowledge can become debased into imaginative knowledge 
by losing its pre-reflective character [its capacity for being 
readily reflectively accessible] in order to become wholly 
fl . 60 non-re ective." 
In the "interest of understanding," (a self-deceptive 
artifice of impure reflection) the addict moves away from 
clarity and reflectivity. What passes itself off for thought 
is in fact nothing other than that resultant from the attempt 
of consciousness to prevent thought, to induce a somnambulism, 
to create a magical world in which the purifying reflection 
can no longer be a threat because it can no longer take place. 
Consciousness has become a hedge against itself. The threat 
of being-in-the-world is circumvented and mutilated via the 
imaginary object of addiction, such that the addict identifies 
59The Psychology of Imagination, 137. Underlining mine. 
60The Psychology of Imagination, 150. 
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with the object as a being-in-the-midst-of-the-world. 61 If 
bad faith were not possible, addiction would not be possi-
ble. 62 
Imaginative consciousness necessarily confuses transcen-
d d 1 . u ence an externa ity. The addict's consciousness, in 
trying to transcend itself (or, in trying to real-ize its own 
transcendence, or be its own transcendence) "realizes" that 
its intention is toward an externality which could serve to 
d . b . 64 groun 1 ts eing. The object of addiction is in fact 
external to the transcending consciousness. But the object of 
addiction as object of addiction is an (imaginary) image and 
thus can be only transcendent but never external to the 
addict's own consciousness. The addict, without the purifying 
reflection, is left to flounder within the confines of his own 
b . . . 65 su Ject1v1ty. The object of addiction as object is always 
61
cf. Being and Nothingness, 58. 
62That is, the project of consciousness, by way of the 
imagination, to prevent access to the perceptual/conceptual 
realms. 
63See The Psychology of Imagination, 151. 
64This belief, of course, is already a fiction. 
65
cf. Addiction as Joseph Chilton Pearce's "Eureka" 
(metanoia) experience. This could be characterized as the 
"transcending" of one's transcendence, which is illusory. 
This may be seen as an attempt to be Other for oneself, while 
bypassing the need for concrete relations with others and/or 
the Ground, in an effort to ground ourselves or wholly unify 
our experience (become at-one with "reality", the cosmos, 
etc. ) . We can experience the Other as a transcendence 
transcended. In addiction, we experience ourselves as a 
transcendence transcended (the metanoia experience) under the 
(continued ... ) 
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conflated with the object of addiction as image. It is this 
object/image (external/transcendent) synthetic structure that 
allows for the faulty bifurcation of the same, displacing the 
. b h . 66 obJect y t e image. 
" ... [T]he image is like an incarnation of non-reflective 
67 thought," that is, an incarnation of the God-project (the 
project to "legitimate" one's own existence) in the object of 
addiction. The image is the stage for the reification of 
thought. The ability to dispense with the object of addiction 
(image) would be coextensive with the ability to abandon the 
God-project, since the project to-be-addicted is a subset and 
concrete manifestation of the metaproj ect that is the God 
project. 
65 
( ••• continued) 
illusory guise that we can get "outside" of our own transcen-
dence (experience, subjectivity) . Just as the Other can "wake 
up" to us in her subjectivity, so the addict can "wake up" to 
himself and the fact that his experience of "transcending his 
own transcendence" was in fact self-deceptive and the result 
of transcendence entangled within itself (introjected, self-
introjected). What the addict seeks, he can only find via 
externality, yet the object of addiction as such remains 
forever transcendent but not external. For more on the 
"Eureka" (metanoia) experience, see Joseph Chilton Pearce, The 
Crack in the Cosmic Egg: Challenging Constructs of Mind and 
Reality (New York: Washington Square Press, 1973), 63-83, 110, 
111, 143, 173. 
660f course, the addict is always aware of this, but she 
does not know it. To make the imaginatively constructed image 
an object for reflective consciousness would destroy that very 
image. Its evanescent nature would immediately give way to 
the nothingness of consciousness. This the addict has a stake 
in preventing. 
67The Psychology of Imagination, 160. 
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"Non-reflective thought is a possession. 1168 This is the 
case because the non-reflective pursuit of being can be, for 
Sartre, totally independent of reflectivity, that is, it has 
no need of reflectivity for its existence. Ideas on the non-
reflective level are always images, and there is no path to 
travel from thought as image to thought as thought. This 
colorized world retains the colorization described quite 
eloquently by Sartre in chapter three of The Emotions. 69 A 
veritable exorcism is needed to purge woman of her own 
hypnagogic imagery, which she believes to be ideas (conceptu-
alizations) as such while she is in her self-induced somnambu-
listic state. The image is thought to be an adequate repre-
70 
sentation of the thought. Addiction is the experience of 
b ' bl 1 I ' 7l not eing ~ to get out: P ato s cave once again. "Oh, 
sir, it's not just that I'm no good, but you lose track of the 
light." 72 Yes, consciousness as image has lost track of the 
light, it has itself sought to extinguish that light which 
68The Psychology of Imagination, 165. 
69The Emotions, 50-94. 
7011 There follows a war.ping of the further course of 
consciousness." [The Psychology of Imagination, 166] 
71with the major difference being that the addict has seen 
the sun but nevertheless gone back to chain herself into the 
cave. See Plato, The Republic (Bk. VII), trans. Paul Shorey, 
in Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, eds., The Collected 
Dialogues of Plato (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University 
Press, 1973), 747-772. 
72 Albert Camus, The Fall, trans. Justin O'Brien (New York: 
Vintage, 1956), 145. 
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would illumine the meaning of being. For the meaning of being 
is the last thing that the addict wants to apprehend, and yet 
in her frenzied attempt to flee herself she shows that she 
knows all too well just what it is that she flees. 
All unreal (imaginatively produced) objects can be 
h d d 1 ' b ' 11 73 appre en e on y quasi-a servationa y. The addictive 
object, as shown above, is and must be such an imaginatively 
produced unreal object, although the original impetus for such 
an imaginative production is always rooted in the real. 
Addiction, therefore, is a quasi-existential phenomenon, based 
on the quasi-observation of its unreal object. Nothing here 
is real except the project to-be-unreal. I must derealize 
I 
(or, unrealize) myself to enter the world of imagery, since 
there is absolutely no other way in which to enter. 74 To 
real-ize oneself (the state of faith in Kierkegaard) is the 
converse of the addicted condition of being, a project which 
necessitates self-derealization. Self-derealization is the 
process whereby through analogical thought, utilizing the 
object of addiction, we evade the responsibility of having to 
be our own nothingness of being: "The images offer us an 
escape, they present themselves as a negation of the condition 
of being-in-the-world [in-der-Welt-sein of Heidegger] as an 
' ld 75 anti-wor . 
73The Psychology of Imagination, 174. 
74The Psychology of Imagination, 188. 
75The Psychology of Imagination, 194. 
173 
The original impetus for the imaginative production of 
addictive imagery, then, being always rooted in the real, 
involves the inability/unwillingness to accept the existential 
conditions of life. It is a sign of nihilism or idealism, 76 
coupled with the inability/unwillingness to advance (positive) 
viable alternative projects. Addiction is the attempted 
. f th f b . 77 suppression o e nausea o eing. Why the nausea? 
Because being is seen as superfluous, de trop, forever 
unjustified. How then could any attempt at "rectification" be 
anything other than spurious? The addict, too, (in spite of 
her addiction) experiences existence as such as unjustifi-
78 
able. "Why is there something rather than nothing?" re-
sounds hopelessly before the nothing with untrammeled hollow-
ness. The human person beckons for meaning, and the universe 
79 fails to respond. Yet, for the addict, the experience of 
addiction is likewise absurd. It becomes one more necessity 
in a world of facticity in which all things are given and 
nothing is justified. The illegitimacy of fate. The illegit-
76
cf. Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals, especially the 
third essay, sections 13-28 (pp. 120-163). 
77 
cf. Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea, trans. Lloyd Alexander 
(New York: New Directions, 1964), lOOff. 
78This is not to say that she doesn't believe existence 
as such is justified or justifiable. 
79For Camus, the origin of the experience of the Absurd. 
The "odd trinity" is comprised of man (the interrogator) , the 
world (which remains silent), and the juxtaposition of the 
two, which brings forth the Absurd. See Albert Camus, The 
Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays, trans. Justin O'Brien (New 
York: Vintage, 1955), 2-48. 
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imacy of freedom. No way out. Addiction as folly to the 
Greeks and a stumbling block to the Jews. 80 The task for the 
addict is to think being - her own being - yet the scissipar-
i ty between being and thought makes this forever impossible. 
"The affective state, being consciousness, could not 
exist without a transcendent correlate. 1181 The object of 
addiction performs the service of posing as this transcendent 
correlate (it is transcendent as object, but merely immanent 
as object of addiction), so that the addict may engage in 
emotional consciousness with "impunity" (the only "punishment" 
being the loss of the real. But this the addict no longer 
"knows."). The object of addiction, that is, thus exists as 
an excuse for the choice of a chronic affective "state." 
Emotion would otherwise return to its origin to be fed there, 
and so realize the nothing (freedom) of its original construc-
tion. The object of addiction allows the emotion to transcend 
into the object and be "absorbed" there, without remainder. 
Addiction. then. allows for sedimented and successful patterns 
82 
of flight (from freedom). 
80
cf. I Cor. 1:23. That is, addiction involves both 
conceptual (Greeks) and praxiological (Jews) bafflement. It 
is that which one goes out of one's way to preserve and engage 
in and is, nevertheless, a centre coeur. A centre coeur. ne 
a centre meta-coeur pas. 
81The Psychology of Imagination, 199. This follows 
clearly from the Husserlian-Sartrean phenomenological dictum 
that "All consciousness is consciousness of something." 
82Put differently, addiction is a sedimented and success-
ful pattern of flight, a pattern of flight being the process 
(continued ... ) 
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"Feeling ... behaves in the face of the unreal as in that 
of the real ... [the unreal] is only the simple reflection of 
the feeling." 83 The (real) object of addiction is utilized 
in an attempt to real-ize the imaginary image at the same time 
as oneself while simultaneously derealizing oneself in order 
to create the (imaginary) object of addiction which is then 
surreptitiously substituted for the real object. Hence, the 
inevitable failure of the project of addiction: it is attempt-
ed simultaneous and symbiotic self-real-ization and self-
dereal- ization. 84 
The attempt at simultaneous and symbiotic self- real-
ization and self-de-real-ization (the structure of the project 
to-be-addicted) is a failure in principle on two counts: 
(1) One cannot at the same time move toward and away from her 
own freedom. Freedom is spent either in discharging itself or 
obstructing itself, since it is a contradiction in principle 
to act so as to effect both at once. 
(2) One cannot, as detailed previously, engage in imaginary 
consciousness (a function of impure reflection) and pure 
reflection simultaneously. To engage in pure reflection is to 
82 
( ••• continued) 
within which the for-itself attempts to 
from/negate/vitiate/deny its own freedom (self) . 
and Nothingness, p. 40, on patterns of flight. 
83The Psychology of Imagination, 200. 
move away 
See Being 
840nly the unreal self can real-ize the (imaginary) object 
of addiction as object of addiction. But since there is no 
unreal self, this has to be a project of the real self, which 
cannot real-ize the imaginary object. 
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effect upon one's own consciousness the katharsis that 
necessarily eradicates all vestiges of the imaginary con-
structs of impure reflection. Were consciousness able to 
effect the katharsis upon itself and still be duped }2y 
imaginary contents therein, the for-itself would have no way 
of delineating the real from the unreal, and all purported 
truth claims would be forever suspect. The imaginary may take 
itself (as a function of nonreflective and impure reflective 
consciousnesses) as the real, but reflective consciousness 
dare not be forever confused concerning its own veracity, lest 
one find herself forever adrift upon the sea of not only 
pseudo-objectivity, but pseudo-subjectivity. For if the 
reflective for-itself has no certitude even regarding its own 
consciousness, then it has no certitude even regarding its own 
subjectivity, to say nothing of the problematic task of 
escaping its own intentional beam to something outside of it. 
Conclusion, as stated previously: Either pure reflective 
consciousness or impure reflective consciousness, but not 
both, unless the consciousnesses are not simultaneous but 
sequential. 
h h . . f . 85 b T e p enomenological experience o "emptiness" can e 
seen as an impetus for the adoption of imaginary consciousness 
and the construction of the image. The abysmal nature of this 
experience can be such that imaginative consciousness is seen 
85See The Psychology of Imagination, 206. 
as preferential. Once consciousness is 
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86 
"degraded" to the 
level of imaginary consciousness and thinking becomes analogi-
cal, consciousness experiences the same objects as somehow 
binding (fantastic), as freedom bleeds toward and into them. 
The price of admission, as it were, into this fantastic 
universe of imaginary consciousness is precisely the accep-
tance of fatality over freedom. I watch my dreams unfold as 
I sleep; at times, I am shocked by what I see. Yet I can only 
think of acting within the dream, rather than thinking of 
shattering its fictitious (self-induced) parameters. I am no 
longer empty because I no longer behold the panorama before me 
in a voluntary fashion. I am condemned to be unfree. I am 
the addict. 87 
"There is no passage between real and imaginary feelings, 
the real is always accompanied by the ruin of the imagi-
88 
nary." The addict, we have said, has an ongoing experience 
of the "object of addiction" which she has imaginatively 
constructed as such. This (imaginary) image is the focus of 
her emotion (imaginary feelings), yet the image is the work of 
her real feelings. As long as consciousness remains self-
86 h . T e Emotions, 76. 
87The addict may be viewed as the woman pretending to fall 
asleep who has in fact fallen asleep. Can such a woman wake 
herself up? The addict is a victim of metaphysical carpal 
tunnels: through engaging in repetitious forms of (addictive) 
praxis, the self is finally crippled and finds itself ontolog-
ically self-mutilated. 
88The Psychology of Imagination, 209. 
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enchanted by the image (that is, as long as the project to-be-
addicted remains) , consciousness only has access to imaginary 
feelings, not real feelings, the latter of which would begin 
to serve to indicate the meaning of the construction of the 
imaginary object (as image) . Therefore, the meaning of the 
addict's own consciousness is veiled from her. 89 
The real and the imaginary selves are two distinct selves 
which, by their very natures, cannot coexist. 90 The imagi-
nary self, as I have indicated, is a project of the real self. 
The addict rejects her real self in favor of the project-to-
be-her-imaginary-self. The addict becomes "bound" by her 
imaginary self: her imaginary self becomes her "real self. 1191 
Her imaginary self transcends (overcomes, dispenses with) 
itself utilizing the "purifying reflection" (in this case, 
also a function of the imagination), to collapse at the feet 
of her "real self" ( a subset of the imaginary self). She 
begins the project (to-be-addicted) again, only to collapse 
· b 1 n Repeated 1'ndef1'n1'tely.~ again efore her "rea self." 
89And t ye 
meaning. 
only the addict can be 
90The Psychology of Imagination, 210. 
conscious of this 
91The contrary would be that the imaginary self would know 
itself as such. This, of course, could not take place in the 
phenomenon of addiction, and from a Sartrean perspective, 
could not occur regardless of circumstance. Once the imagi-
nary self becomes an object for itself, it collapses before 
its own freedom that is the real self. 
n . From a Kierkegaardian perspective, "real self," as 
engaged here, should always appear within quotations (Sartre 
(continued ... ) 
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Consciousness is spontaneity. But in the "syndrome of 
influence" which occurs with imaginary consciousness, says 
Sartre, consciousness recognizes in itself its own "counter-
spontaneity. 1194 Such counter-spontaneity has run wild in the 
imaginary consciousness of the addict, and the addict experi-
ences a "loss of control, " even in regards to her own con-
sciousness. If I am defined as freedom, why can't I think 
what I want to think? The existence of the notion of counter-
spontaneity, at least in part, addresses this issue. Con-
sciousness is a "victim" of itself, 95 it experiences its own 
otherness. But if I am not free, then I am not responsible: 
the makeshift ontology of the addict, crafted to suspend 
(ethical) obligation. 96 
"There is no imaginary world. In fact, it is but a 
92 
( ••• continued) 
does not follow this practice) , because the self that refuses 
to be itself is not a self at all. Hence, "real self." See 
The Sickness Unto Death, 42-74. 
930 r, until reduction/conversion. 
94The Psychology of Imagination, 225. 
95The Psychology of Imagination, 222. 
96The addict makes the illicit move from not finding 
herself responsible for her own intentionality that is her 
consciousness to not finding herself responsible for her own 
praxis. It is true that she is not the source of her own 
consciousness. But it is false to say that she is not 
responsible for the praxiological choices she makes based upon 
this consciousness - provided she is responsible for anything 
at all. In addition, she is responsible not for consciousness 
itself, but for its mode of being, in this case, being-
addicted. Response-ability is entailed by the choice of a 
project, provided one is responsible for anything at all; if 
one's project is not chosen, then one is not free. 
180 
matter of belief. 1197 So, too, the imaginary world of the 
addict. Phenomenologically, the addict perceives only the 
imaginary world. Addiction is not experienced as a phenomenon 
of belief, therefore, the addict's sitz im leben seems 
"sedimented" and is experienced vividly as real (irremedia-
ble) . If terror before the unreal exceeds terror before the 
real, katharsis/conversion may result. 
The experience of the imaginary world is an experience 
not of freedom or determinism, but of fatalism. 98 This is 
precisely the experience of the phenomenon of addiction in 
that consciousness fatal-izes itself and subsequently unreal-
izes this fatal-ization. Fatalism transpires when conscious-
ness degrades itself to the impure, imaginary level, and then 
"forgets" (suppresses) the process whereby it effected this 
degradation upon itself. 
As argued previously, either the unreal/aesthetic or the 
real/perceived: "Esthetic contemplation ... a sort of recoil in 
relation to the object contemplated which slips into nothing-
ness so that, from this moment on, it is no longer perceived; 
it functions as an analogue of itself, that is, that an unreal 
image of what it is appears to us through its actual pres-
97The Psychology of Imagination, 242. For Sartre, 
"belief" is defined as " ... fascination without existential 
position." [The Psychology of Imagination, 245.] Described 
thusly, it seems to be an "involuntary" version and subset of 
Husserlian bracketing, if such a thing is possible. 
98The Psychology of Imagination, 246. 
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99 
ence. 11 Either the unreal/addictive or the real/perceived. 
(Actual) presence effaces imaginative consciousness. There-
fore, actual presence effaces addiction. Actual presence is 
accompanied by absurdity and contingency. The function of 
imaginative consciousness in addiction is an attempt to negate 
100 both the former and the latter. 
Section D 
Addiction is a Phenomenon of Bad Faith 
Bad faith (self-deception) is an effort to evade one's 
b . d . h. . . f . 101 own eing an in t is sense it is a con ession. Addiction 
is likewise a confession in that one prefers being-addicted to 
being-oneself. One can either be addicted or be oneself. 102 
The failure to achieve "wholeness, 11 11 oneness," 11 unifica-
tion," or "ontological integration" leads one to the project 
of addiction, in whatever form this project may veil itself. 
The experience of ontological integration can occur only when 
the for-itself has concretely faced its own desires and its 
99The Psychology of Imagination, 281. 
100This, of course, is a failure in principle, since any 
project of the unjustified and unjustifiable for-itself is 
equally unjustifiable. 
101B ' d h' 6 eing an Not ingness, 2 1. 
102Please see part one, section A of this chapter for the 
Kierkegaardian perspective on this same dynamic. The full-
throttled theory of addiction, of course, involves the union 
of both Kierkegaardian and Sartrean perspectives. 
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own freedom. Both sadism and masochism, says Sartre, are "two 
103 
reefs on which desire may founder." The nonrealization of 
the desire for "wholeness" leads to the sado-masochistic self-
relation of addiction, an alternate approach to unifica-
t . 104 ion. 
Addiction is an attempt to effectuate one's own salvation 
via the rejection of one's own freedom. "Thus the refusal of 
freedom can be conceived only as an attempt to apprehend 
lf b , . , lf 11 10s onese as eing-in-itse . The addict attempts to 
become at-one with the object of addiction by projecting her 
freedom into the object (which is g totem for herself), and, 
collapsing at its feet, pays it obeisance in hopes of becoming 
like it (in-itself) . 106 Addiction is the project of the 
(self)-extinguishment of one's own freedom an Eastern 
conception of "salvation." Simply to seek to become one with 
the object of addiction while preserving one's own conscious-
ness would be a Western conception of "salvation. " Both 
103 • d h. Being an Not ingness, 404. 
104For more on this, see part two, section E of this 
chapter. 
105B · and N th· 440 eing o ingness, . 
106This is equally true of addictive interpersonal 
relations, since one can never experience for oneself the 
freedom of the Other, that is, one can never experience the 
Other's subjectivity, which is in essence the experience of 
freedom. See Being and Nothingness, p. 611, for the descrip-
tion of "anti-value", which is the attempt to utilize one's 
freedom to become in-itself. The addict does not flee this 
anti-value (even if she fears it), but instead welcomes it. 
Nevertheless, she welcomes it only as addict. 
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"conceptions" of "salvation" are necessary failures (since 
being-in-itself and being-for-itself are nonnegotiable realms 
of being), and the addict has a (nonreflective) awareness of 
this. 
"The will can reach only details and structures and will 
never modify the original project from which it has is-
d II 107 sue . The will is an epiphenomenon of the project: in 
relation to the project to-be-addicted, the will can provide 
only temporary reflective respite from (the effects of) this 
project. One chooses reflectively ("will") to circumvent the 
nonreflective choice which one is - thus one "chooses" against 
oneself (the freedom that is being itself against the being of 
freedom itself in the for-itself) - although reflectively in 
favor of oneself. 
Therefore, a reflective "abandonment" of addiction is a 
necessary failure unless a nonreflective abandonment can be 
1 d . h . 108 coup e wit it. This would be the attempt to integrate 
thetic and nonthetic projects. How does one make the nonre-
flective reflective, or how does one make imaginary conscious-
ness/emotional consciousness reflective consciousness? The 
ability to shift and focus awareness from the one to the other 
is consciously and deliberately impaired by the addict. How 
can one abandon a project {of addiction) if one cannot 
107 • d h. Being an Not ingness, 476. Underlining mine. 
108In fact, if the latter is realized, the former will 
appear superfluous. 
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reflectively or nonreflectively choose to engage in a new 
• ?109 proJect. 
When one does not have a reflective awareness of the 
project to-be-addicted, addiction is experienced as the "fall" 
(psychological and ontological) into facticity. 1w 
Addiction is surrogate intimacy, an attempt to ground 
one's being without the necessity of relations with other 
freedoms as such. The ontological flue vent of the Other is 
voided in favor of the pseudofreedom proffered by the imagina-
tively constructed object of addiction. This is the case even 
in interpersonal addictions, since the addict fails to relate 
to the freedom of the Other as freedom, but rather seeks to 
acquire (imbibe) it in the manner of an object - the imagina-
tively constructed object of addiction. 
Section E 
Addiction is a Basic Fear of the Human Condition: 
The Addict Prepares Her Own Death 
Th 
'' 
· t d 1 · b t '' of Sartre's anti' - Semi' te111 i's e inver e i er y 
. 1 h h . h 1 b. d 112 precise y w at t e addict as apparent y o taine . Per-
haps she experiences it rather as an inversion of this 
109That is , be a new project. 
110
viz. addiction is the nonreflective telos. 
111That is, liberty without responsibility. 
112
cf. Jean-Paul Sartre, Anti-Semite and Jew, trans. 
George J. Becker (New York: Schocken, 1972), 32. 
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inverted liberty: as responsibility without liberty. She 
feels responsible for her addiction without feeling free to 
abandon it. h . f b . lLl T e experience o eing-towards-death. The 
social psychology, i.e. group psychology, of the anti-Semite 
is the individual psychology of the addict. The latter 
operates intrapsychically; the former, interpsychically. 
Nevertheless, the imagination and construction of the imagi-
nary object remains identical in both cases: its purpose is to 
vitiate and mask freedom and its corollary, responsibili-
t 114 y. 
The relationship that the anti-Semite has with the Jew is 
the relationship the addict has with himself: the addict 
discerns in himself a "metaphysical principle that drives him 
to do evil under all circumstances [that is, perpetuate the 
dd . . ] 115 a iction , even though he thereby destroy himself, 11116 
113The addict feels that this 11 nonevadeable 11 addiction is 
leading her towards death, towards unhope, inexorably, even if 
this death is not ostensibly "physical" or corporeal. 
114The "sub-man" in de Beauvoir's The Ethics of Ambiguity 
(pp. 42-45) is afraid of engaging himself as a project, is 
afraid of a "positive" use of freedom. It is this "sub-man" 
who turns to addiction as a project-unrecognized-as-such. In 
this way, his freedom is discharged "without" responsibility, 
the very conditions the "sub-man" sought to attain. The 
"positive" use of freedom entails the movement toward becoming 
a self. The "negative" use of freedom entails anything that 
involves self-negation. A person becomes a slave to any end 
(project) not posited as such. "The sub-man makes his way 
across a world deprived of meaning toward a death which merely 
confirms his long negation of himself." [p. 45] Quite the 
saga of the addict. 
115Based on the principle that consciousness "ethicizes" 
itself. See part one of the present chapter. 
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Anti-Semitism represents a basic sadism; 120 once the 
anti-Semite and "the Jew" are within the domain of a single 
human consciousness (that of the addict) , sadism becomes 
masochism. The addict as sado-masochist. 121 The addict is 
the sado-masochist in that she has introjected the anti-
Semi te' s belief in the metaphysical principle that drives the 
Jew to do evil, and then has undertaken the process of trying 
to dispel this principle from her own psyche. The addict thus 
seeks a psychic incision to induce the expulsion of this 
heinous evil. Addiction is thus the creation of ontological 
guilt (freedom-negation) and also a bid for ontological 
expiation (i.e. rectification of the previous psychic surgery 
or ontological mutilation resultant from this freedom-nega-
t ' ) 122 ion . 
As the anti-Semite prepares the death of the Jew, the 
addict prepares her own death because she finds herself to be 
120Anti-Semite and Jew, 46. 
121
cf. Ernest Becker's The Denial of Death (New York: The 
Free Press, 1973) , 244-248, and Nietzsche's Genealogy of 
Morals, second essay, 57-96. 
122Addiction, as a species of self-mutilation, is a kind 
of masochism. This is not to say that all masochists are 
addicts. Insofar as the addict utilizes her addiction to 
manipulate the Other, the addict is a sadist. This is not to 
say that all sadists are addicts. Unless it is the case that 
masochism, sadism, and sado-masochism are themselves kinds of 
addictions. To support this claim, I would be required to 
provide a detailed description/analysis of these practices, 
something clearly beyond the scope of this work. These 
practices appear to be addictions to the degree in which they 
exhibit teleology synonymous with other addictions, coupled 
with imaginatively produced hypnagogic imagery. 
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the embodied "principle of evil" that she seeks to stamp out. 
The addict' s only recourse lay in eradicating this very "evil" 
thing - her own freedom - (for how can there be evil without 
freedom and responsibility? she "thinks"), thus the in-itself 
becomes the goal of the project of addiction. And the in-
itself is precisely the death of the for-itself. The addict 
123 prepares her own death. 
123This description of addiction calls to mind Camus' 
brilliant history of "metaphysical rebellion" as expounded in 
his 1951 work, The Rebel. I feel that it would be difficult 
to overrate this amazing and often misunderstood book. The 
publication of this volume led to the definitive split between 
Sartre and Camus. In it, Camus attacks Marxism and Christian-
ity directly, but implicitly attacks existentialism as well as 
all other forms of what he called "idealism." ["To abandon 
oneself to principles is really to die - and to die for an 
impossible love which is the contrary of love." (pp. 129, 
130)] 
I view addiction as a form of introverted or introjected 
metaphysical rebellion. In delineating this rebellion, Camus 
makes the following claims (these few excerpts are by no means 
meant to be exhaustive) : 
"Rebellion cannot exist without the feeling that, somewhere 
and somehow, someone is right." (p. 13). 
"The transition from facts to rights is manifest ... in rebel-
lion." (p. 15) . 
"··· [R]ebellion puts total freedom up for trial." (p. 284). 
The addict is the rebel, she recognizes herself as 
calling the metaphysics of existence into question, yet she 
fails to engage in interpersonal (social/political, etc.) 
rebellion, but instead remains yoked through fear of freedom 
and its implications to a fully introjected (internalized) 
form of rebellion. She recognizes the legitimacy of rebellion 
while recognizing the illegitimacy of her form of (introject-
ed) rebellion, which is no more than legitimated freedom 
negated as legitimate praxis. The being of the rebel (as 
addict) becomes sour, becomes rancid, as she tries to force-
fully expel her (self-introjected) freedom. The rebel may 
utilize her freedom in two conflicting ways: introjection and 
expulsion. The dominance of one of these forms over the other 
will determine rebellion as praxis or as addiction. 
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Anti-Semitism is a basic fear of the human condition, 124 
precisely as is the case of the addict. "His life [the anti-
Semite's] is nothing but a long flight from others and from 
himself, 11125 the addictive flight from the being of free-
d 126 om. Universal existential anxiety (angst) is introject-
ed; the addict particularizes the anxiety, turning it into 
fear, centering it on repercussions/machinations/ruminations 
surrounding the object of addiction. Death (global freedom-
negation) is less an object of fear than the pain of addic-
tion, which is, for the addict, a specific and ever present 
phenomenological reality. The absence of this flight (free-
dam-negation) in the for-itself would be authenticity. 
To broach the topic of authenticity, for Sartre, is to 
broach the topic of morality: "Thus the choice of authenticity 
b 1 d . . 127 appears to e a mora ecision. " Sartre states on page 
124Anti-Semite and Jew, 54. 
125Anti-Semite and Jew, 135. 
126Under a certain description, we could in fact conceptu-
alize the anti-Semite as an addict with her imaginatively 
constructed/nuanced external object, the Jew. In this case, 
the anti-Semite could no more do without the Jew than any 
other addict could do without her object of addiction. The 
"loss" of the Jew (as an object of execration) would thus 
involve the anti-Semite in withdrawal. Therefore, the anti-
Semite has a stake in preventing the death of the Jew, that 
very class of people she may conceptually and even praxiologi-
cally seek to exterminate. Withdrawal: Existential pain 
experienced over the loss/prospective loss of the object of 
addiction. 
127 • s . d k Anti- emite an Jew, 141. I as 
recall the bridging of the is-ought gap 
addiction, as delineated in part one of 
the reader kindly to 
in the phenomenon of 
this chapter. 
190 
ninety-three of the same volume that the term "inauthentic" 
implies "no moral blame." Here we see clearly the strange 
relation, for Sartre, between the authentic and the inauthen-
tic human being. Authenticity appears in the moral sphere, 
but inauthenticity somehow does not. Can these viewpoints be 
reconciled? I certainly shall not even feign to solve the 
problem here, but shall leave the reader with one thought: If 
the anti-Semite is "inauthentic," and inauthenticity implies 
no moral blame, on what grounds can Sartre condemn the anti-
Semite? It seems that if the anti-Semite is inconsistent in 
h . . h s . 128 er position, t en artre is too. If addiction is merely 
an ontological phenomenon (as, supposedly, is anti-Semitism), 
stemming from the improper utilization of one's freedom, 
freedom itself cannot be seen as a legitimate aim and ground 
(metavalue) for a morality. 129 The categorization of addic-
tion (and anti-Semitism) as moral phenomena is essential for 
the possibility of any Sartrean ethical theory. If freedom 
can be truncated by the for-itself (as in the case of addic-
tion) without ethical ramifications, then the for-itself can 
have no legitimate value at which it can project itself. 
128 f . . . . d . t th h I inconsistency is no in ictmen , en on w at 
Sartrean grounds can we ever impute "moral blame, " since 
Sartre wants so much to censor anti-Semitism? How does Sartre 
fail to be caught in his own trap? 
129Sartre attempts the latter repeatedly, in Anti-Semite 
and Jew, in Existentialism and Human Emotions, in Cahiers, 
and, I believe one could argue, in The Psychology of Imagina-
tion and Being and Nothingness, the latter volume, o{ course, 
merely by implication, since the text remains on an ontologi-
cal level. 
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Which may well be the case. "Thus it amounts to the same 
thing whether one gets drunk alone or is a leader of na-
tions. 11130 
Section F 
Addiction: The Illicit Illusion 
To conclude this work's Sartrean section on addiction, I 
wish to note but a few ethical implications of the phenomenon 
of addiction. These observations are not essential for the 
theory, but are certainly important tangential considerations 
when dealing with this phenomenon within the context of 
Sartre's philosophy. 
"The ultimate meaning of the acts of honest men is the 
130Being and Nothingness, 62 7. This is found at the very 
end of this volume, under the section entitled "Ethical 
Implications." Interestingly, Sartre says in the same short 
section the following: "Thus existential psychoanalysis is 
moral description for it releases to us the ethical meaning of 
various human projects ... Thus we are already on the moral 
plane but concurrently on that of bad faith ... existential 
psychoanalysis is going to reveal to man the real goal of his 
pursuit ... as a means of deliverance and salvation ... In 
particular is it possible for freedom to take itself for a 
value as the source of all value, or must it necessarily be 
defined in relation to a transcendent value which haunts it?" 
[pp. 626, 627] The latter scenario, as Sartre repeatedly 
points out, is a failure in principle. The former, which 
would require the "conversion," delivers us over to an 
"ethical plane." [p. 628] Of course, if it really does amount 
to the "same thing" if one gets drunk or is a leader of 
nations, then it makes no difference if one loves or hates her 
neighbor, for one would have no "neighbors" at all. All talk 
concerning the value and sanctity of freedom as such would be 
strictly rubbish. 
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131 quest for freedom as such." Given the preceding section, 
one could certainly ask "Why be honest?" Choosing freedom, 
for Sartre, is an ethical rather than an aesthetic choice. 132 
Why is this? How so? Sartre tells us that coherence is the 
proper ground for ethical decision making. 133 Why is this? 
What does coherence have to do with morality? Is coherence an 
unquestionable ideal? Why is this? Why is freedom an 
unguestionable ideal? Is it? Other statements regarding this 
issue from the same work include the following: 
"We want freedom for freedom's sake and in every 
particular circumstance. 11134 
"Therefore, in the name of the will for freedom, which 
freedom itself implies [the inexorable dythrarnbic 
ontology of individuation? cf. The Birth of Tragedy], i 
may pass judgement [moral judgement] on those who seek to 
hide from themselves the complete arbi~rariness and the 
complete freedom of their existence. "13 
"One may choose anvthing if it is on the grounds of 
f . 1 13!! ree invo vement." 
If my description of addiction is correct, then addiction, for 
Sartre, is illegitimate. It cannot be the free project of a 
free, honest being (engaging in pure reflective conscious-
131 Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions, 
trans. Bernard Frechtman and Hazel E. Barnes (Secaucus, NJ: 
Citadel, 1957), 45. 
132E . . l. xistentia ism and Human Emotions, 42. 
133E . . l. xistentia ism and Human Emotions, 45. 
134E . . l. xistentia ism and Human Emotions, 46. 
13SE . . l. xistentia ism and Human Emotions, 46. Underlining 
mine. 
13sE . . l. xistentia ism and Human Emotions, 48. 
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ness), and it is therefore "immoral," given the statements 
above. 
In terms of addiction, the addict' s phenomenological 
loss/restriction of freedom is: 
(1) An illusion (voodoo metaphysics). In fact, (A) the 
project of addiction is involved in the quest for freedom, or 
(B) the project of addiction is involved in masking one's 
freedom from oneself, but one is in fact not less free, or (C) 
the project of addiction is an unsuccessful project to become 
less free. All projects are projects to-be-free. but one does 
not become free through all projects. One seeks to become 
"less free" because this is perceived as a "freeing" experi-
ence. Movement relative to freedom is a function of the for-
itself and must be ascertained/evaluated only through each 
for-itself 's phenomenal field. 
(2) A process consciousness effects on itself. Therefore, the 
addict is necessarily dishonest with herself, i.e. she is in 
bad faith, and 
(3) The addict thinks (1) nonreflectively, while thinking she 
is "less" free (reflectively) . Consciousness thus thinks A (I 
am equally free) and not-A (I am "less" free) at the same time 
(bad faith), violating Aristotle's "law" of noncontradiction. 
The addict thinks A and not-A simultaneously (this she 
must do in her role as addict) ; addiction is inherently 
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paradoxical, unthinkable, absurd. 137 The goal of addiction 
is the cessation (or discharge) of freedom as such, hence the 
d . l 'd 138 en is not va i . Freedom is engulfed in the goal of 
extinguishing itself. Therefore, it is not a valid free 
project. "The constructive activities of man take on a valid 
meaning only when they are assumed as a movement toward 
139 freedom. 
Now either addiction is a movement toward freedom which 
involves the experience of "unf reedom" or "loss of freedom" as 
a movement toward freedom, or addiction is a movement away 
from freedom, in which case it would lack a valid meaning. I 
have argued throughout this chapter for the latter. The 
project to-be-addicted is one of attempting to hide one's 
freedom from oneself, and to do so in the dynamic surrounding 
the "object of addiction." Addiction is a "negative" action 
in that transcendence is "condemned to fall uselessly back 
upon itself because it is cut off from its real goals." This 
defines a situation of (self) • 140 "oppression." Addiction is 
illegitimate as a project because "A freedom which is inter-
137
"An end is valid only by a return to the freedom which 
established it and which willed itself through this end. But 
this implies that freedom is not to be engulfed in any goal; 
neither is it to dissipate itself vainly without aiming at a 
goal." [The Ethics of Ambiguity, 70] 
138Th' ' ' k d d is is equally true for Kier egaar , Sartre, and e 
Beauvoir. 
139The Ethics of Ambiguity, 80. 
140The Ethics of Ambiguity, 81. 
195 
ested only in denying freedom must be denied ... [F]reedom will 
b ' ' 1 h b 141 never e given; it a ways as to e won ... " 
the addict consistently fails to recognize. 
being upon the stake of truth. 
This reality 
The flaying of 
Yet the reflective slat of opportunity waits quietly for 
the addict as an eye in a dim cavern, as a lantern on a hill, 
as a voice in the wind, if the addict will but turn a weary 
gaze upon the halcion illumination. Fail not, O wayward one, 
to heed the beckoning beam that is within you! The light of 
freedom dances deftly upon the razor's edge of reflection, 
singing brightly of another being, yet the same being, of 
another land, yet the same land. The horn pipe plays to your 
gossamer-like figure sweet tales of moon beams playing upon 
your destiny the hope of an eternity. Your being cries out! 
Do not mute its wistful voice of pining. 
' 1 f ' d 142 Rise up, my ove, my air one, an come away. 
In the next chapter I shall address the necessary 
preconditions for the possibility of a nonaddictive relation-
ship. I shall also demonstrate that Sartre advances not a 
theory of love, but a theory of addiction. 
REED'S THEORY OF ADDICTION: A SUMMATION 
Addiction is the self (A) seeking to be other than it is, 
(B) seeking to mask the project to be other than it is from 
141The Ethics of Ambiguity, 91, 119. 
142 Song of Songs 2:10b 
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itself, and (C) seeking to mask its "true nature" from itself. 
Truth about the self and freedom are inseparable; untruth (the 
lie) and bondage are likewise linked. 
The experience of the contingent and unaccounted for 
(unnecessary, superfluous) nature of freedom is such that 
consciousness fears freedom and the dread/anguish that is an 
integral part of the experience of freedom. Therefore, 
consciousness fears itself and the truth of itself, since 
consciousness is freedom. 
Since consciousness fears freedom (the truth of itself) , 
it seeks to elude its own self-knowledge by way of an addic-
tive encounter with being. By means of such an encounter, 
consciousness (A) effectively (self-deceptively) obscures its 
knowledge of itself, (B) gives itself a "nature" or an 
"essence" (the "locus" of the addiction), and therefore, (C) 
"OVERCOMES" THE INSOLUBLE PROBLEM OF THE CONTINGENCY OR 
SUPERFLUITY OF ITS OWN FREEDOM (BEING). It achieves this 
through the "realization" that it cannot dispense with the 
"object" of addiction, thus legitimating, due to its experien-
tial inexorable exigency, the praxiological link between the 
addict and the object of addiction. The addiction "results 
from" the essential nature of the self and is therefore 
"irremediable" and consequently justified, since it can no 
longer fall within the realm of free being. Put differently, 
if one's project is not chosen, then one is not free. Ergo, 
the self is determined as addict. Addiction, then, is the 
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contradictory effort of the self seeking self-constitution 
through the not-self (object of addiction) . 
But being is either free or determined, but not freely 
determined. The addict seeks to freely determine being, 
therefore engaging in the project of denying his or her own 
freedom. If freedom is denied, there is n.g hope of constitut-
ing oneself as a valid project, since freedom is the only 
possible source of validity (validity = meaning) . Indetermi-
nate free being equals nonself, so the task of consciousness 
is to become a self without recourse to freedom-denying self-
determinative projects. 
Consciousness of and knowledge about the self allow one 
to seek to ~ free rather than to be. Addiction is a project 
in which the self seeks being as an end. The self desires to 
think its own being, but the necessary difference between 
being and thought makes this impossible in principle. So the 
self as addict seeks to be what it cannot think: its own 
being. 
In order for addiction to be possible, emotional and 
imaginative consciousnesses must be possible, since emotion 
and imagination are necessary for addiction to transpire. 
Both types of consciousness operate on a sub-reflective level, 
a level at which consciousness is not clear to itself, a level 
at which consciousness is not fully aware of its own "nature." 
On this sub-reflective level, consciousness imaginatively 
produces an addictive image which functions as an analogue of 
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the existential object in question. The addict bestows upon 
this object-as-image "magical" powers, most importantly, the 
"power" to coopt a degree of the freedom that is the self. 
Unless the addict can dispense with this mode of conscious-
ness, he or she can only think of acting within the sub-
reflective "dream." The unreal (addicted) self is mesmerized 
by the image produced via emotional/imaginative consciousness, 
and remains trapped within the imaginary feelings/thoughts 
produced thereby. The unreal self is produced by the real 
self simultaneous with the production of the (unreal) object 
of addiction (image) . The addict cannot return to his or her 
real (free) self unless imaginary consciousness and its 
attendant image is eradicated, as perception and imagination 
are antithetical (both being wholly consciousness) , and cannot 
occur together. This is because the image, being imaginative-
ly constructed, is not perceivable, even in theory. 
Addiction is possible because the self is both voluntary 
and involuntary spontaneity. Voluntary spontaneity is 
reflective or sub-reflective freedom, whereas involuntary 
spontaneity is nonreflective (yet intentional), at one with 
consciousness. How does one become conscious of one's own 
consciousness? How can one know consciousness as such, when 
consciousness is not knowledge? One cannot know consciousness 
qua consciousness, and therefore the project that one is 
escapes reflective comprehension. 
The will, being voluntary spontaneity, being reflective 
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consciousness, cannot comprehend and therefore cannot alter 
the fundamental project or being that one is. The only 
solution, therefore, to the problem of addiction would be to 
redirect the project-to-be, for as long as one seeks being as 
an end, one is the addict: one seeks to imbibe being and make 
one's own existence necessary. 
If one cannot renounce the nonreflective project to be, 
one is forever the addict. This is because one believes 
(nonreflectively) that one needs to ingest the nonself in 
order to be a self. The necessary and sufficient condition 
for the possibility of a nonaddicted mode of being would be 
the possibility of the project of freedom as an end, the being 
of play. Therefore, we could ask the question concerning the 
possibility of a nonaddicted mode of being in a different but 
equally accurate way: Is it possible for human being to play? 
For the possibility of play is the possibility of freedom. 
And the possibility of freedom is the possibility of the 
nonaddicted self. Any unacknowledged project of the self 
creates in the self a condition of bondage, a condition of 
slavery. Addiction is the self slavishly but nonreflectively 
seeking to justify its own unjustified and unjustifiable 
freedom that it is, a freedom that is indelibly precarious, a 
freedom that cannot exist as anything but praxis. For freedom 
cannot be reif ied or collected, but must be utilized as the 
flow that it is. Anything less is self-mutilation. 
CHAPTER 4 
SARTRE'S THEORY OF LOVE: A THEORY OF ADDICTION 
Introduction 
In the present chapter, I will do a closer analysis of 
Sartre's phenomenological apparatus as it impinges upon the 
topics of love and addiction. Of particular import for this 
project will be the following well-trod Sartrean notions: pre-
reflective (nonreflective), impure reflective and reflective 
consciousnesses, bad faith in both the weak and strong senses 
of this term (to be elucidated below), the purifying reflec-
tion (katharsis), the phenomenological reduction, deliverance, 
salvation, conversion, and authenticity. Among the conten-
tions I wish to make in this chapter are the following: 
(1) That pre-reflective consciousness = "immediacy". 
(2) That impure reflection = bad faith consciousness. 
(3) That the purifying reflection is not equivalent to 
conversion. 
The purifying reflection allows for consciousness of bad 
faith. Consciousness of bad faith is good faith but not 
authenticity. Good faith is a certain point of view on one's 
bad faith, but not a (radical) escape1 from it. Existential 
psychoanalysis, via the purifying reflection, allows the human 
1i.e. as would be necessary for conversion. 
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person to "see" the project that he is (the project of the 
recovery of being), but this alone does not constitute the 
abandonment of the project. This is why it is possible to 
glean from Sartre's writings weak and strong notions of bad 
faith. 2 Strong bad faith exists in the for-itself that sees 
its project for what it is, and yet still engages itself as 
this very project (a scenario possible only subsequent to the 
purifying reflection) . 
Weak bad faith would constitute engagement in the same 
project prior to the purifying reflection, through impure 
reflection. "Deliverance and salvation," possible only 
subsequent to the purifying reflection, are made possible 
through existential psychoanalysis. 3 A condition of deliver-
ance (conversion, salvation) would be authenticity. The 
addict can exist in weak or strong bad faith; in fact, the 
for-itself in weak or strong bad faith is the addict (non-
being inexorably seeking to be through that which is other 
than itself) . Authenticity dispenses with the conditionality 
of addiction in the for-itself. That is, the authentic self 
does not need to seek to imbibe the non-self in order to be 
2Joseph Catalano, "Good and Bad Faith: Weak and Strong 
Notions, " Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry, 
vol. XVII, no. 1 (1980-81): 79-90. I utilize but radically 
alter Catalano's distinction between weak and strong notions 
of bad faith in Sartre, nearly to the point of a complete 
inversion. I see this as necessary for a more complete 
rendering of Sartre's concept of bad faith. 
3See Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: Ari Essay on 
Phenomenological Ontology, trans. Hazel Barnes (New York: 
Philosophical Library, n.d.), 626, 627. 
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its self. "Self"-ingestion is not a constitutive ground for 
selfhood for either the addict or the authentic self. The 
authentic self recognizes this and operates knowing that it is 
the case, whereas the addict continues his flight toward the 
ingestion of freedom/being. The purifying reflection alone is 
not enough to spawn authenticity, because awareness (impure 
reflection) and knowledge (or quasi-knowledge, through pure 
reflection) are not equivalent to authentic being, but merely 
are preconditions for its possibility. Authentic being, if 
such is possible, would arise simultaneous with a choice based 
upon this awareness and knowledge, but would not be reducible 
merely to this awareness and knowledge. Good faith, then, is 
not equivalent to authenticity, but is, again, a necessary 
prerequisite for the possibility of the same. 
There are thus four levels of being, not three: 
{I) Pre-reflective consciousness. Innocence? No, since being 
still seeks to be other than itself. 
{II) Impure reflection. This is the realm of weak bad faith. 
(III) Pure reflection. This is the realm of strong bad faith 
when coupled with the refusal of (IV). This could also be the 
realm of good faith, depending upon one's own relation to 
one's own self-knowledge. 
(IV) Conversion. This is authentic human being. 
For Sartre, level (IV) is unattainable. I shall demon-
strate this below. Being and Nothingness is written from the 
point of view of pure reflection (III) , about persons engaged 
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in impure reflectivity (II) . "Reasons are always from above 
downward," 4 and the explication and analysis of any paradigm 
is always extraparadigmatical. Those who engage in the 
purifying reflection and subsequently suppress the evidence 
derived therefrom are in bad faith in the strong sense. Those 
of pre-reflective consciousness cannot be in bad faith in the 
strong sense because they have not yet taken a point of view 
on their own being as such, rather, being it, they are 
absolutely taken in. Those who engage in impure reflection 
are "captivated" by the psychic objects which their own 
consciousness has spun, and, due to the element of captivity, 
are in bad faith in the weak sense. Such a consciousness has 
become drunk through the consumption of its own pharmacologi-
cal elixir (the pharmacon), imbibing to the dregs the draught 
of its own serum of falsehood. Truth is temporally suspended 
in the balance of unknowing, as consciousness has eclipsed the 
vision of its own sun. Many of these contentions may appear 
to run counter to much of accepted scholarship on Sartre and 
therefore appear untenable, but seeming is not always being, 
and sometimes, at least, the crowd is untruth. 5 
The aim of part one of this chapter is to show that the 
Sartrean conversion is not possible. If conversion is not 
4C.S. Lewis, ed., George MacDonald: An Anthology (New 
York: Macmillan, 1978), 22. 
5See Soren Kierkegaard, The Point of View for My Work as 
an Author: A Report to History, trans. by Walter Lowrie (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1962), 109-120. 
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possible, for Sartre, then the only possible type of Sartrean 
human being is the addicted being. This is another angle of 
attack, a flank, if you will, on Sartrean type two love, 
showing the impossibility of its existence in any Sartrean 
world. In chapter two I demonstrated that the conversion was 
a necessary precondition for the possibility of Sartrean type 
two love. I also showed in that chapter that Sartrean type 
one and type two love were incompatible. In addition, I 
sought to show the impossibility of Sartrean type two love 
against the backdrop of Sartrean ontology. Here, I wish to 
argue that the conversion is not possible. Since the conver-
sion was previously shown to be a necessary prerequisite for 
type two love, type two love, then, is likewise excluded from 
any possible Sartrean world. This being the case, Sartre is 
left with only type one love. Type one love, as I shall argue 
in this chapter, is nothing but g form of addiction in light 
of the phenomenological theory of addiction proffered in 
chapter three. Therefore, Sartre's theory of love is actually 
a theory of addiction. This I shall conclusively demonstrate 
in part two of the present chapter. The Sartrean world thus 
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What is the phenomenological reduction in Sartre? This 
question may be premature, as there is no consensus as to 
whether the reduction even exists in Sartre's philosophy. If 
the reduction in fact exists in Sartre (a question we shall 
attend to momentarily) , what would it involve? It could/would 
involve one or more of the following: 
( 1) The process whereby consciousness suspends judgement 
concerning the existential condition or truth value of the 
phenomenon (experiential reality) in question. "Experience" is 
the operative word here, rather than "reality," the "real," 
etc. What is at issue, once the reduction has taken place, is 
not the existence or nonexistence of the datum before con-
sciousness, but the specific nature of tha data and the 
conditions for its appearing/possibility of its appearing. In 
this way, no existential truth claims need be made about the 
"object" pole of consciousness, and consciousness is free to 
focus on the appearing itself. 
(2) The process whereby consciousness seeks to go beyond the 
phenomenon and its series of appearances in order to grasp its 
essence. The essence could be said to be the meaning of the 
phenomenon. 
(3) The process whereby consciousness purges itself of bad 
faith, viz. a reflective katharsis in which consciousness 
faces itself, unfettered by duplicity. The nature of the 
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project that is the for-itself will come to light under this 
description. 
The above three descriptions of the phenomenological 
reduction are by no means mutually exclusive. It is my 
contention that they are in fact compatible, a claim that will 
be developed coincident with the development of a number of 
other claims relevant to the topic at hand. But before this 
can take place, we need to address squarely the possibility of 
the phenomenological reduction in Sartre. 
The translators of Sartre's early work, The Transcendence 
of the Ego, state that 
Much 
... the rejection of the transcendental ego and the return 
to the phenomenological doctrine of intentionality in its 
original significance had a radical consequence 
seemingly not fully evident to Sartre himself at the time 
of the following essay [1936-37] - which led directly to 
existentialism, that is, to a philosophy of human 
existence. The radical consequence is that the important 
Husserlian technique of "reduction" or "epoche" is 
. 'bl 6 1mposs1 e. 
of the debate surrounding the necess-
ity/possibility/impossibility of the reduction in Sartre 
revolves around what is meant by the reduction, and can be 
resolved at this level. Sartre himself spoke of the necessary 
use of the phenomenological reduction in his brilliant 1940 
work entitled The Psychology of Imagination. 7 Hazel Barnes 
6Robert Kirkpatrick and Forrest Williams, Introduction to 
Jean-Paul Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, (New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, n.d.), 23. 
7 Jean-Paul Sartre, The Psychology of Imagination, trans, 
anonymous. (Secaucus, NJ: Citadel Press, n.d.), 259ff. 
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writes in her "Key to Special Terminology" in her translation 
of Being and Nothingness that Sartre approves of the "eidetic 
reduction" but rejects the epoche. 8 In The Transcendence of 
the Ego, Sartre writes that " ... the epoche is no longer a 
miracle, an intellectual method, an erudite procedure: it is 
an anxiety which is imposed on us and which we cannot avoid: 
it is both a pure event of transcendental origin and an ever 
possible accident of our daily life." 9 
Many other notable thinkers have maintained that Sartre 
rejects the reduction(s). Wilfred Desan states that "Heideg-
ger and Sartre have abolished the reductions. 1110 Maurice 
Natanson maintains that "no epoche or reduction has been 
performed" in Sartre's philosophy. 11 Joseph Catalano writes 
in his commentary on Being and Nothingness that Sartre 
"rejects Husserl's phenomenological reduction." 12 Robert 
Solomon claims that "Sartre and Heidegger explicitly reject 
the reduction in all its forms. 1113 A. G. Pleydell-Pearce 
claims that "Sartre found no role in his philosophical method 
8Being and Nothingness, 630. 
9 The Transcendence of the Ego, 103. Underlining mine. 
10
wilfred Desan, The Tragic Finale (New York: Anchor 
Books, 1960), 5. 
11Maurice Natanson, A Critigµe of Jean-Paul Sartre's 
Ontology (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1951), 70. 
12 Joseph S. Catalano, A Commentary on Jean-Paul Sartre's 
"Being and Nothingness" (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), 8. 
13 Robert Solomon, Phenomenology and Existentialism (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1974), 20. 
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for that central feature of Husserlian phenomenology - the 
14 
epoche. 
Contrary to this view is that espoused by Kerry Walters, 
Linda Bel 1 , and Thomas Bus ch. 15 Bus ch holds that "Being and 
Nothingness can be understood only within the context of 
Sartre's use of the phenomenological reduction. 1116 He also 
states that Sartre's philosophy can be seen as an "extension 
of Husserl's programmatic." 17 My own view is that there is 
in fact a necessary place for the reduction in Sartre's 
philosophy. I also feel that it is necessary to deal with 
this issue in order to adequately address the topics of love 
and addiction. The possibility/impossibility of the reduction 
has extensive ramifications vis-a-vis Sartre's notion of love, 
and also for the construction of a phenomenological theory of 
addiction. 
14 A. G. Pleydell-Pearce, The Journal of the British 
Society for Phenomenology 5 (January 1974): 86. 
15See Linda Bell, Sartre's Ethics of Authenticity (Tusca-
loosa: University of Alabama Press, 1989); Thomas Busch, 
"Sartre's Use of the Reduction: Being and Nothingness Recon-
sidered," in Jean-Paul Sartre: Contemporary Approaches to His 
Philosophy, edited by Silverman and Elliston (Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press, 1980), 17-29; Thomas Busch, 
"Sartre: The Phenomenological Reduction and Human Relation-
ships," Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 6: 1 
(January 1975): 55-61; and Kerry S. Walters, "A Recovery of 
Innocence: The Dynamics of Sartrean Radical Conversion, " 
Auslegung, XI: 1 (Fall 1984): 358-377. 
16 Thomas Busch, "Sartre's Use of the Reduction": ·10. 
17Ibid. I 18. 
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What is the phenomenological reduction in Sartre? It is 
certainly true that some critics deny that such a reduction 
exists, but I wish to focus on the line of interpretation that 
maintains that the writings of Sartre can only be understood 
within the context of the phenomenological reduction. 18 
This, most certainly, is my view. Thomas Busch, in his 
article entitled "Sartre: The Phenomenological Reduction and 
Human Relationships" maintains, simply, that impure reflection 
constitutes the "natural attitude" and that pure reflection 
(effected by way of the purifying reflection) constitutes the 
"phenomenological viewpoint," or the "reduced" attitude. 19 
The natural attitude, he says, is marked by indelible bad 
faith. Busch maintains that "If Being and Nothingness is read 
within the context of Sartre's presentation of the reduction 
in The Transcendence of the Ego, it is evident that a purify-
ing reflection can be effected which delivers a consciousness 
from bad faith. 1120 This reduction is the move from the 
18See, e.g. Thomas W. Busch, "Sartre: The Phenomenological 
Reduction and Human Relationships,": 55-61; Simone de Beau-
voir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, trans. Bernard Frechtman 
(Secaucus, NJ: Citadel Press, 1980): 14; Francis Jeanson, 
Sartre and the Problem of Morality, trans. Robert V. Stone 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1980): 34, 83-89; 
and Kerry S. Walters, "A Recovery of Innocence: The Dynamics 
of Sartrean Radical Conversion," : 358-377. These writers are 
in agreement in that they maintain that the phenomenological 
reduction is a katharsis during which consciousness moves from 
the level of impure reflection to pure reflection. 
19 




natural attitude characterized by bad faith to the phenomena-
logical attitude in which bad faith is rooted out. Busch also 
maintains that subsequent to the reduction, "the stage is set 
for the refusal by phenomenological consciousness of the 
project to be God ... "21 I can follow Busch this far, as long 
as this stage-setting is not confused with the conversion 
itself. The order is therefore (1) The natural attitude, (2) 
The reduced attitude, and (3) The converted attitude. The 
question both in play and at bay at this point concerns 
whether or not (3) is possible. In another article on Being 
and Nothingness, Busch claims that Sartre "··· reserves his 
treatment of authentic human relations for separate study," 
because Being and Nothingness is only meant to be a condition-
22 
al, partialized ontology. Linda Bell, in Sartre's Ethics 
of Authenticity, equates pure reflection (the phenomenological 
reduction) with (radical) conversion. 23 Kerry Walters seeks 
to clearly delineate the reduction from the conversion. 24 In 
21Ibid., 57. 
22Thomas W. Busch, "Sartre's Use of the Reduction: Being 
and Nothingness Reconsidered": 26, 18. Note that Sartre in 
fact does not reserve his treatment of authentic human 
relationships for separate study, as he does not study them 
at all. 
23Linda Bell, Sartre's Ethics of Authenticity, 118. 
Others also seem to equate the reduction with the conversion. 
See, e.g. de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, 14; Francis 
Jeanson, Sartre and the Problem of Morality, 28; and Thomas C. 
Anderson, The Foundation and Structure of Sartrean Ethics 
(Lawrence, KS: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1979), 41. 
24 Kerry Walters, "A Recovery of Innocence: The Dynamics 
of Sartrean Radical Conversion": 358-377. 
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Cahiers, we may remember, Sartre tells us that the "pursuit 
of being is hell, " and that Being and Nothingness was an 
"ontology before conversion. 1125 
What is the relationship between reduction and conversion 
in Sartre? Sartre tells us in Being and Nothingness that the 
work is writ ten as a description of accessory or impure 
reflection rather than a description of pure reflection. 26 
Therefore, all consciousness described in Being and Nothing-
ness would be immersed in bad faith, unable to imbibe the 
breath of pure reflective consciousness unless the reduction 
was effected. As a result of the reduction, consciousness 
comes to realize (know) the project that it is. Consciousness 
recognizes that it is the project of "assimilating and making 
27 
an object of the Other," that it is the project of the 
f . b . 28 recovery o its eing. Prior to this reflective katharsis, 
the for-itself is not aware that it seeks to be being: "There 
is no consciousness of this being [the unrealizable ideal] 
since it haunts non-thetic [pre-reflective] self-conscious-
ness. "
29 Note here that Sartre says "no consciousness of, " 
not "no knowledge of." This means, precisely, that at no time 
25 Jean-Paul Sartre, Cahiers pour une morale (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1983), 42, 13. Hereafter referred to as Cahiers. 
26 . Being and Nothingness, 581. 
27 . Being and Nothingness, 363. 
2aB . eing and Nothingness, 364. 
2sB . eing and Nothingness, 90. 
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could consciousness have knowledge of the unrealizable ideal 
of the recovery of being, since knowledge is the result only 
of a reflective focusing upon that which consciousness was 
heretofore nonpositionally aware of. One cannot become 
positionally (reflectively) aware of (know) that of which one 
was not previously nonpositionally aware (conscious of): 
reflectivity (knowledge) is a tributary of the river of 
nonreflectivity (awareness, consciousness) . Awareness 
(consciousness) circumscribes knowing, therefore, awareness 
circumscribes potential modes of being. 
The reduction brings this nonthetic unrealizable before 
the gaze of consciousness (or does it?) so that consciousness 
may therefore realize the project that is its own being. It 
is a revelation of self, for I am my project. This unrealiz-
able ideal haunts my being as that which I must be, and is in 
I ' ' II 30 no sense 'imaginary. For I am my unrealizable ideal in 
the mode of not being it or I am not it at all, since I cannot 
be anything other than the attempt to be. The unrealizable 
ideal appears as an imperative, since it appears to me as "to 
be realized. 1131 I recognize this previously pre-reflective 
imperative for what it is after my consciousness is purged, so 
to speak, by the phenomenological reduction. It is at this 
point.that I acquire a "bad conscience," which is synonymous 
with consciousness of bad faith, the ideal of which is 
30
cf. Being and Nothingness, 527. 
31B ' d N h' 528 eing an ot ingness, . 
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" ... taking toward oneself the point of view of the Other [a 
self-judgement] . 1132 This, of course, is also the goal of 
impure reflection, and it is for this reason that impure 
reflection exhibits bad faith in the weak sense. I have a 
"bad conscience" (bad faith) because I realize that I have 
been attempting to objectify myself, deny my own freedom, and 
surreptitiously and inexorably pursue an unrealistic ideal. 
The ideal of a "good conscience" (good faith) as it presents 
itself to me at this time would entail the cessation of the 
project that involves the fusion of this triad. 
In the Psychology of Imagination, Sartre makes clear that 
"After the phenomenological reduction ... consciousness ... un-
veils itself to our reflective descriptions. "33 The reduc-
tion and pure reflectivity thus amount to the same thing, and 
by this means we purge consciousness of bad faith (if we 
squarely face the task of becoming authentic, rather than 
retreating into the nebulous nether world of the pre-reflec-
tive/impure reflective) . In Being and Nothingness, the 
reduction is that which is indispensable for the practice of 
existential psychoanalysis. Sartre makes many claims regard-
ing this psychoanalysis, his own non-Freudian type of psycho-
analysis, among them that 
32Being and Nothingness, 527. 
33The Psychology of Imagination, 259. 
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Thus existential psychoanalysis is moral description, 
for it releases to us the ethical meaning of various 
h . 34 uman proJects. 
The principle result of existential psychoanalysis must 
be to make us repudiate the spirit of seriousness.":rs--
Existential psychoanalysis is going to reveal to man 
the real goal of his pursuit ... this psychoanalysis may 
function as a means of deliverance and salvation. 36 
Notice the following about these passages: 
(A) The normative standard invoked, i.e. the necessary 
repudiation of the God-project (deliverance from the spirit of 
seriousness) . 
(B) The tentative nature of deliverance and salvation. That 
is, in spite of the fact that existential psychoanalysis DOES 
reveal to us (reflectively) our own bad faith (via moral 
description) , DOES acquaint us with our passion (the God-
proj ect), it MAY OR MAY NOT operate as a means of deliverance 
and salvation. This is the same thing as saying the reduction 
is possible, and that the conversion may or may not be 
possible. Therefore, we can conclude that the two notions are 
separate ones in Sartre's mind, and that the second may not 
even be possible, that is, that it may be another Sartrean 
unrealizable ideal, albeit one that would allow one to get out 
of hell, since one would no longer pursue being but free-
34Being and Nothingness, 626. Underlining mine. 
35Ibid. Underlining mine. 
36Ibid., 626, 627. Underlining mine. 
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37 dom. Once consciousness makes the reflective turn upon 
itself which comprises the phenomenological reduction, it 
opens itself to anguish, to fear. For it then recognizes the 
inexorable nature of its freedom while concomitantly recogniz-
ing that it is not the author of this very freedom. One can 
. . h 38 b f d ext1ngu1s ut not create ree om. It is present as the 
negation of facticity, as the beckoning of responsibility, as 
the genesis of the ethical. The consciousness that realizes 
this becomes afraid: "Consciousness is frightened by its own 
spontaneity because it senses this spontaneity as beyond 
39 freedom. 11 The response to this fear is at least in part 
determinative of the possibility of conversion. Consciousness 
may once again flee its own spontaneity, retreating once again 
into the bad faith of impure reflectivity which characterized 
it prior to the reduction, or it can choose to respond to the 
realization of itself as the pursuit of the impossible. What 
would be constitutive of the latter response? Is the for-
itself forever immured in the pursuit of the in-itself-for-
itself, all attempts to the contrary being somewhat less than 
feckless? Is this the nadir of the Sartrean corpus, its 
horrible achilles heel? 
37Again, this too is only possibly the case. 
38Th ' ' d h at is, in eat . 
39 The Transcendence of the Ego, 100. 
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In section B of part one, I shall utilize Kerry Walter's 
f . d . 1 40 a orement1one art1c e to a great extent. I find it to be 
the most inclusive and accurate rendition of the Sartrean 
processes of reduction and conversion. 41 Walters tells us 
that "The progression [from the reduction to the conversion] 
is not an inevitable one, in the sense that anyone who 
acquires pure reflection will automatically undergo a conver-
sion, nor even that anyone who undergoes the conversion will 
sustain it in her future • 42 actions." Now, the notion of 
"undergoing" either the reduction or the conversion indicates 
passivity. For Sartre, consciousness is all activity, all 
spontaneity, having no inertia. Furthermore, nothing can act 
upon consciousness save consciousness itself. Therefore, all 
connotations of passivity must be expunged in relation to 
consciousness itself, and in particular in relation to the 
notions of reduction and conversion. Assuming that the 
phenomenological reduction has been effected upon conscious-
ness by itself, what then can be said of the conversion? This 
is the very question I shall delve into in section B. 
Section B 
Conversion and Authenticity in Sartre 
40 
"A Recovery of Innocence: The Dynamics of Sartrean 
Radical Conversion." 
41With a major flaw, to which we shall attend momentarily. 
42Ibid., 359. Underlining mine. 
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The authentic individual, for Sartre, is the converted 
. d. . d 1 43 in 1v1 ua . The authentic individual knows of the god-
project which he is, and no longer wishes to pursue this 
unrealizable. 44 The authentic, converted individual no longer 
seeks to appropriate being, but seeks instead freedom as an 
45 
end. Phyllis Sutton Morris equates authenticity with lack 
of self-deception. 46 This is not enough, since one could 
most certainly recognize his pursuit of being and therefore 
not be in bad faith, yet still engage in such a pursuit. This 
is why a clear distinction between the reduction and the 
conversion must be made. The reduced individual recognizes 
that he is the pursuit of being (awareness); the converted, 
authentic individual abandons this very project (praxis) . The 
abyss between the two is enormous, comparable to that between 
Lazarus and the rich man. 47 Carole Haynes-Curtis has likened 
the "radical conversion" to the Kierkegaardian "leap of 
faith, " but she has not attempted to produce a strict argument 
43c h' a 1ers, 42. 
44 
"The Last Words of Jean-Paul Sartre, An Interview with 
Benny Levy," trans. Adrienne Foulke, Dissent (Fall 1980), 400. 
4sc h' a 1ers, 495, 496. 
46Phyllis Sutton Morris, "Self-Deception: Sartre's 
Resolution of the Paradox," as found in Silverman and Elli-
ston, eds., Jean-Paul Sartre: Contempora:r:y Approaches to his 
Philosophy (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1980), 
30-49. She focuses on the equation of self-deception and 
authenticity on p. 44. 
47 
cf. Luke 16:19-31. 
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f h . 48 or t e comparison. This comparison I find interesting, 
and I believe it shows promise. The connection, however, 
certainly cannot be made from within the Sartrean paradigm, 
but only from within that of Kierkegaard. To say this is to 
say that there is no conversion in Sartre because the possi-
bility is delimited by his ontology. 49 
Simone de Beauvoir does an interesting gloss of Sartre's 
notion of the conversion in her celebrated The Ethics of 
Ambiguity. She tells us that the converted individual puts 
his "will to be 'in parentheses. '" 5° First he recognizes his 
will to be (the reduction), then he denies it as a basis for 
action (the conversion) . But how can I put what I AM in 
parentheses? For Sartre makes it only too clear that human 
being is this very project. 51 Is this a simple act of the 
will? Does volition allow for the alteration of ontology? de 
Beauvoir goes on to say that in the conversion "[Man] rejoins 
himself only to the extent that he agrees to remain at a 
distance from himself and ambiguous. " 52 But how does this 
appropriate and moral distantiation come about? Through 
48Carole Haynes-Curtis, "The 'Faith' of Bad Faith," 
Philosophy, 63 (1988): 269-274. 
49This, as it turns out, is in fact my view. But Haynes-
Curtis says none of this and my spelling it out shall have to 
await a later section of this work. 
50The Ethics of Ambiguity, 14. 
51
" I am the project of the recovery of my being. " [Being 
and Nothingness, 364] 
52 h h. f Amb. . 13 T e Et 1CS 0 1gu1ty, . 
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volitional recognition alone? Does this turn the Sartrean 
ld f f . 1 53 • ld wor o " ai ure" into a wor of "successful," "moral" 
men? Was it all a matter of the will, unrecognized as such? 
de Beauvoir follows Sartre in saying that to will oneself free 
and to will oneself moral are identical. 54 Morality, then, 
. b . h h . 55 is orn wit t e conversion. 
de Beauvoir continues: "To will oneself free is to effect 
the transition from nature to morality by establishing a 
genuine freedom on the original upsurge of our existence. "56 
Nature, as Busch told us earlier, 57 is the nonreduced atti-
tude of bad faith consciousness. The move to morality, then, 
is effected by the reduction and conversion. If freedom is 
"total and infinite," 58 how can I will myself free? Isn't 
freedom prior to will? How could it be otherwise? "Willing 
oneself free" involves precisely the hypostasization of self 
(the psychic) that Sartre has repeatedly repudiated and 
53
"The history of a life, whatever it may be, is the 
history of a failure." [Being and Nothingness, 481] 
54The Ethics of Ambiguity, 24. 
55But - why be moral? Maybe this amounts to asking why 
the pursuit of being is hell. Here I think Sartre is mistak-
en. The pursuit of being recognized as such is hell. This 
means that man is born into hell through the phenomenological 
reduction. The conversion? Only a matter of will? No 
symmetry here? The end of the "allegory?" 
56The Ethics of Ambiguity, 25. 
57 
"Sartre: The Phenomenological Reduction and Human 
Relationships,": 57. 
58Being and Nothingness, 531. 
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scourged. And if I can will myself free, in what sense was I 
heretofore not free? If freedom is total and infinite, in 
what sense was I "less free" before? Again, how can I 
"become" (will myself) free? In Sartrean ontology, where 
there are only two kinds of being, such an occurrence is 
f . 59 ore1gn. For I am either free (pour-soi) or not free (en-
soi) . What is this mythological hybrid that can will itself 
free? The whole point of the Sartrean corpus is to show that 
we do not and cannot have an essence, that we cannot achieve 
in-itself-for-itselfness, that the very idea of such is a 
contradiction in terms. 60 
59
cf. John A. Schumacher, "The Existential Sociology of 
Jean-Paul Sartre." Unpublished munuscript, Rensselaer 
Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY, 1985. Schumacher states that 
"[For Sartre] there are no totalities whatsoever (ontological-
ly, separation and the individual reign), though human beings 
can act as if there were ... Indeed, the challenge posed by the 
non- classical conception of materiality is to find a non-
classical conception of freedom (and an associated conception 
of social sciences) , a conception based on fusion rather than 
separation. Moreover, Sartre's disputants do not consider a 
non-classical materiality any more than he does, and if the 
classical materiality is to remain - as it may very well do -
then there is no way, I have argued, to escape Sartre's 
conclusions about human sociality, that is, if human freedom 
is to remain as well." (pp. 10, 16). Sartre's (contemporary) 
disputants may well have failed to directly challenge the 
"classical" (Cartesian) conception of materiality. But this 
does not mean that certain of Sartre's precursors did not do 
this very thing. I have in mind Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, t.o 
say nothing of Pav~l Florensky. 
60And, therefore, according to Sartre, God cannot exist. 
The parallels to Kierkegaard and Nietzsche at this point are 
almost uncanny. I am not trying to legitimate Sartre's 
bifurcated, simplistic ontology here. I am merely attempting 
to shed at least a bit of light on the issue. Could it be 
that " ... the negation of everything [which is equivalent to 
the original upsurge of the for-itself] is in itself a form of 
(continued ... ) 
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Let us at this time take a closer look at Walters' claims 
concerning the reduction and the conversion. In delineating 
the difference, Walters says that 
In short, the phenomenological reduction, by illuminating 
the essential structure of the for-itself, reveals the 
futility of the god-project. It does not, however, 
represent the abandonment of the project. That act of 
the will, clearly not a .part of the dispassionately 
neutral reduction's mandate, just as clearly belongs to 
the domain of the radical conversion. 61 
I would like to make two fundamental points here: 
(1) The will (freedom) cannot alter fundamental ontology since 
this would be an attempt to volitionally alter the spontaneity 
that we are. Freedom is the ground of the possibility of the 
will. Freedom's primordial nature is such that it cannot be 
induced or impeded by the will, but only reflectively acknowl-
edged and utilized. Otherwise, it is merely utilized nonre-
flectively. Whatever the case, it is utilized as a function 
of existence itself, rather than willing, for freedom is the 
very "stuff" of our being. If Sartre believed it was in fact 
60 
( ••• continued) 
servitude and [that] real freedom is an inner submission to a 
value which defies history and its successes."[?] [Albert 
Camus, The Rebel, trans. Anthony Bower (New York: Vintage, 
1951), 186.] Of course, with these words, the "good friend-
ship" between Sartre and Camus came to an end (1951) . "He who 
has ears to hear, let him hear. " [Matthew 13: 9] Camus goes on 
to say in the same work that "Atheist existentialism at least 
wishes to create a morality ... But the real difficulty lies in 
creating it without reintroducing into historical existence a 
value foreign to history." [p. 249] Camus translated "diffi-
culty" as "impossibility" and in one fell swoop "realized" the 
necessity of dispensing with (at least) this form of "existen-
tialism." 
61 
"A Recovery of Innocence: The Dynamics of Sartrean 
Radical Conversion": 368. 
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possible for the for-itself to will itself free, he never made 
a case for it, and based on the Sartrean corpus we do have, we 
can positively exclude such a possibility. It simply makes no 
sense for a being that is freedom to "will itself free," as if 
an additional measure of freedom could be superadded to a 
being that ~ nothing other than freedom. 
(2) The reduction is not "dispassionately neutral." If it 
were, there would be no motivation to effect or sustain it. 
"Why the reduction at all?" has no answer, especially in the 
light of the accompanying anguish. Such a naive belief (that 
the reduction is "dispassionately neutral") is relegated to 
the playroom of mythology along with such ideas as "I am no 
more than a thing which thinks. 1162 
Walters claims that the conversion is "a direct volition-
al act of the for- itself arising from reflection upon the 
reduction's revelation of 
. 63 
the for-itself 's true nature." 
If this is so, how does the "volitional act" change the "true 
nature" of the for-itself, if this nature is such that will 
(reflective) is merely a tributary of the more primordial 
(nonreflective) project which it is? The reflective scissi-
parity of the will is only a secondary phenomenon, and in no 
way can alter the fundamental structure of the for-itself, 
62 Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, as 
found in James Ogilvy, ed., Self and World, 2nd ed. (New York: 
Harcourt Brace Javanovich, Inc.), 22. 
63 11 A Recovery of Innocence: The Dynamics of Sartrean 
Radical Conversion,": 368. 
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which is wholly responsible for the form and content of 
volitional activity. 64 
Furthermore, Walters claims that 
This explicit acceptance of its non-being [as a result 
of the conversion] does not mean that the for-
itself suppresses its desire to be god; that hunger 
is a result of its ontological structure. It does 
mean, however, that the for-itself is no longer a 
slave to that desire, that its fundamental project 
64To say that the will alone can effect the conversion 
seems to me to be Sartrean in only one way: the desperate, 
futile attempt seeks to perpetuate the moral solipsism 
inherent in the desolate Sartrean world. Certainly, Sartre 
made "optimistic" statements to the contrary, but optimistic 
statements are not equivalent to a revamped ontology. Witness 
the following: "In order to get any truth about myself, I must 
have contact with another person. The Other is indispensable 
to my own existence, as well as to my knowledge about my-
self ... Hence let us at once announce the discovery of a world 
which we shall call intersubjectivity." [Jean-Paul Sartre, 
Existentialism and Human Emotions, trans. Hazel Barnes and 
Bernard Frechtman (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957), 38. 
Underlining mine. Hereafter referred to as Existentialism.] 
Sartre says this after he states in Being and Nothingness that 
being-for-others is a contingent mode of being for the for-
itself: "Being-for-others is not an ontological structure of 
the for-itself ... it is a fact ... not an essential necessity." 
(282-283] Furthermore, note that "My original fall is the 
existence of the Other." (263] See also pp. 362-412 on the 
impossibility of intersubj ectivity. Philosophically, Existen-
tialism and Human Emotions is probably the worst document 
Sartre ever published (as well as the most popular) . It is 
also the most "optimistic." I do not think this is a coinci-
dence. On page 476 of Being and Nothingness, Sartre writes 
that "The will can reach only details of structures and will 
never modify the original project from which it has issued." 
(underlining mine). This being the case, I do not see how any 
type of call for a willful repudiation of the god-project can 
do anything other than serve to drive this project to the 
nonreflective level once again (if one ever left this plane to 
begin with) . Even after the phenomenological reduction, the 
realization of the project that I am does not alter the 
scenario, for I am this project. 
is no longer the god-project, but is instead free-
dom itself. 65 
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Now, the "hunger" is not merely a result of the for-itself 's 
ontological structure, it is its ontological structure. There 
is a coextension here, rather than a causal connection. This 
is a world of difference. To say that one can act (will) 
counter to what one is is like saying that there is a "neutral 
substratum" (the "will") within the for-itself that can choose 
or not choose to be what the for-itself is. This is just 
another attempt at a reflective ekstasis, a bifurcation 
between the reflecting and reflected self, and in no sense 
will lead to a second "innocence" in which man no longer 
b . 66 pursues eing. To take a point of view on one's desire 
(being) is simply no longer to be that desire in the mode of 
being it, but is, rather, to be that desire in the mode of not 
being it. Otherwise, there would be no such desire. One 
cannot consistently take freedom for an end, cannot sustain 
the conversion (cannot not-be what one is) unless the desire 
(being) to be god is somehow obviated, vitiated, negated, 
expunged, eradicated, quelled from the heart of being. For 
the desire to be god coupled with the horrifying fear of 
freedom (the yawning abyss of the infinite) is too great, too 
65 
"A Recovery of Innocence: The Dynamics of Sartrean 
Radical Conversion,'': 369. 
66The attempt is akin to the weak asking the strong not 
to be strong. See Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of 
Morals, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1969), 24-
56 (First essay) . 
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monstrous, too boundless to be surmounted by the 11 will 11 of the 
for-itself. The conversion simply cannot be a matter of 
simple reflective katharsis and subsequent volition. Even for 
Sartre, this was only too clear. 
To quote Walters again: "In short, there is no necessary 
connection between reduction and conversion. 1167 Precisely. 
"Satan" is "reduced" but not "converted": "He" "knows" that 
which he fails to embody. Put differently, "he" embodies it 
as negation or refusal. The will. again, is always an 
epiphenomenon of the project. Without the project, the idea 
of willing would make no sense and lack impetus. While one 
deliberates concerning the making of the conversion, one 
deliberates from within the structures of an already existent 
project. The spontaneity that is consciousness thrusts us 
toward both God and the god-project. The will is but a log in 
the everflowing stream of consciousness that is the for-
itself. No, the conversion cannot be effected via purifying 
reflection and volition alone. Man is freedom, but freedom 
does not extend to the alleviation/truncation of his own 
spontaneity that is the god-project. For the for- itself 
cannot get "outside" the project that it is - this attempt at 
dissociation like the dissociative attempt of impure 
reflection - necessarily results in failure. How does one get 
"outside" the project that one is - and one is nothing other 
67 
"A Recovery of Innocence: The Dynamics of Sartrean 
Radical Conversion,": 369. 
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than this project? How does one get "outside?" Impossible, 
68 in fact and theory. 
Walters states triumphantly that the "Post-conversion" 
attitude is marked by "innocence," that it is "natural," 
"naive," and ideally, "unsullied by ulterior motives." It is 
said to be akin to pre-reflective inunediacy. 69 In this 
context, what could constitute an "ulterior motive?" How 
could this be determined? Indeed, what would constitute a 
"motive" at all? In what sense is this seamier for-itself 
"innocent?" Is "innocence" a moral term? If so, why? How? 
Whence cometh the moral sphere? If not, what is its import? 
Why should one deem it desirable enough to pursue it? If it 
is merely ontological, why call it "innocence?" If it really 
is a return to pre-reflective inunediacy, does this mean our 
reflective capacities have been eradicated (a seeming condi-
tion for true "innocence"), or do we now simply have the 
capacity to temporarily suspend reflectivity? If so, wouldn't 
we necessarily be aware of such a suspension, and in this 
sense no longer "innocent?" Isn't the possibility of reflec-
tivity the possibility of philosophy? Is this the end of 
philosophy? What? The possibility of philosophy based on the 
"fall" into reflectivity? Philosophy the result of the 
originary "loss" of "innocence?" Are we "responsible" in some 
68Note the parallel between this problem and that of how 
"objective" truth can be available to a "subject." 
69 
"A Recovery of Innocence: The Dynamics of Sartrean 
Radical Conversion,": 371. 
sense for this loss? No? 
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The reflective dissociation 
"forced" upon us? The reflective dissociation and loss of 
innocence a victimization, a process undergone but not 
assented to? Yes? The reflective dissociation and loss of 
innocence somehow our "fault?" But what can ontological 
(rather than moral) fault mean if not precisely a crevice in 
being, that is, the reflective dissociation? But why attempt 
to induce such a "fault" and subsequently remediate the same -
unless the crevice that is cloying reflectivity seemed 
somehow like a "mistake?" But what? The ground for the 
possibility of the acknowledgement of selfhood is a mistake, 
is the fundamental loss of "innocence?" 
How can this "return" to "innocence" be merely an act of 
the will after the katharsis? It cannot be, if the will is an 
epiphenomenon of the project, as I have been arguing. The 
will cannot modify the original project which I am, for it is 
constituted by that project. Conversion is ontological. I am 
freedom, and freedom is the equivalent of choice. Therefore 
my ontology, in tote, is freedom/choice. But the free-
dom/choice that constitutes my ontology cannot be utilized to 
alter that very freedom/choice in its very being. I can 
utilize my freedom to change my original relationship to my 
freedom (as evidenced in the move from pure to impure reflec-
tion - if I can choose this. It is possible that the reduc-
tion itself is not g_ choice, for if the for-itself "naturally" 
flees freedom, why would it ever effect upon itself the 
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reduction?), yet I cannot utilize my freedom to change my 
freedom's original relationship to me, for i am it. 
Walters wishes to have us believe that the Sartrean 
conversion is a "a return of sorts to the original pre-
reflective celebration of freedom which was characteristic of 
original immediacy. It is in this sense that we may call it 
f ' 70 a recovery o innocence." In response, (A) The pre-reflec-
tive for-itself did not celebrate freedom because it did not 
know itself as free. Therefore, conversion is not the 
equivalent of pre-reflective immediacy. (B) There was no 
originary "innocence" in the Sartrean world, because there was 
never unadulterated, pure immediacy. Such an idyllic state of 
innocence could be postulated only upon the assumption of a 
Sartrean "Garden of Eden." The mythic Sartrean cosmology 
grows to monstrous proportions. But no such Garden could ever 
have existed, since the original upsurge of the for-itself was 
and is an upsurge of negation: "I am not X" (Let "X" be 
anything whatever) . This, being the universal property of 
consciousness (the only such universal in the Sartrean 
description of consciousness) , negates pure immediacy or being 
71 
on any level. 
70 Ibid. 
Sartrean philosophy is a philosophy of 
71It is true that in the state of pre-reflectivity I am 
not reflectively aware of myself as the negation of being. 
Nevertheless, I am aware of this nonreflectively, and have 
access to it reflectively if I choose to effect the reflective 
dissociation. I am also nonreflectively aware of this latter 
possibility but have simply not as yet made it an object for 
(continued ... ) 
hypervigilance: "I am never that which I apprehend." 
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72 Fear. 
In "Consciousness of Self and Knowledge of Self" Sartre 
tells us that " ... [We] place ourselves ... on the level of 
morality ... starting from the moment when we reject being, 
since being has rejected us, the moment when we no longer want 
values, in the sense in which want is taken as a simple 
coincidence with self. "73 Kierkegaard certainly could have 
said this, in the sense that for Kierkegaard, value could 
never be a simple coincidence with self, for freedom gives 
birth to value, and freedom negates the possibility of 
coincidence. The above passage seems to imply that if we do 
not reject being (do not dispense with the project to be in-
itself-for-itself), we are for that very reason premoral or 
nonmoral. What does this mean? What are its implications? 
Does this suggest that none of our actions under these 
conditions can be brought into question, having no basis from 
71 
( ••• continued) 
consciousness. For Sartre, pre-reflective consciousness 
always entails non-positional self-consciousness. There is, 
therefore, no such thing as originary or recovered innocence 
in Sartre. 
72Hypervigilance: Being seen, if not by the Other (this 
is contingent) , then by the self. The latter is forever 
impure and forever existent: no innocence. 
73Jean-Paul Sartre, "Consciousness of Self and Knowledge 
of Self," trans. Mary Ellen and N. Lawrence, as found in N. 
Lawrence and D. O'Connor, Readings in Existential Phenomeno-
1.Qgy (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), 134. 
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which to interrogate in a moral sense? Regardless, Sartre 
certainly would reject the idea that none of our actions could 
be brought into question, for how then could freedom remain 
the ultimate value? 75 It too, would be relative to my valua-
tion. Certainly freedom is the basis for any valuation and is 
in this sense ultimate, but why valuation at all? 
The conversion, then, for Sartre, is subsumed under a 
well-known Sartrean category: that of the unrealizable ideal. 
Once again, we must refrain from confusing the unrealizable 
. h h . . 76 wit t e imaginary, and wonder why it is that the conver-
sion is an ideal at all. 
74 Possibly, actions could be condemned on the grounds of 
logic alone, as Sartre tries to do in Existentialism. But in 
this work he seems to assume that both the reduction and the 
conversion are realizable, otherwise he would not speak of the 
world of "intersubjectivity," and one could not respect the 
freedom (project) of the Other. What kind of indictment could 
it be, to be incriminated on logical grounds? The essence of 
the for-itself is contradiction - a being that is not what it 
is, and is what it is not [Being and Nothingness, 58), in 
addition to the fact that the for-itself is the contradiction 
of being! Therefore, noncontradiction seems at best to be a 
tenuous ground for a moral theory, at worst, positively 
mistaken. 
75Mustn' t an ultimate value be valuable in terms of 
something? What is the basis for the designation of an 
ultimate value within the Sartrean paradigm, if all other 
values are designated as such only with reference to this 
ultimate value? Mustn't such an ultimate value be somehow 
justified? If we say that freedom is the ultimate value 
because we are freedom, how does this legitimate freedom in 
any sense, especially if it is the case that our existence is 
de trap? Insofar as a "thing" exists (and freedom is a 
"nothing") it is "good," and "evil" really is a privation? 
Ontology is destiny? What? 
76Being and Nothingness, 527. 
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In Either/Or, vol. 2, Kierkegaard tells us through the 
Judge that "I do not create myself, I choose myself," and the 
lf . s . f d 77 se , as in artre, is ree om. He goes on to inform us 
that choosing oneself is equivalent to repenting oneself, a 
religious category in the presence of God. There is quite a 
gulf between the notions of choice and creation, all the more 
so since they are both on the grounds of a freedom that is 
1 d . f. . 78 tota an in ini te. The difference between these two 
notions will be unfolded as we progress. Maybe it is the case 
that Sartre is right in maintaining that the for-itself must 
"repudiate the spirit of seriousness. 1179 Sartre beckoned 
from the prison of seriousness in Being and Nothingn·ess, 
faintly sensing an Elysian field of play. For Sartre, it is 
Kierkegaard who is the serious one, it is Kierkegaard who is 
both a "coward" and a "stinker. 118° Could it be precisely the 
contrary? Could it be that Sartre is the serious one and that 
Kierkegaard is not? Could not Kierkegaard truly be the 
humorist (as he often was pseudonymously), and this be the 
final twist of existential irony? Can one be playful (humor-
77Soren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, vol. 2, trans. Walter 
Lowrie and Howard A. Johnson (Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1959), 
220, 218. 
78Vigilius Haufniensis [Soren Kierkegaard] , The Concept 
of Anxiety, trans. Reidar Thomte and Albert B. Anderson 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 112; Being 
and Nothingness, 531. 
79Being and Nothingness, 62 6. 
80 f . . l' 47 c . Existentia ism, 46, . 
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claims) can be made apart from a specific and deliberate 
grounding in nondemonstrable truth claims. 83 
To continue with my line of reasoning, I am arguing that 
Kierkegaard's notion of love and Sartrean type two love 
overlap significantly, meaning that Kierkegaard in fact 
espouses a viable existential theory of love, whereas Sartre 
does not. Sartre presents us with a theory of addiction, 
whereas Kierkegaard presents us with a theory of love. Yet 
83 . 
In the weakest rendition of this claim, I would be 
maintaining that (A) One cannot legitimate presuppositional 
truth claims from within the paradigm in question, because the 
claims themselves serve to legitimate the paradigmatical 
structure. In addition, to assume a metaparadigmatical 
approach to the epistemological legitimation of presupposi-
tional truth claims is to announce implicitly the advent of 
other such truth claims outside of any paradigm thus far 
scrutinized, and (B) All truth, therefore, is perspectival. 
These claims do not deny "objective" or (at least) nonrelati-
vistic truth, they merely make statements about how the 
"subject" can "get to" this truth. These claims, I realize, 
are complicated and sweeping. To do them any type of justice 
would require at least another dissertation. Kierkegaard's 
Johannes Climacus [trans. Howard v. Hong and Edna H. Hong 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985)] and 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript [trans. David F. Swenson 
and Walter Lowrie (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1968] as well as Nietzsche's corpus more forcefully argue such 
a position than I could ever hope to do. I urge the curious 
reader to consult one or more of these outstanding works. 
Phenomenological truth can be sufficient or even apodictic 
without an attendant so-called "demonstration." 
Furthermore, since the topic proper of this dissertation 
is addiction, I do not need to advance any specific truth 
claims regarding the specific substantive nature of love. I 
merely need to show that Sartre's theory of "love" is in fact 
a theory of addiction. It is theoretically possible that the 
scope of addiction as a phenomenological reality is so broad 
as to encompass all "types" of "love," and that not only the 
Sartrean, but in fact all, worlds are loveless. It is also 
possible that the reduction and conversion are unrealizable 
not only for Sartrean human being, but for all human being. 
If this is the case, being-addicted is coextensive with being-
human. 
234 
Sartre knows, as previously indicated, that type two love, if 
it in fact existed, would in fact constitute love, and that 
type one love is hell in the sense that addiction is hell 
because it involves the grievous, heinous pursuit of being. 
That is to say, Kierkegaard and Sartre agree in the main on 
the ideal of love, yet only the former has uncovered suffi-
cient groundwork for its theoretical realization. Love as 
well as addiction can exist in the Kierkegaardian world, but 
only the latter can appear in the Sartrean world. Existence, 
f ' ' f ' 84 or Sartre, is an imper ection, yet Sartre can well envi-
sion another scenario, where one would lay down his pursuit of 
being and be "completely visible" before his neighbor, who 
would be in turn completely visible to him. 
At this point I wish to move to a more complete analysis 
of Sartrean love, with a view to showing that Sartrean love, 
of whatever variety, 85 is in fact addiction. 
Sartrean Love as an Addiction 
In the twilight of his life, in "Self-Portrait at 
Seventy," Sartre tells us that "visibility" (truth, nondupli-
84 Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea, trans. Lloyd Alexander (New 
York: New Directions, 1969), 101. 
85Keep in mind that Sartrean type two love has been 
eliminated. All appearances of love in the Sartrean world 
must be of type one, regardless of their particular guise. 
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city, openness) is essential for concrete relations with 
others, including the relation of love. 86 Yet, in spite of 
this ideal, deception and self-deception are essential for 
Sartrean love type one (as shown in chapter two), the only 
existent Sartrean love (hereafter ref erred to simply as 
Sartrean love) . The lover must "seduce" the beloved because 
the lover cannot make the true intentions. of her project known 
to the beloved, lest the entire edifice collapse. 87 Decep-
tion is necessary: I must appear partialized, that is, as an 
object, not a subject attempting to appear as an object. 
Leni's love relation with Franz is predicated upon deception, 
' I 1 1 • • h h 88 as is Franz s ove re ation wit Jo anna. Bad faith is 
"intended to fill up the nothingness which I am in relation to 
myself, " 89 and this is precisely what I attempt to do in 
becoming the object-limit (absolute value) for the subjectivi-
ty of the Other in the love relation. 
Another salient characteristic of the bad faith that is 
in play in the Sartrean love relation is that it "affirms 
facticity [essence] as being transcendence [freedom] and 
86 Jean-Paul Sartre, "Self-Portrait at Seventy," in 
Life/Situations, trans. Paul Auster and Lydia Davis, pp. 3-92 
(New York: Pantheon, 1977), 13. 
87See Being and Nothingness, 371. 
88Jean-Paul Sartre, The Condemned of Altona, trans. Sylvia 
and George Leeson (New York: Vintage, 1963), 17, 18 and 134, 
135, respectively. · 
89B ' d h' eing an Not ingness, 43. 
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d b . f . . 90 transcen ence as eing acticity." The project that is 
Sartrean love does precisely this in that it does not seek 
freedom as an end, but rather being (the unrealizable ideal of 
love) . Yet the lover does not recognize the illusive and 
unrealizable nature of this project, for the very reflective 
ignorance of this fact allows for the possibility of the 
project. A necessary failure recognized as such would cease 
to appear attractive in the eyes of the for-itself. The Judge 
in Either/Or, vol. 2 foresaw such a scenario in his insightful 
corrunent that "If you know love is an illusion, you have lost 
everything [the possibility of being], unless you struggle 
again to fall into the same illusion, which is a self-contra-
d . . 91 1ct1on. 
Love, being for Sartre a phenomenon of belief, necessi-
tates perpetual deception and self-deception. The Aesthete 
tells us that "In illusion, the individual is hidden from 
himself [no reflective cognizance of the desire to be]; in 
mystification, he is hidden from others [the Other does not 
know that the lover seeks to incorporate into himself the 
92 beloved's very freedom]." "Love" as an addiction involves 
both illusion and mystification. A full recognition on the 
part of the Other concerning the lover's project would reveal 
a self seeking to become itself through the conduit of the 
90Being and Nothingness, 56. 
91Either/Or, vol. 2, 129. 
0 Either/Or, vol. 1, 248. 
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Other, the latter being merely a part of the circle of 
selfness. The beloved could do nothing other than vituperate 
against the seductive project in which the lover has engaged 
to bleed the Other's freedom (enslavement) from him toward the 
lover who utilizes it to fulfill himself. 93 The illusion and 
mystification noted in addictive "love" is a function of a 
certain kind of lover, the aesthetic lover. 94 
"Generally, I can assure any girl who entrusts herself to 
me a perfect aesthetic conduct: only it ends with her being 
deceived; but this is consistent with my aesthetics, for 
either the girl deceives the man, or the man deceives the 
. 1 1195 gir . Certainly this is the intransigent rule for Sartre-
1 1 . f 1 . . d . 96 an ove re at1ons, or ove is in essence ecept1ve. The 
"triple destructibility" of Sartrean love is ever present 
because all patterns of conduct toward the "Other-as-object 
include within themselves an implicit and veiled reference to 
h . h' . h . d h 97 the Ot er-as-subJect, and tis reference is t eir eat ... " 
Sartrean love, as is the case with all addiction, must be 
930n love as seduction, see Being and Nothingness, 371ff. 
94The same could be said for the ethical lover, as there 
is no inherent kinetic power within the self sufficient to 
offset the centripetal force of the love relation. The reader 
is encouraged to consult chapter two of the present work for 
a fuller rendition and analysis of Sartrean love. 
95Either/Or, vol. 1, 375. 
960n the inherent deception of love, see Being and 
Nothingness, 374-377. 
97Being and Nothingness, 408. 
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based on the metastability of deception/self-deception, but 
has as its underlying (ideal) unrealizable ideal (telos) 
nondeceptive love, which would move us into the ethical sphere 
and the reality of ethical 98 love. Sartrean aesthetic 
(addictive) love leads inexorably either to its own demise or 
to ethical love. 99 
"He who cannot reveal himself cannot love, and he who 
100 
cannot love is the most unhappy man of all." Love, for 
Sartre, demands that one conceal, not reveal, himself. Thus, 
98 h' . f 1 b h T 1s 1s o course true on y su sequent to t e necessary 
phenomenological reduction and conversion, the latter of 
which, in the previous section, has been shown to be, for 
Sartre, an unrealizable ideal. 
99Note the metalevel in play in this argument, a level 
which Sartre never explicitly deals with: The unrealizable 
ideal of Sartrean love is being. The ideal unrealizable ideal 
of Sartrean love is freedom. The real and the ideal unrealiz-
able ideals are incompatible, and Sartre knows this, yet 
continues to espouse the ideal as if somehow the conflict 
might be volitionally resolved. I certainly do not accuse 
Sartre of bad faith here (as does Richard Bernstein [in Praxis 
and Action (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1971) .] I believe he was well aware of the sleight of hand he 
attempted to effect. Yet just as freedom is the contradiction 
of being in Sartrean ontology, so the real is the contradic-
tion of the ideal in Sartrean love theory. I would say that 
Sartre lacked the heart to draw the logical conclusions from 
his fundamental ontology which remained unaltered throughout 
his lifetime, which is certainly not to say that he lacked the 
insight. "In the middle of the winter I at last discovered 
that there was in me an invincible summer. " [Albert Camus, The 
Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays, trans. Justin O'Brien (New 
York: Vintage, 19 55) , 144.] Even Sartre - even Sartre 
remained hopeful against reason - against his own reason. I 
would say again in an analysis of this issue that, for Sartre, 
both the real and the ideal unrealizable ideals were not to be 
confused with the imaginary, but were instead experienced as 
imperatives [see Being and Nothingness, 529.] It is a mistake 
to confuse the true with the beautiful. 
~0Either/Or, vol. 2, 164. 
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for Sartre, all consciousness is inevitably "unhappy" con-
sciousness. Love based on concealment is not love, but rather 
addiction. A clandestine and sordid attempt at ontological 
f . 101 USJ.On. 
"Only when one knows what one loves does one truly 
1 II 102 ove. For Sartre, love is in principle deceptive/self-
deceptive. The lover engages in a series of ruses to "pre-
vent" the lover from "waking up." Sartre is the inverse of 
the Judge, the ethical lover in Either/Or, vol. 2, just as 
addiction is the inverse of love. The incompatibility of the 
two manifests the either/or nature of the relation. Kierke-
gaard tells us through the mouthpiece of Climacus in the 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript that "All love is affected 
by illusion, but when love is interpenetrated with a God-
relationship this imperfection of illusion disappears. "103 
Kierkegaard recognizes the illusion inherent in all love, and 
does not discount this existential phenomenon. In fact, 
noting the above, he tells us that this illusion is so 
powerful that human being in its own subjectivity cannot be 
104 freed of it - without recourse to the Ground. 
10111 Fusion 11 as the interfacing of the for-itself and the 
in-itself in "God." 
102 
• h I 1 f E . h F I Th A f Eit er Or, vo . 2, 111. c . ric romm s e rt o 
Loving (New York: Harper and Row, 1958). 
103c 1 d · · · f · · t 52 one u ing Unscienti ic Postscrip , . 
104This argument is similar to that of Descartes. in his 
Meditations. Here Descartes says that the only way one can be 
(continued ... ) 
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"This perpetual act by which the in-itself degenerates 
into presence to itself we shall call an ontological act. 
Nothingness is the putting into question of being by be-
, II 105 1ng. In Sartrean love, the lover seeks to become the 
"absolute value" for the beloved and thereby become the limit 
of his freedom. Absolute value suppresses freedom since the 
origin of value is freedom. But absolute value would be 
coincident with being (which represents the object state the 
lover seeks to "become" for the beloved), and being is the 
106 
absence of freedom. Sartrean love, which we construe as 
104 ( • d) 
... continue 
sure that one is not deceived is through belief in an all 
powerful and benevolent (i.e. Judeo-Christian) God who would 
not suffer His creatures to be involuntarily deluded - at 
least not for an extensive period of time - concerning the 
nature of reality. Does this form of argument "work" for 
Kierkegaard? By means of an indirect proof we can say (A) All 
love involves illusion; (B) Sartre's ontology precludes 
eradication of this illusion, and, in fact, predicates "love" 
upon its perpetual reality; (C) The resultant love is unpalat-
able for Sartre ("hell"); (D) Therefore, if one rejects 
Sartrean love, the world is loveless unless one adopts 
Kierkegaardian love. If Sartre is right, we are thrust either 
upon a Kierkegaardian conception of love, or left with the 
loveless world of Sartre. The third alternative, of course, 
would be to reject this indirect type proof and make a 
paradigm shift. But these thinkers do not entertain this 
possibility, and this would be another story altogether. 
Either love or addiction. Or, merely addiction. How does one 
accept the unacceptable? Impossible. We "reject being, since 
being has rejected us ... " [Sartre, "Consciousness of Self and 
Knowledge of Self.": 134.) Rejection is the essence of the 
affirmation of the for-itself. ·When explicating the above 
claims, it is important to keep in mind Otto Rank's aforemen-
tioned concept of the "god-ideal." See chapter one and 
chapter three, part one. In no sense in a transcendent "god-
ideal" necessarily external to consciousness. 
105 B ' d N h' 79 eing an ot ingness, . 
106Except in the case of the unrealizable ideal, God. 
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a functional addiction, is the (implicit) utilization ("inter-
rogation") of being attempting to prevent the interrogation of 
being by suppressing the possibility of valuation through the 
attempted absolutization of value. Being is thus not put into 
question and therefore the realization of contingency remains 
pre-reflective. For Sartre, "Bad faith is also a confession, 
since it is an effort to flee the being which I am. 11107 This 
is precisely the avoidance of the interrogation of being. In 
love, the lover seeks to be himself before God, 108 in addic-
tion, as in bad faith, one seeks to flee oneself. For 
Kierkegaard, the God-relationship negates illusion/self-
d . 109 eception. Such a relationship is grounded in conscience, 
which possibilizes love based on truth. 110 Love demands not 
ontological fusion, but telic fusion, which involves a 
recognition and respect for the freedom of the Other, and at 
the same time a mutual enhancement of both projects toward 
freedom. Sartrean love, the antithesis of love, involves "two 
hypnotists in a closed room" who each seek to bleed the 
freedom and the project of the Other into one's own. 111 
107Being and Nothingness, 261. Addiction (Sartrean love) 
is also a confession that one prefers being-addicted to being-
oneself. One can either be addicted or be oneself. cf. 
Kierkegaard's The Sickness Unto Death, 42-74. 
108
works of Love, 251-253. 
109Works of Love, 129. 
110
works of Love, 13 7. 
111With Sartrean love as with any addiction, an ever 
present danger is the confusion of narcoticization with peace. 
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Regarding selfhood, Sartre tells us that 
The self therefore represents an ideal distance within 
the immanence of the subject in relation to him-
self, a way of not being his own coincidence, of 
escaping identity while positing it as a un~ty. 112 
What the for-itself lacks is the self - or itself as 
in-itself . 113 
... the ontological mirage of the Self. 114 
The Kierkegaardian self, on the other hand, does not lack 
itself in the Sartrean sense because it is a triple synthesis 
of freedom/necessity, finitude/infinitude, and temporali-
ty/eternity which is grounded in the in-itself-for-itself 
(self) of God. 115 The Kierkegaardian self as in-itself is 
that which overlaps in the nexus of the God-relation. Such 
Kierkegaardian selfhood is not grounded in human being, lest 
this self also disintegrate into an ontological mirage. The 
possibilities of nondeception and selfhood, for both Sartre 
and Kierkegaard, are not found within one's own ontology. For 
Kierkegaard, they are found in the relation to the Ground. 
For Sartre, if such g relation were possible. it would be 
found in this Ground- relation, i.e. in whatever would function 
ontologically as Ground (the god-ideal). Therefore, the being 
of the for-itself, in addition to being for-itself and for-
others, has as a contingent ontological structure being-for-
112B • eing and Nothingness, 77. 
113B • eing and Nothingness, 89. 
i14B • eing and Nothingness, 137. 
115See The Sickness Unto Death, 13,14. 
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addiction or being-addicted. The very structure of the for-
itself as pursued ("by" being) -pursuing (being) 116 is the 
ontological structure of addiction. Only by an ekstatic 
relation to a being that would constitute (ground) its own 
freedom could the transcendence of being-addicted transpire. 
Regarding selfhood, Heidegger claims that "as 'human 
reality' is essentially its own possibility, this existent can 
'choose' [Note the word "choose" here rather than "create. "] 
itself in its being; it can win itself and it can lose 
't lf 11117 1 se . How can the Sartrean self "lose" itself if this 
self is an ontological mirage? How can the for-itself "lose" 
the self if the for-itself lacks the self? This is precisely 
what happens in addiction (the Sartrean love relation) , since 
the lover in objectifying himself (the equivalent of failing 
to choose himself) alienates his own freedom. 118 Addiction 
is a function of having no self. That is, one must "harness" 
one's own freedom, so to speak, through the reflective 
projection of oneself. Otherwise, one is indeterminate free 
being, that is, non-self. Sartre tells us in The Psychology 
of Imagination that in obsession, consciousness is a captivat-
ed victim of itself, yet " ... Not for a moment does he [the 
obsessive person] mistake imaginary objects for real 
116Being and Nothingness, 362. 
117 
' H 'd S ' d Z . t 41 t d ' J Martin ei egger, ein un ei , , as quo e in ean-
Paul Sartre, The Emotions, 12. 
118See Being and Nothingness, 375. 
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ones ... Nevertheless, something has disappeared: the feeling of 
belonging to oneself ... "119 This is a function of the fact 
that the addict has to mask from himself the project to-be-
addicted, that is, the project to alienate his freedom from 
himself. This is also the effect of the love project. The 
Sartrean lover/addict cannot give himself away and so suffers 
from the loss of self and the loss of the possibility of 
giving that self away. Both projects (love/addiction) in the 
Sartrean world demand that one's freedom be alienated, 
otherwise the true nature of the projects would be reflective-
ly conscious and signal (be at one with) the collapse of the 
project. Sartrean love beyond the metastable illusion is just 
as much a kind of bondage as is any other addiction, for both 
are rooted in the same ontological structure. 
Love is not possible in the Sartrean world because love 
must be between two individual beings. 120 Selfhood is an 
unrealizable ideal, therefore lovers pretend to give to one 
another a self that they do not have. I cannot possess 
myself, for I am not a self. 121 I cannot possess the Other, 
119The Psychology of Imagination, 222. 
120 
cf. Works of Love, 6 8 . 
121 
"He [the aesthete] does not possess himself; only when 
the world trembles [reels] before him is he tranquilized." 
[Either/Or, vol. 2, 191.] To not-be-oneself is to-be-addict-
ed. Tranquilization must be induced in the non-self,· it must 
be 11 self 11 -introjected, since it does not comprise in any sense 
other than negation the being of the addict. 
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for the Other is not a self. 122 Therefore, we must "pre-
tend," and we can only pretend seriously as long as we tell 
ourselves that pretending is the only thing we can do. As 
long as we believe our own narration/metanarration, pretense 
is functional reality, the being of the phenomenon is appear-
123 
ance. 
"A person who does not know himself cannot promise love 
f . f . h 124 out o a sincere ait . " Exactly. The Sartrean lover 
promises love out of faith - but this faith is bad faith. The 
Sartrean lover knows that he is a lack, and he engages in the 
project of love to vitiate/"justify" this lack of being. He 
does not know himself as a positivity, but as a negativity 
(i.e. negation), his "self" having no content but the inter-
rogative, the absence of being. The Sartrean pursuit of love 
intended to fill the cavity that is the ("self's") lack of 
being is the frenzy of addiction. Sincere faith is excluded. 
122 I could not possess the Other even if the Other were a 
self. The goal of Sartrean love is therefore multiply 
unrealizable. 
123The being of the human phenomenon is nevertheless 
irreducible to the phenomenon of being, due to the transpheno-
menality of being. That is, all being exceeds any and all of 
its manifestations. [See Being and Nothingness, xlvii-li for 
Sartre's elucidation of his ontological position on this.] 
But being free and the pretense of being free are not synony-
mous, therefore the possibility of the conflation of the two 
necessary for the possibility of the deceptive/self-deceptive 
Sartrean love relation. The absence of self hood may be 
discerned through a series of significations, one of which may 
be an experience of entrapment in the addictive love relation. 
124 Works of Love, 150. 
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One does not focus on the seamier side: one is the seamier 
side. For Kierkegaard, selfhood is constituted through the 
Ground. For Sartre, selfhood is simply not constituted. This 
bleeding (free) cavity that is the Sartrean self can relate to 
being in no other way than by way of addiction. The Sartrean 
for-itself, be it the lover or no, is the addictive leech on 
being, that being which attempts to inject being into it-
lf 125 se . 
"One must know oneself before knowing anything else. "126 
Sartrean type one love is necessarily a function of impure 
reflection. Since this is the case, the Sartrean lover has no 
self-knowledge in the sense of knowing his being as free 
being. Rather, he considers himself to be "determined" to be 
free as g function of the psychic objects which appear to his 
accessorily reflective gaze. The Sartrean project of love is 
predicated upon a lack of self-knowledge and is perpetuated as 
such on the same grounds, as is the project to-be-addict-
d 127 e . Love and addiction in the Sartrean world are predi-
cated upon pre-occupation, a process of deflection whereby 
125An interesting conception of the intravenous addict' s 
relationship to the needle whereby he "comes into being" (or, 
"comes alive"). 
"
6Kierkegaard's Journals, 1 
Bretall, A Kierkegaard Anthology 





127Wh ' h h b ' ' h h ' Th 1c , as I ave een arguing, is t e same t 1ng. e 
project to-be-addicted simply has broader scope,. as the 
project of love is a single mode of the project to-be-addict-
ed. 
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consciousness induces in itself and the Other a somnambulistic 
stupor via hypnagogic imagery. As the possibility of a 
sleeper awaking is an ever present danger, the love/addiction 
relation is exceedingly precarious and generally involves 
d d . d t d . . 128 esperate attempts irecte owar its maintenance. 
Kierkegaard maintains that the self is not a creation of 
itself but a choice of itself. He informs us that after God, 
the self is that which is most eternal. 129 Kierkegaard also 
states that "Not until a self as this specific single individ-
ual is conscious of existing before God, not until then is it 
the infinite self. 130 What this indicates, for Kierkegaard, 
is that the self is a synthesis of finitude/inf initude but 
that the self cannot tap into the infinitude of itself unless 
it relates itself to the Infinite. The Infinite allows the 
self to release and fully utilize that which is infinite in 
1280 k f b . . h . f . . rtega y Gasset spea s o o session in is ine series 
of lectures compiled in What is Philosophy?, stating that 
obsession is evidenced in those individuals who try "to 
substitute for their own being another one." [Jose Ortega y 
Gasset, What is Philosophy?, trans. Mildred Adams (New York: 
W.W. Norton, 1960), 252.]- This overlaps Kierkegaard's notions 
of the despairer under the categories both of despair in 
weakness and despair in strength (the defiant despairer) . See 
The Sickness Unto Death, 49-74. 
129The Sickness Unto Death, 53. This is a problematic 
claim, possibly analogous to that of "levels" of infinity. 
Yet the essence of the claim, that the self is eternal, 
remains unscathed and may be advanced (given the Kierkegaar-
dian paradigm), sidestepping the issue of the genus of the 
eternality specified. An investigation into this issue would 
most likely prove quite fruitless and certainly would not be 
in keeping with the spirit of Kierkegaardian existentialism. 
130The Sickness Unto Death, 80. 
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itself, that is, its freedom. The free release of freedom 
(infinitude) is contingent upon the substantia-
tion/instantiation of the self in Freedom (Infinitude) . 
Otherwise freedom, entangled, turns back upon itself, having 
no aim other than itself, and the self is being-addicted. In 
a draft of The Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard states that 
"To be a human being is to be a relation ... a relation which 
is [reflectively and responsibly] for itself [for sig] . 131 
The way I read this is that the self becomes reflectively for 
itself subsequent to the phenomenological reduction, and 
responsibly for itself following the conversion. The self 
outside of the reduction/conversion is the addicted self, a 
self that cannot know itself because it cannot be a self, a 




it is, ontologically nonsynchronous with its 
A proper relation to the Ground is essen-
131The Sickness Unto Death, 143, 144. 
132Related to this is the notion of "reflective grief," 
which Kierkegaard deals with at length in Either/Or, vol. 2, 
165-187. The sorrow that is reflective grief, says Kierke-
gaard, constantly and unsuccessfully seeks its "object." This 
is a function, as I see it, of missing one's self, and is the 
essence of addiction and Sartrean love. Another example of 
the absence of self is found in Kierkegaard's Repetition, p. 
221: "I belong to the idea. When the idea calls, I abandon 
everything, or, more correctly, I have nothing to abandon." 
The speaker here is a young lover. The sentiment expressed 
could perhaps be more accurately rendered "I have no self to 
abandon, therefore, I abandon everything [all existential 
considerations] and lose 'myself' in the idea [hypnagogic 
image] . " The subjectivity of the nonself is necessarily self-
deceptive (love and addiction) and deceptive (love) . 
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tial for the nonaddictive love relation. All nonaddictive 
love is grounded in the Eternal, says Kierkegaard, 133 and 
therefore can never be coopted into a nonreflective project 
to-be-addicted. 134 The relationship to the Ground is primary 
and must be the substratum for all other love relations, 135 
for only love itself can teach one what love . 136 is. Love 
involves hope because "Hope is the relationship to the 
137 
eternal." Addictive love necessarily involves the absence 
of hope, as one is paralyzed in the face of love's irruninent 
demise. The project of love (addiction) is the flight toward 
the Sartrean anti-value, a process whereby one strips oneself 
of one's own humanity, and flays one's freedom upon the stake 
Of b . 138 eing. The ramifications of the perversion of freedom 
and value in addictive love (under the guise of love) course 
through one's being as a nauseating emetic. The introjected 
love project must be pro-jected (vomited) into the world to 
disguise the anti-value in the form of value. Hence, the 
advent of the Sartrean love relation. 
For Kierkegaard, one achieves a faith relation (relation 
of nondespair) with the Infinite through repetition. "Repeti-
133See Works of Love, 27. 
134 
cf. Works of Love, 51. 
i3sw k or s of Love, 122. 
136Works of Love, 118. 
137w k or s of Love, 237. 
138 
cf. Being and Nothingness, 611. 
250 
139 ti on' s love is the only happy love." Such love would be 
Kierkegaardian or Sartrean type two love. Sartre envisages 
this type of love as the ideal unrealizable ideal, as noted 
previously. This type of love would be the result of reduc-
tion/conversion, a null set in the Sartrean world. The 
Sartrean reduction/conversion is equivalent to repetition for 
Kierkegaard, an existential condition in which bad faith is 
rooted out and the for-itself is free to pursue freedom as an 
end in itself. It "takes courage to will • • 140 repetition" 
because it is equivalent to the dispensing with the project to 
be one's own project. Both the Sartrean conversion and the 
Kierkegaardian notion of repetition involve acceptance of the 
limitations upon one's own freedom in the face of being, the 
difference being that in the Sartrean world the totality of 
being, as compared to the Kierkegaardian, is more circum-
scribed. Sartre realized that the conversion, within the 
confines of such a circumscription, was not possible, yet even 
in his last interview with Benny Levy he still sought the 
conversion as an ideal. For Kierkegaard, the self connects 
with the Eternal through repetition in such a way that the 
self itself becomes eternal. This claim, of course, is para-
139K' k d R ' ' 3 ier egaar , epetition, 1 1. 
140R • • 3 epetition, 1 2. 
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doxa: "The proposition inaccessible to thought is: that one 
can become eternal al though one was not such. " 141 
Sartre makes two claims in Being and Nothingness that 
serve to forever impose certain strictures upon his ontology 
and disallow him from shifting toward Kierkegaard: 
142 Being is uncreated. 
B ' ' fl (d t ) f ' 143 eing is super uous e rop ... or eternity. 
I wish to make but one observation here. If Sartre's major 
work is "an essay in phenomenological ontology," neither of 
144 the above claims can be advanced. For Being and Nothing-
ness must remain on the level of pure description, it must 
remain an elucidation of the contents of the experiential 
reality of the for-itself. Phenomenology is an essential 
description of being. Therefore, truth claims outside of the 
descriptive scope of the for-itself are a fundamental viola-
tion of the procedure expounded by Sartre himself. Both of the 
above ontological claims, then, are extramethodological and 
therefore cannot be legitimately advanced. Sartre wishes to 
make definitive truth claims here regarding both the past and 
141C 1 d' ' 'f' P . 508 F one u ing Unscienti ic ostscript, . rom a 
philosophical standpoint, I am not even going to begin to 
argue for this claim. It is simply a piece of Kierkegaardian 
dogma. 
142B · and N th · 1 eing o ingness, xv. 
143B · and N th · 1 · eing o ingness, xvi. 
144This is in fact Barnes' translation of the subtitle of 
this very work, essai d' ontologie phenomenologigue. See 
L'etre et le neant (Paris: Gallimard, 1943). 
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the future. This seems clearly to be a fundamental violation 
of his own methodological protocol. 
If Sartre were to ref rain from describing what is in 
essence nondescriptive, he may find himself open to a wider 
range of ontological possibilities, possibilities which he 
145 himself would find admittedly more palatable. Sartre can 
envision such possibilities, but he fails to be able to 
146 
explore them given his preexistent ontological mythology. 
The issue is central for the possibility of a nonaddictive 
love relation in the Sartrean world, and for the possibility 
of a nonaddicted for-itself. The experiences of anguish, 
nausea, revulsion, bondage, etc. Sartre describes well 
throughout the body of his works. These phenomenological 
findings serve as backward indicators to illuminate the 
preexistent ontological presuppositions laid down in the 
introduction of Being and Nothingness. 147 
Put differently, cognitive presuppositions necessarily 
color the nature of one's perceived phenomenological reality. 
145Hence, the possible superfluity of nausea? 
146 
"Mythology": Methodologically nondemonstra-
ble/extraparadigmatic. A myth may be true or false, or, 
possibly, have no truth value at all. It is simply the case 
that with mythology, knowledge of the truth value of the myth 
is outside the knower's epistemological scope. 
147These findings do not, however, demonstrate the 
fallaciousness of Sartre's presuppositions, that is, they in 
no way show (demonstrate, prove} that Kierkegaard is right. 
Sartre's findings are merely suggestive of other possibly 
valid ontological frameworks, and the urgency of the need to 
explore the same. 
253 
Phenomenology, then, cannot be a science based on primordial 
experience. It becomes, rather, a description of cognitively 
infested/presented/interpreted/discounted experiential data. 
Back to things in themselves? A retreat to the tree of life 
within the Garden? If and only if "reason" has its own 
immutable and distillable essence, separate from originary 
being-in-the-world. God was in his heaven no longer. Stalin 
was in the Soviet Union. Mussolini was in Italy. Hitler was 
in Germany - and in Poland. And in France. And the people 
needed to believe. Something. 
Sartre sets love in opposition to God in his explication 
of his play "The Devil and the Good Lord: "[E]very love is in 
. . G d 148 opposition to o ... 11 Finally, Sartrean ontology denies 
both God and love in favor of another absolute - freedom. Yet 
Sartre sees freedom without love as de trop, and life becomes 
not only meaningless but nauseating. 149 Why is Sartrean love 
in opposition to God? Because it sets itself up as the 
absolute, because, if God existed, as Kierkegaard has said, 
148Michel Contat and Michel Rybalka, eds. The Writings of 
Jean-Paul Sartre. vol. 1: A Bibliographical Life. Trans. 
Richard C. McCleary. (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press, 1974), 254. 
149 h ' ' ' k ' h h ' C I T is is in star contrast wit t e view amus 
espouses in The Myth of Sisyphus. The Plague. The Rebel. A 
Happy Death, etc., that life is meaningless while also being 
invigorating, affirming, joyful. Camus has no conception of 
a reduction or a conversion because he sees no need of them. 
Sartre, however, forever cried out concerning their absolute 
necessity ( and simultaneous impossibility) . 
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absolutized love would be a form of "idolatry." 150 Both 
Sartrean love and addiction are idolatrous because they seek 
to perform the ontological task of God and thus exist only as 
God-surrogates. The Sartrean lover seeks to be "the whole 
151 
world" for the beloved, he seeks to become the absolute 
limit of the beloved's freedom and therefore "unsurpassable": 
"As the absolute limit of freedom, i.e. as the absolute source 
of all values, 152 I am the absolute value." I am the abso-
lute value. I am the absolute. I 153 am. The project of the 
lover is the God project, the project to-be-addicted, the 
project to freely create an essence. The lover seeks to 
become the absolute value for the beloved: such is the 
unrealizable telos of Sartrean love and addiction. The object 
of addiction (love) becomes the absolute limit of freedom, 
hence one cannot get "outside" of it. 154 
150
cf. Works of Love, 70. In Either/Or, vol. 1, Kierke-
gaard also notes that aesthetic love, as the object of 
ultimate concern, is equivalent to idolatry. 
151B · and N th· 367 eing . o ingness, . 
"
2B · and N th' 369 eing o ingness, . 
153Echoing Yahweh to Moses; an unrealizable telos. 
154Note the obvious parallel to omnipresence and omnipo-
tence, the classical attributes said to be a part of the 
essential nature of God. These would also be said by the 
addict to pertain to the object of addiction. The fork in the 
road comes when we toss in omnibenevolence, said to be an 
attribute of God but certainly not the addictive object. 
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In Sartrean love, I attempt to become the object of 
addiction for the Other. 155 "I [as the lover] try to cons ti-
tute myself as the necessary intermediary between the beloved 
156 
and the world." I try to constitute myself as the addic-
tive object, the necessary object, the indispensable object, 
h h . h . f t 1 . 1 f . 157 t at w ic is necessary or on o ogica usion. Neverthe-
less, "essence is what has been. 11158 In Sartrean love and 
addiction, I try to be in the manner of an essence, trying, 
therefore, to be what I have been but am not. Thus, the 
successful project to-be-addicted (to-be-in-love) would be the 
death of the for-itself. Yet I seek life through the contra-
dietary and self-disintegrating conduit of death, forging 
backward, as I am unable to meet my freedom ahead of me and so 
coincide with my being. "Reflective consciousness can be 
called a moral consciousness since it cannot arise without at 
159 the same moment disclosing values. Reflective awareness 
of the project of the self in both love and addiction, for 
Sartre, would entail the recognition of the anti-value 
"
5
cf. Being and Nothingness, 369. 
156Being and Nothingness, 3 72. 
15711 Fusion 11 in th~ sense of "overcoming" the fragmented 
diasporatic nature of the for-itself by reference to an 
"essence" (the lover) . 
158B · and N th · 3 5 eing o ingness, . 
159B · and N th · 9 5 eing o ingness, . Underlining mine. 
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implicitly espoused the telos of both • 160 proJects. as 
deBeauvoir has this to say concerning the issue: 
By virtue of the fact that he refuses to recognize 
that he is freely establishing the value of the end 
he sets up, the serious man [as lover, ad~jct, or 
both] makes himself the slave of that end. 
For the lover (addict), the "object" of love (addiction) 
appears as the object of ultimate concern (absolute limit), 
and thus as a "necessary" choice (absolute choice; "fatal-
ism") . In Sartrean love, as in addiction, one does not become 
more free in relation to the "object," but "less free. 11162 
Imagination is the mode of communication between Sartrean 
(addictive) lovers as well as the mode of communication the 
addict has with himself. Both addiction and love are projects 
of the imaginary rather than the real self. 163 Since we 
cannot perceive and imagine simultaneously, our experience 
must flow from either the former (real self) or the latter 
( . . lf) 164 imaginary se . Love is a project of the real self, 
160
cf. Being and Nothingness, 611. 
161The Ethics of Ambiguity, 48. 
162Phenomenologically speaking. I am arguing against this 
notion in any ontological sense. Like Sartre's description of 
the experience of mi tsein in Being and Nothingness, the 
experience of "loss of freedom" is psychological in nature. 
I make the psychological/ontological distinction as Sartre 
does in Being and Nothingness, and as Kierkegaard does in The 
Sickness Unto Death, the latter when explaining the relation-
ship between consciousness and despair. The distinction is 
both crucial and problematic. 
163 f c . The Psychology of Imagination, 210. 
164
cf. Being and Nothingness, 257, 258, 600. 
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addiction (Sartrean love) is a project of the imaginary self. 
Just as imagination and perception are mutually exclusive, so 
are love and addiction. Sartrean consciousness is constructed 
such that the dynamics of both love and addiction cannot 
coexist, therefore love and addiction necessarily exclude each 
other, as do perception and imagination. "So the structure of 
an affective consciousness of desire is already that of 
imaginary • 1 165 consciousness. ' The desire for being that 
166 (through the green fuse) drives the flower of Sartrean 
love and addiction is an affective consciousness of desire for 
the object of addiction (love), thereby negating perception, 
encapsulating consciousness in its own hermetically sealed 
hypnagogic vacuum. "But if we form a second consciousness, or 
a reflective consciousness, on top of this imaginary con-
sciousness, a second kind of belief appears: the belief in the 
, f h ' I 167 existence o t e image. ' This means that the "reflective 
katharsis" operative in imaginary consciousness is effected 
only within the confines of imaginary consciousness itself. 
Hence, a captivated consciousness (as in the case of imaginary 
consciousness) , effects the katharsis (reduction) as a matter 
of fallacious belief rather than as an effectual purifying 
165The Psychology of Imagination, 102. 
166 Dylan Thomas, "The Force That Through the Green Fuse 
Drives the Flower," The Norton Anthology of English Litera-
ture, vol. 2, 4th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1979), 2410, 
2411. 
M
7The P h 1 f I · · t' 125 syc o ogy o magina ion, . 
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reflection. This game of mirrors operative in Sartrean love 
and addiction allows for imaginary reflectivity, which is 
simply another cul-de-sac in Sartrean self-consciousness. 
This being the case, the problematic of self-deception in 
Sartre is closely aligned with that of Descartes in his 
M d . . 168 e itat1ons. Cognition becomes the handmaiden of affec-
tivity. 169 This means that in Sartrean love as in all addic-
tions, the "truth" of imaginary consciousness (as is also the 
case with emotional consciousness) is a function of affect, 
not reflective intentional perception of the world. Affect is 
a necessary distortion of reflective phenomenological rela-
. . h h ld 170 t1ons wit t e wor . "Everything is symbol; I myself am 
a myth about myself: "171 a poignant statement of the relation 
the Sartrean lover has with his being-in-love or the addict 
has with his being-addicted. For if I were not a myth about 
myself, I would be nothing at all. 
The mythology imaginary consciousness proffers itself in 
bad faith is intended to fill the nothingness it is in 
relation to itself and so suppress its own anguish. Yet how 
can I suppress that which I am? I become (am) an imaginary 
168That is, how does one know if one is (self) deceived? 
Due to the insular structure of Sartrean imaginary conscious-
ness (exclusionary of perception) and the attendant "warping" 
of thought, this question becomes of utmost importance. 
169
cf. The Psychology of Imagination, 129. 
170See The Emotions: Outline of a Theory, 58ff. 
171 
' h I 1 Elt er Or, VO . 1, 439. 
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self; I become (am) an addict (Sartrean lover). "The idea [a 
function of imaginary consciousness] is the life principle in 
erotic [in this case, Sartrean] love and, if necessary, one 
must sacrifice life [freedom, consciousness] for it [the 
h . 1. ] d t. 1 . lf 172 ypnagogic ie an even ero ic ove i tse . 11 Camus has 
said that an idealist is one who will kill for an idea. 173 
The Sartrean lover is an idealist (forever forging toward the 
mythic noncontingent being) who will kill his own love (self) 
for the sake of the idea of the meaning of that love. The 
addict is the idealist who will kill his self for the nonre-
flective ideal addiction represents. The addict (re)presents 
this ideal to himself (imagination), and believes in his own 
representation (faith). 
In Either/Or, vol. 1, we see that imagination is the real 
mode of conununication between Cordelia and Johannes, the two 
"lovers" 174 chronologized in The Diary Qt. the Seducer. This 
is quite consistent with any analysis of aesthetic erotic 
love, and is in accord with Sartre's description of imaginary 
consciousness in The Psychology of Imagination: the object of 
love (addiction) is the hypnagogic image, which negates 
perception by its very existence. It could not be otherwise, 
for love (addiction} here is a fiction based on the project of 
172R ' ' h h t b ' 1 ' ' 1 epetition, 140. T us, t e me as ta i ity, trip e 
destructibility, and perpetual insecurity of Sartrean love. 
173See Albert Camus, Neither Victims Nor Executioners, 
trans. Dwight MacDonald (New York: Continuum, 1980}, 25-61. 
114 • h I Eit er Or, 297-440. 
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175 the false self. Given analysis, the similarity should not 
be unexpected at all, as the Sartrean lover induces in himself 
imaginary consciousness (autohypnosis) which gives rise to the 
mysticism of hypnagogic imagery, merely a subset of the 
parallel case of the broader spectrum of other addictive 
relations. 
Sartrean love is a despairing love, a love that is 
perpetually insecure and forever precarious. Despairing love 
is addiction. Such despairing love is evidenced in Donna 
Elvira's relation to Don Juan: nothing earthly or heavenly has 
any significance for her except Don Juan, and from the very 
b . . h . . d . 176 eginning s e is in espair. Such is the case in Sartrean 
love, as the lover "becomes" the "whole world" for the 
beloved, and there is nothing beyond the world; the loss of 
the lover is the loss of the world, i.e. affective and 
effective death. The lover seeks to induce despair in the 
beloved, that is, being-addicted. In this way, the beloved is 
bonded to the lover through an act of affective treason. 
Kierkegaard tells us in Works of Love that "Spontaneous 
love is in despair because the lover relates himself with 
infinite passion to a single individual, but with infinite 
passion one can relate onself - if one is not in despair -
1750rtega, in On Love, notes what he calls an "unexpected 
similarity" between falling in love, mysticism, and hypnosis. 
See Jose Ortega y Gasset, On Love, trans. Toby Talbot (New 
York: World, 1968), 56. 
176See Either/Or, vol. 1, 189. 
only to 177 the Eternal . " Spontaneous love 
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is despairing 
love; such despair is the equivalent of the ontology of the 
addict. Despair, we may recall, is an ontological disrelation 
in one's inmost being. For Kierkegaard, a man despairs 
because he lacks the Eternal . The "Eternal" in Kierkegaard is 
the functional equivalent of Sartre's in-itself-for-itself, 
which is the unrealizable telos of Sartrean love. 178 There-
fore, the unrealizable telos of addictive, despairing Sartrean 
love is nonaddictive nondespairing love, which is contingent 
upon the "creation" of the in-itself-for-itself. Why does one 
relate with infinite passion and thus induce disrelation/des-
pair? Because freedom is infinite. The "stuff" of my project 
that is me is my freedom and only my freedom. 179 
For Kierkegaard, love must be consciously grounded in the 
Eternal to eradicate despair, but love cannot be grounded in 
an unrealizable and so disintegrates into addiction. Put 
177 Works of Love, 56. 
178Why is the unrealizable telos of Sartrean love the 
Kierkegaardian Eternal? Because Sartre fully recognizes the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the possibility of a 
nondespairing self. The nondespairing self is the nonaddicted 
self, that is, the self that is capable of loving. For even 
the addicted lover has as her unrealizable goal nonaddicted 
love. Despair is the discrepancy between the former and the 
latter; cognizance of the discrepancy generates a new level of 
despair in which a certain level of translucency is operative 
with regard to one's being. 
179Proj ect-ion cannot be partialized short of ontological 
schizophrenia, which is the Sartrean lover/addict attempting 
to derealize via imaginary consciousness his own despair. 
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differently, the Sartrean project of love is a disintegrative 
. f dd. . 180 proJect o a 1ct1on. 
"Doubt is a despair of thought, despair is a doubt of the 
l ' I 181 persona 1ty. ' Despair is ontological, not psychological. 
It has significance in that it is indicative of something 
other than itself (being-addicted) . The Absolute is appre-
hended not through doubt, but despair, because despair is 
ontological, as is knowledge. Despair is the starting point 
for choosing oneself; choosing oneself is the starting point 
f k . 182 or nowing. The Sartrean lover (addict) seeks to hide 
from his own anguish and so suppress the despair that he is. 
Sartrean love and addiction function as the anti-value, 
leading one away from the truth of the self (despair) which 
could lead to the proper (nontruncated) utilization of one's 
own freedom - the condition of the nondespairing self. "Every 
man who has not tasted the bitterness of despair has missed 
the significance of life. 11183 Without despair, the for-
itself lacks the impetus to effect the purifying reflection 
(katharsis) upon itself, to say nothing of conversion, for 
which the former is requisite. Life truly does begin on the 
180 See Works of Love, 46. 
181Either/Or, vol. 2, 215. 
182Echoing Paracelsus: "He who knows nothing, loves 
nothing ... The more knowledge is inherent in a thing, the 
greater the love .... " Found in Erich Fromm's The Art of 
Loving, xxiii. 
183Either/Or, vol. 2, 212. 
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h . d f d . 184 ot er si e o espair. Yet the flight that is the Sartre-
an project of love/addiction is a flight from self that 
disallows sufficient knowledge of oneself for the cognizance 
of one's own despair, thus precluding the possibility of the 
realization of this "other side." "The Jordan river is chilly 
and cold/It chills the body but not the 1 II 185 sou . 
Love/addiction: the amulet worn in flight to ward off the 
"evil" of despair. Soon, Draconian measures are necessary due 
to the habituation (developed tolerance) of the addicted for-
. t lf 186 i se . 
184Jean-Paul Sartre, "The Flies." In No Exit and Three 
Other Plays, trans. Gilbert (New York: Vintage, 1976), 123. 
185 d . h . d 1 d . h . d 1 Jor an river: t e promise an , conversion, t e i ea 
unrealizable ideal. 
186Even if I kill the Other, says Sartre, there is no way 
that I can get away from my being- for-others, which still 
exists as a result of the fact that the Other existed, and 
exists now (as a nothingness). My suggestion is that, in the 
for-itself 's codependent attempt to utilize the being of the 
Other (or the object of addiction) to flee his own despair, he 
becomes inextricably intertwined with that other being. 
Sartre is well aware of this, as is Sade: "I am alone here, I 
am at the world's end, withheld from every gaze [the Sartrean 
look, whereby I am objectified by the Other and realize my 
being-for-others], here no one can reach me; no limits, hence 
no barriers, I AM FREE." [Marquis de Sade, The 120 Days of 
Sodom and Other Writings, trans. Austryn Wainhouse and Richard 
Seaver (New York: Grove Press, 1987), 412.] Better yet might 
be Austryn' s Wainhouse 's superb gloss on the philosophy of 
Sade, which could quite directly also be said of Being and 
Nothingness: 11 'The supreme good consists in living independent 
of others' [thus, no drain hole, no crack, no bleeding of the 
world toward the Other, no guilt following my original upsurge 
in a world where there are others, no invisible flight, no 
fixed sliding of the whole universe, no decentralization of 
the world, no internal hemorrhaging. See Being and Nothing-
ness, 255-257]; that being out of the question, one had to be 
clever [deceptive] , supple [able to appear as subject or 
(continued ... ) 
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"What the lover is demanding he expresses by the awkward 
and vitiated phrases of 'fatalism. ' 11187 The Sartrean lover 
seeks to induce in the beloved the fatalism of imaginary 
consciousness, the nonreflective dream state of the addict. 
The beloved's being-in-the-world must be a "being-as-loving" -
an ontologically "determined" (nonfree) condition. This must 
be a free determination of being that subsequently ceases to 
be within the realm of freely determined being - an impossi-
bility. It would be being that has (been) chosen to be 
determined "forever", irrevocably (thus, security). 188 The 
lover seeks to induce dependency in the Other in order to 
186 ( • d) 
... continue 
object, depending upon the particular ruse de jour] in order 
to live with them." [Writers in Revolt, ed. by Terry Southern, 
Richard Seaver, and Alexander Trocchi (New York: Berkley, 
1963), 58.] For Sade, "Solitude is power" - just as is the 
case for Sartre [See Albert Camus, The Rebel, 248], a power 
(freedom) without warrant, without justification, and without 
purpose. Within the Sartrean paradigm, the conclusion, 
therefore, is as follows: "I AM FREE, THEREFORE, I VOMIT." 
This may appear absurd, but it is not humorous. Incongruity 
can be just as much a source of pain as pleasure. Erotic love 
thus degenerates into "the mute nausea of my passion." 
[Kierkegaard, Repetition, 204.] Passion becomes engulfed in 
the juxtaposition of its necessity (for man is the passion to 
be God) and its own superfluity. The aim is not lacking, as 
Nietzsche says in The Genealogy of Morals. What is lacking is 
the reason for the aim (operative, of course, in Sartrean love 
and addiction). Again, a question for philosophers. Or is 
it? What do philosophers know about themselves? Or anything 
else, for that matter? Despair expropriates the purview of 
the pusillanimous. 
187Being and Nothingness, 3 70. 
188The necessity of deception and self-deception in this 
process is readily evident, for how could one freely dBtermine 
one's being? Being is either free or determined but not 
freely determined. 
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create the lover's own necessity. This ontological dependency 
on the love-object is the addictive relation. The telos of 
love and addiction is 189 11 freedom's self-enslavement. 11 The 
beloved's freedom runs aground upon the ubiquitous shore of 
the lover, the endless shore from which one never again shall 
set sail. 190 
The induced/self-induced hypnagogic imagery at the center 
of the addictive relation can be characterized in the follow-
ing ways: imprisoned consciousness, modification of attention, 
bondage, fascination, condition of paralysis, enchantment, 
nervousness, willing bondage, captive, possession. All these 
are terms Sartre utilizes in The Psychology of Imagination, 
11 th h . 1 k . f dd . . 191 a e w 1 e ma ing no re erence to a 1ct1on. Sartre 
tells us that 11 these are forms that possess the power to 
deceive consciousness 192 endlessly, 11 strikingly indicating 
the escape from freedom at the root of the project of such 
self-induced hypnagogic imagery operative in Sartrean love and 
in all addictions. The Sartrean lover seeks the "alienated 
freedom" of the Other, a desperate attempt which leads only to 
189See Being and Nothingness, 403. 
190That is, until the deception (love) is over. Ontologi-
cal lucidity is a necessary but insufficient condition for the 
possibility of a nonaddictive love relation, as delineated 
previously in part one, section B of the present chapter. 
191These terms are introduced in the text between pages 
59-101. 
192The Psychology of Imagination, 71. 
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the lover's own self-alienation of his freedom. 193 The only 
possible way the lover can hope to recapture his alienated 
freedom is through the ontological flue vent of the Other, 
since it is the Other that "possesses" this alienated freedom, 
and it is the Other that makes this "possession" evident (in 
the look} . 194 
The dependency experienced in Sartrean love and addiction 
is an ontological mirage: "There is no situation in which the 
for-itself would be more free than in others. 11195 Of course, 
for the addict to know this would be for the addict to "wake 
up" to the project. Therefore, the addict as addict never 
experiences this reality, but is left to struggle in the realm 
of imaginary consciousness. Kierkegaard does not eschew 
dependence, but relegates it to one's relation with the 
193This occurs as the lover seeks objectivity before the 
look of the beloved. See Being and Nothingness, 375. 
194This is why addictive love is only a degeneration on 
the first level, since the "bartering" ("exchange"} is still 
in kind (freedom for freedom - as an ideal} . Addictions which 
do not involve two freedoms - noninterpersonal addictions such 
as alcoholism, nicotine addiction, food addiction, cocaine 
addiction, etc. - are degenerative addictions of the second 
level, because they do not even seek in the object of addic-
tion freedom as an unrealizable ideal. Sartrean addictive 
love is a failure in principle; noninterpersonal addictions 
are double failures in principle, for, in the latter, addicts 
have even given up hope of coopting free being, but instead 
have directly sought the in-itself qua in-itself. 
195 • d . Being an Nothingness, 549. 
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196 Ground. Such dependence, for Kierkegaard, is true inde-
pendence. Independence, then, is only through the conduit of 
another, but this other must be ontologically categorically 
different from oneself. 197 
de Beauvoir's ideal of love, working from within a 
Sartrean ontological framework., 198 maintains that love should 
not involve the expropriation of the Other: "Love is the 
renunciation of all possession, of all confusion. 11199 de 
Beauvoir's ideal is in accord with those of Kierkegaard and 
Sartre, but remains unrealizable within the Sartrean paradigm. 
Love based on the telos of possession is rooted in confusion 
and is addiction. Either possession/confusion and addiction, 
or love based on the absence of both possession and confusion. 
An attempt to imbibe/ingest freedom/being is ipso facto 
addiction and precludes the possibility of love due to its 
inherent constellation of metastability/deception/self-
deception/expropriation. 
In The Second Sex Simone de Beauvoir says that 
Genuine love ought to be founded on mutual recogni-
tion of two liberties; the lovers would then expe-
rience themselves both as self and as other; nei-
196Soren Kierkegaard, The Gospel of Suffering, trans. by 
David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson (Minneapolis, MN: 
Augsburg, 1948), 197. 
197
viz., independence, for Kierkegaard, can never be 
achieved through a temporal love relation with another, or 
through a lack thereof. 
198 1 d' h k . At east, accor 1ng to er rec on1ng. 
199The Ethics of Ambiguity, 67. 
ther would give up transcendence, neither would be 
mutilated; together they would manifest values and 
aims in the world. For the one and the other, love 
would be a revelation of self by the gift of self 
and enrichment of the world. 200 
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Note the imperative/hypothetical/subjunctive voice. For the 
Sartrean addictive lover, love is not and cannot be founded on 
the recognition of two liberties. Therefore, the lovers do 
not experience themselves both as self and as other, but 
rather experience a partialization and denial of self and 
other. The lover and beloved feign the giving up of transcen-
dence even before the gaze of the self. If they could 
manifest values and aims in the world, there would be telic 
(not ontological) fusion. Sartrean addictive love is predi-
cated upon ontological fusion. It is neither a revelation of 
self by the gift of self or an enrichment of the world, but an 
ongoing impoverishment of the world through self-denial and 
the attempted enslavement of the Other. Since type two love 
is made impossible by Sartrean ontology, these conditions 
obtain in every expression of Sartrean love. What both Sartre 
and de Beauvoir want, obviously, is the realization of type 
two love. Can one desire what one cannot have? Most assured-
ly. Can one be mistaken about that which is unrealizable? 
This amounts to asking and answering the Kantian question 
"What can one know?" in a specific manner. Regardless, the 
200
simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans. and ed. H.M. 
Parshley (New York: Vintage, 1974), 667. Underlining mine. 
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possibility of an affirmative answer exists, since it is ruled 
out neither in fact or in theory. 
At this point, it becomes necessary to look briefly at 
the issue of the meaning and value of freedom in Sartre, since 
Sartrean love and addiction both involve a flight from the 
same. It is commonly held by commentators that Sartre takes 
freedom as the ultimate value, since he designates it as the 
source of all value. There is ample textual support for such 
a view of Sartre's writings. Love as an addiction runs 
counter to this very ideal, and, therefore, is open to 
excoriation by Sartre himself. From the plethora of referenc-
es as to the meaning and value of freedom in Sartre, I wish to 
replicate but a few, in concert with congruous references on 
the same topic from the works of de Beauvoir (all underlining 
mine) : 
One ~y choose an¥o£hing if it is on the grounds of 
free involvement. 
I can take freedom as a goal only if I take that of 
others as goal as well [not the case with Sartrean 
love] . As soon as there is involvement [concrete 
relations with others] , I am obliged [why is 
this?] to want others to have freedom at the same 
time that I want my own freedom [I am obliged to 
want the ideal unrealizable ideal?] . 202 
201Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions, 
trans. by Hazel Barnes and Bernard Frechtman (New York: 
Philosophical Library, 1956), 48. On this ground, Sartrean 
love and addiction are excluded from the set of legitimate 
ends. 
202E . , l' d . 6 xistentia ism an Human Emotions, 4 . 
The one thing that counts in ethics is knowing 
whether the inventing was done in the name of 
freedom [contra addiction and Sartrean love] . 203 -
... human freedom is the ultimate, the unigue end to 
which man should destine himself [therefore, Sar-
trean addictive love is negated] . 20 
An end is valid only by a return to the freedom 
which established it and which willed itself 
through this end ... freedom is not to be engulfed in 
any goal [freedom, however, is engulfed in the 
Sartrean projects· of love and addiction] . 205 
To will oneself free is also to will others free 
[Sartrean love and addiction are therefore jetti-2os 
soned] . 
We have to respect freedom .Qilly when it is intended 
for freedom. A freedom which is interested only in 
denying freedom must be denied [On such grounds, 
Sartre~n love and addiction must again be de-
nied] . 7 
The supreme end at which man must aim is his free-
dom, which alone is capable of establishing the 
value of eve:r:y end [love/addiction are illegitimate 
ends] . 208 
Man is free but he finds his law in his very free-
d 209 om. 
203 . . 1. d H Ex1stent1a ism an uman Emotions, 47. 
204The Ethics of Ambiguity, 48, 49. 
2osThe Ethics of Ambiguity, 70. 
2osThe Ethics of Ambiguity, 73. 
207The Ethics of Ambiguity, 90, 91. 
2osThe Ethics of Ambiguity, 113. 
2osThe Ethics of Ambiguity, 156. 
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The unrealizable goal of both Sartrean love and addic-
tion, as readily seen by this time, is "freedom's self-
210 
enslavement." Since it has already been shown that addic-
tion and Sartrean love both involve a flight from freedom - in 
fact, that they are this flight, we can utilize the above 
passages to see clearly that even within the Sartrean ontolog-
ical framework, 211 addictive love is still illegitimate. 212 
For if freedom is denied within the Sartrean framework. there 
is no hope of constituting oneself as g valid project. since 
freedom is the only possible source of validity. 213 Thus the 
preservation and sanctification of freedom is crucial in the 
Sartrean world. This is also, of course, true for Kierkegaard 
(but in a different sense) , for without freedom, there would 
be no self and no God. Freedom, for Kierkegaard, is an 
essential ideal and value, yet not the only ideal or value, 
nor the only potential source of 214 value. Kierkegaard 
values freedom so highly that for him "Every human being's 
essential destiny is to become free, independent, to become 
210 
' d h ' 0 S 1 Th C f Being an Not ingness, 4 4. ee a so e oncept o 
Anxiety and The Sickness Unto Death on this dynamic. 
211Not to mention that of Kierkegaard, who censors such 
freedom negation in an even more categorical and forceful way. 
212 Yet, as we have seen, it is the only ontologically 
possible love-fare for Sartre. 
213
validity =meaning, value, self-constitution, nonaddic-
tedness. 
214What b h · d d h b one means y t is epen s on w at one means y 
freedom. 
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himself. 11215 Yet all is not decided within a vacuum of 
freedom for "If the eternal is not, there is neither truth nor 
216 freedom." This is the same as saying that without the 
eternal there is no nonaddictive love. For Kierkegaard, as 
well as for Sartre and de Beauvoir, the in-itself-for-itself 
is the necessary precondition for the possibility of a 
nonaddictive love relation, 217 but for the latter two think-
ers, the in-itself-for-itself is an ideal unrealizable ideal. 
Love and addiction, we have noted, are both for Sartre 
unrealizable ideals. 218 The unrealizable ideal of love must 
be separated from the concrete praxis of love, says Sartre: 
"This unrealizable ideal which haunts my project of myself in 
the presence of the Other is not to be identified with love 
215 Works of Love, 259. 
216 h f . ( d f ) 6 T e Concept o Anxiety ra t , 20 . See also p. 207. 
217 Jean Grenier succinctly expresses what I take to be the 
Kierkegaardian view: " ... absolute freedom is the destruction 
of all value [the Sartrean framework], absolute value sup-
presses all freedom [the Hegelian framework]." The quote is 
found in Camus' The Rebel, 288. Kierkegaard's own position is 
represented between the two (Sartrean-Hegelian) poles. 
Nietzsche provides us with an interesting gloss of the issue, 
quite applicable to the discussion: " ... Hence a philosopher 
should claim the right to include willing within the sphere of 
morals [axiology, values] ... the desire for 'freedom of the 
will' INVOLVES NOTHING LESS THAN TO BE PRECISELY CAUSA SUI. 
[Beyond Good and Evil, 27-28.] But from Nietzsche's perspec-
tive, Sartre is dead wrong. For Nietzsche, "freedom as the 
ultimate value" is a ridiculous perversion of the eternal 
recurrence wherein freedom is an ephemeral illusion engulfed 
in the necessity of all things. Kierkegaard would again fall 
in between the two thinkers on this second, Sartrean-Nietz-
schean spectrum. 
218See Being and Nothingness, 365-366. 
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insofar as love is an enterprise ... But it is the ideal of 
1 11219 ove. The enterprise of Sartrean love and addiction, 
ostensibly, is exclusive of the god project, viz. its meta-
physical underpinnings are not nonreflectively apprehensible 
(visible) . Sartre's statement merely highlights the irremedi-
able gulf between what I do in the love (addiction) relation 
and what I think I do (on a number of levels, dependent upon 
the depth of bad faith) . His statement serves to underscore 
the necessity of deception/self-deception in any Sartrean love 
relation. The concrete enterprise differs from the ideal 
enterprise because in the former there is no (reflective) 
consciousness of the unrealizable ideal. 220 
Kierkegaard tells us that 
All idealizing passion (Earthly passion tends to 
prevent existence by transforming it into something 
merely momentary) is anticipation of the Eternal in 
existence functioning so as to help the individual 
• 221 to exist. 
In saying this, Kierkegaard sets up a passion dichotomy that 
could be linked to Sartre's conception of love. Kierkegaard 
delineates two kinds of passion: (A) The real ("earthly") and 
(B) The ideal ("idealizing") . (A) could be said to be the 
219B ' d h' 6 eing an Not ingness, 36 . 
220 
cf. Being and Nothingness, 9 O. There is no conscious-
ness of the unrealizable ideal prior to reduction/conversion, 
which would entail the death of Sartrean type two love. 
Therefore, for the Sartrean lover engaging in the enterprise 
of loving, there is no consciousness of the unrealizable 
ideal. 
221c 1 d · · · f · · 211 one u ing Unscienti ic Postscript, . 
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concrete enterprise of love in Sartre, with its attendant 
passion, whereas (B) would then be the unrealizable ideal of 
the love project. The Sartrean unrealizable ideal functions 
as a constant ontological substratum, in relation to which the 
concrete manifestation of love is only fleeting and contin-
gent. Such is likewise the case with the project to-be-
addicted, which is identical in form to the Sartrean love 
project but may or may not be identical in content. Idealiz-
ing passion, says Kierkegaard, helps the individual to exist; 
idealizing passion in Sartre simply helps the individual 
(addict) to flee existence toward being. Idealizing passion 
linked to the Ideal does not volatize existence but rather 
makes it possible. The passionate Sartrean is relegated.to 
cynicism and the abortion of passion as an ideal. The 
passionate Kierkegaardian creates within the boundaries of a 
formally but not materially constituted universe. The 
passionate Sartrean creates with a backdrop of naught but the 
222 
abyss of freedom. 
"The one thing that it is impossible to become is to 
become necessary, because the necessary is always presupposed 
222Camus made a point quite relevant in this regard in The 
Rebel: "Artistic creation is a demand for unity and a rejec-
tion of the world ... rebellion can be observed here in its pure 
state." [p. 253.] The artist as the addict; the addict as the 
rebel. An attempt to create a universe in which there is 
subject-object unity on some level. The inexorable and 
insatiable desire in the heart of the artist/rebel/addict for 
this unity, experienced as an ontological necessity. (Hence 
the "necessary" tone of the contingent ontology espoused in 
Being and Nothingness.) 
275 
b , I 223 as eing. ' On this point, Kierkegaard and Sartre are 
forever in agreement. Yet, for Sartre, love is an enterprise 
of becoming necessary for the Other, an enterprise of becoming 
the Other's addictive object, the goal of such impossible 
. b . 1 . 11224 necessity eing "sa vat1on. As Constantin Constantius 
said of the young lover in Repetition, so we can say of the 
Sartrean lover: "I am completely convinced that he does not 
know the girl at all ... she is the girl, - period. 11225 For 
the Sartrean lover, the beloved is merely of value as a symbol 
(conduit, conductor, circuit, transformer) for the potential 
recovery of being. Therefore, "necessity," "salvation." The 
love object is the object of addiction for the lover, as the 
lover seeks to become the object of addiction for the beloved. 
"Salvation" predicated upon addiction is a necessary failure. 
Since Sartre was tacitly well aware of this, his thought 
contains another, positive notion of salvation which negates 
addiction and type one love. This conception of salvation is 
already employed in Being and Nothingness when Sartre makes 
clear that existential psychoanalysis, as he delineates it, 
"may function as a means of deliverance and salvation. 11226 
This type of salvation would entail the dispensing with 
223c 1 d · · · f · P · one u 1ng Unsc1ent1 1c ostscr1pt, 90. Underlining 
mine. 
224 f B ' d h' 3 71 c . eing an Not 1ngness, . 
225R ' ' 185 epet1t1on, . 
226B ' d N h ' 62 7 eing an ot 1ngness, . 
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addictive love relations and would allow for type two love. 
As de Beauvoir says: 
An authentic love should assume the contingence of 
the other; that is to say his lacks, his limita-
tions, and his basic gratuitousness. It would not 
pretend to be a mode of salvation [as trpe one love 
does], but a basic human interaction. 22 
This type of love relation is not available to the 
unconverted for-itself, and conversion is not possible in the 
Sartrean world. All love in the Sartrean world is a variation 
on the basic theme of addiction, a bid for salvation, a bid 
for necessity, a bid for cosmic significance, nonsuperfluity. 
de Beauvoir writes of salvation in The Ethics of Ambiguity: 
Existentialist ethics [made possible after the 
reduction and conversion] appears [appears, yes, 
and is, finally, only mere appearance] as the only 
proposition of salvation which one can address to 
men [viz. the only proposition of salvation is the 
refusal of salvation] ... If it came to be that each 
man did what he must [that is, give up the perfidi-
ous quest for salvation, made possible only after 
reduction/conversion. Each man must give this up 
in order to be 9-. man] , existence would be saved 
[but certainly not from contingency, or from the 
possibly mistaken belief that existence could be 
anything other than contingent] in each one without 
there being any need of dreaming of a paradise 
where all would be reconciled in death [a good 
thing too, since the assumption of basic superflu-
ousness is a condition for this type of salva-
t ' ] 228 ion . 
Sartre and de Beauvoir both want "salvation." The ideal 
unrealizable ideal would be salvation-as-ontological-justifi-
cation. Since this is not possible short of reduc-
227The Second Sex, 654. Underlining mine. 
228The Ethics of Ambiguity, 159. 
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tion/conversion and reduction/conversion, for them, is not 
possible, they chose an "inferior" (even by their own reckon-
ing) form of salvation: salvation-as-the-repudiation-of-the-
attempt-at-ontological-justification, an inverse notion of the 
preceding account of salvation. This, of course, isn't 
salvation at all in any traditional sense of the word, but an 
acquiescence in the face of a superfluous, meaningless 
existence. 229 The problem is that even this inferior notion 
of salvation cannot be possibilized in the Sartrean world 
because the reduction/ conversion is not possible. Because the 
reduction/conversion is impossible, the for-itself's pursuit 
of being is inexorable, inexpungable. Therefore, salvation in 
both senses is excluded from the Sartrean world. One cannot 
be an authentic lover in the Sartrean world, and one is either 
a lover or an addict. The Sartrean for-itself, as such, is 
the addict. The Sartrean for- itself will always be the addict 
as long as, according to Sartre, "being is superfluous (de 
trop) for eternity, "230 and, ontologically, the for- itself 
balks and chafes at this. And this is all the for-itself can 
do, for the for-itself is this balking and chafing at the 
superfluity of being. The essence of the for-itself is either 
to-be-nauseated or to-be-(self)deceived (or both). In the 
latter as in the former, the for-itself is being-addicted. 
229 Thus, the greater the degree of acquiescence, the 
greater the degree of "salvation." 
230 • d h. 1 . Being an Not ingness, xvi. 
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There is no love in the Sartrean world, but only varia-
tions on the theme of addiction. In fact, it is the reality 
of the absence of the former that is the genesis of the 
reality of the latter. This is descriptive, phenomenological 
analysis. Either love or addiction. For Kierkegaard, both 
are ontological possibilities. For Sartre, addiction alone is 
the grievous alpha and omega of ontological possibility. 
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